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What accounts for the differences in implementation of IMF programs across countries and 
across policy areas? Why are some countries more effective in implementing IMF reforms than 
others, and in some policy areas than others? In this dissertation project, I argue that one of the 
most important sources of this heterogeneity in implementation lies in the strength of organized 
interests who are adversely affected by specific policies and their interaction with their 
governments. Specifically, I examine how partisan differences in the borrowing country 
governments and their electoral concerns mediate the effect of organized interests in the 
implementation of IMF reforms. Departing from common practice in the literature, I use a 
disaggregated approach to study implementation. With a novel global dataset, constructed from 
the Fund’s MONA database, I analyze implementation in two specific policy areas: labor market 
and financial sector reforms, in which preferences of organized interests and their linkages to the 
different partisan governments can be drawn from the existing literature. The results provide 
strong evidence regarding the interactive effect of special interests and partisanship. Analysis of 
the implementation of labor market reforms show that these reforms are driven by partisan 
preferences, electoral concerns and the interaction between the borrowing country governments 
and labor unions. When faced with an increasing number of strikes, left-wing governments are 
more likely to implement labor market reforms in non-election years than center/right wing 
governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international 
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commitments when labor groups are militant during election years.  Unlike labor market 
reforms, financial sector reforms are not necessarily mediated by partisan politics and democratic 
institutions in the implementation stage due to the lack of broader electoral appeal and 
mobilization capacity. The implementation of financial sector conditionality significantly goes 
down in the presence of strong financial interests, irrespective of the regime type and partisan 
ideology. This dissertation also provides two detailed case studies: the recent Fund programs in 
Ireland and Greece, focusing on the politics of reform in these countries and further highlighting 
the empirical findings.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs are an essential tool for international organizations 
(IOs) to improve the long term economic stability of developing countries.1 The Fund requires 
borrowing countries to implement specific policy conditions in return for the disbursement of its 
loans (Stone 2002). These policy requirements, known as structural conditionality, have become 
the basis for domestic reforms and adjustment during crisis periods.2 The effectiveness of IMF 
conditionality depends on the degree of compliance by the recipient country (Dreher 2009). For 
instance, the implementation of financial sector reforms is crucial for banking sector 
performance (Giustiniani and Kronenberg 2005). Thus, understanding the conditions under 
which the IMF reforms are implemented is critical for the success of IMF programs and long-
term economic recovery. 
Scholars have shown that non-compliance with structural conditionality is common 
(Stone 2002, Nsouli, Atoian et al. 2004, Stone 2008, Pop‐Eleches 2009, Edwards and Martin 
2010). Compliance is contingent upon a variety of factors, such as worsening macroeconomic 
conditions such as fiscal deficits, current account imbalances and slow GDP growth (Nsouli, 
Atoian et al. 2004, Edwards and Martin 2010), geopolitical interests such as strategic ties to the 
US (Stone 2002, Stone 2008), the type of crisis, partisan politics and institutional capacity 
(Pop‐Eleches 2009). However, we still know very little about which policies are eventually 
adopted and how the IMF interacts with struggling countries in specific policy areas. 
This is critical since there is significant variation in the implementation of different 
policies under the IMF (Dreher 2003, Vreeland 2006). For instance, between 1992 and 2014, the 
overall implementation of IMF conditionality remains around 61%. While only 51% of the 
pension reforms were implemented, 64% of financial sector reforms were implemented 
                                                 
1 I use the IMF and the Fund interchangeable throughout the text.  
2 The IMF Conditionality requirements include fiscal austerity measures such as raising taxes 
and cutting expenditures, monetary policy measures such as raising interest rates and structural 
reforms such as privatization and labor market reforms.  
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respectively.3 The implementation remains especially low in areas such as the privatization of 
public institutions and pension and civil service reform. Closer look at implementation records of 
these countries highlight further differences. While Greece was able to implement 70% of all the 
financial sector reforms and 80% of the labor market reforms pertaining to private sector; it had 
difficulties in especially passing legislations regarding civil service and pension reforms. While 
Irish government had difficulties in implementing reforms pertaining to financial sector 
privatization and restructuring (60%), it was more effective in pushing for financial sector 
regulations (91%). 
 These observations raise important questions: What accounts for the differences in 
implementation across countries and across policy areas? Why do some countries are more 
effective in implementing IMF reforms than others, and in some policy areas than others? In this 
dissertation project, I argue that one of the most important sources of this heterogeneity in 
implementation lies in the strength of organized interests who are adversely affected by specific 
policies and their interaction with their governments. Specifically, I examine how partisan 
differences in the borrowing country governments and their electoral concerns mediate the effect 
of organized interests in the implementation of IMF reforms.  
 This study argues that the implementation of IMF reforms should be analyzed at a 
disaggregated level by analyzing specific policy areas in which different organized interests have 
distinct effects. The IMF structural conditionality spans many dimensions and the distributional 
consequences of each specific reform vary with these policy dimensions (Vreeland 2006). Thus 
the implementation of IMF reforms are politically contentions and governments, more often than 
not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups and voters. Indeed, scholarly work has 
shown that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult 
reforms (Vreeland 2003). However, the research on the implementation of IMF conditionality 
requirements in general fails to capture the particular contentions and dynamics surrounding 
specific policy conditions. For instance, while labor unions may be relevant for understanding 
the implementation of labor market reforms, the interests of the banking sector are more relevant 
in the reforms pertaining to the financial sector. Although previous literature assumes that 
different organized interests may have different preferences, they fail to directly model these 
                                                 
3 These are based on the authors’ own coding of the IMF conditionality from the MONA 
database.  
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differences (Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012). Accordingly, each organized interest group is not 
necessarily interested in every reform in the program but is most likely to focus on the reforms 
that directly affect their welfare. Thus, the borrowing countries’ domestic political characteristics 
such as the ideology of the government, strength of different interest groups, their access to 
political apparatus and institutional structure would influence implementation in different areas. 
There is, thus, a remaining need to systematically investigate when and how governments take 
on strong interest groups4 that oppose particular IMF reforms. 
 This study focuses on specific groups, their preferences, and their effect on 
implementation. Specifically, one important link that provides access to the decision makers for 
the organized interests is studied: partisan orientation of the decision makers. How does the 
nature of the interaction between the domestic stakeholders and the government partisanship 
matter for the implementation of IMF conditionality in policy specific areas? That is why this 
study focuses on two policy areas, which are theorized to be driven by partisan preferences and 
electoral concerns: labor market and financial sector reforms. Labor market policy includes 
reforms in labor market, social policy including reforms in pension, health and education 
systems, public sector wages/employment and privatization. Financial sector reforms include 
financial sector regulations/supervision and privatization.  
 There are several reasons for focusing on labor market and financial sector reforms. 
These reforms matter have real redistributive effects on the lives of citizens in the short and the 
long run. Typical IMF reforms have crucial distributional consequences, affecting employment, 
income inequality, and social cohesion (Steinwand and Stone 2008, Abouharb and Cingranelli 
2009, Blanton, Blanton et al. 2015, Papi, Presbitero et al. 2015). Accordingly, they generate 
political backlash from the adversely affected groups such as labor unions and financial sector 
interests. Analyzing how these groups interact within the context of labor market and financial 
sector conditionality provides a window to study and isolate the effects of organized interests in 
IMF programs. Moreover, a well-functioning labor market and financial sector is critical to 
achieving sustainable long term growth (OECD 1994, Levine 1997, Siebert 1997). 
Understanding the conditions under which labor market and financial sector reforms are 
implemented is critical for the success of IMF programs and long-term economic recovery.  
                                                 
4 I use special interests, organized interests, organized interest groups terms interchangeably 
throughout the text.  
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1.1 SUMMARY OF THE THEORATICAL ARGUMENT 
I theorize the implementation of IMF reforms in the presence of strong organized interests. The 
IMF targets important sectors of the economy, especially when they seem dysfunctional. When 
organized labor is strong and militant, it signals generous welfare systems and rigid labor laws 
that increase labor costs and reduce pro-market incentives and competitiveness. Thus, countries 
with dysfunctional labor markets are more likely to have labor market reform as a part of their 
loan package. I use general strikes as an indicator of dysfunctional labor markets. When the 
financial sector is strong, the IMF maximizes conditionality to ensure the stability and 
transparency of the sector, enable access for the foreign institutions, especially the ones from the 
major stakeholders. Countries with large and dysfunctional capital markets are more likely to 
have financial sector reforms as a part of their loan package. I use capital stocks, which correlate 
with the size and importance of a country's capital market, to proxy for the strength of the 
financial sector. In summary, when organized labor and financial interests are strong, IMF 
increases conditionality to address structural problems in these markets and achieve long-term 
sustainable economic growth and development. 
Whether the borrowing country government responds to the IMF pressures in the 
presence of strong organized interests is function of partisan interests and electoral process. Left 
governments respond to low-income groups and trade unions, and the right governments protect 
the owners of the capital such as businesses as their respective constituencies. When when faced 
with reforms that are costly to their constituents, the left may be less willing to accept and 
implement labor market reforms and the right would be less willing to accept and implement 
financial sector reforms. 
However, both the left and right governments benefit from a properly functioning labor 
market and financial sector in the long term. Under IMF programs, the short and long-term 
interests of political parties and partisan governments can diverge. Despite the long-term benefits 
of structural reforms, these reforms also result in significant short-term costs to the welfare of 
organized interests and partisan constituencies. In democracies, elections cause political parties 
to focus on the short-term costs when these costs directly affect a large number of potential 
voters. Labor unions can politicize the labor market reforms and mobilize workers to vote for 
certain parties. They increase the visibility of the reforms in the public space and the political 
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costs of reforms for the policy-makers. During election years, left-wing governments will focus 
on the short-run costs of labor market reform for labor rank-and-file and therefore be less likely 
(than right-wing governments) to implement these reforms. During non-election years, left-wing 
governments will focus on the long-run benefits of labor market reforms and, because of their 
unique ability to build pro-reform coalitions, be more likely (than right-wing governments) to 
implement these reforms. 
The politics of financial sector reform are different. The short-run costs of financial 
sector reform are borne by a numerically small but economically important and politically 
influential group. Financial sector interests do not collectively organize and mobilize electoral 
groups. The financial sector resists to these reforms through their discretionary control over the 
economic interactions in the borrowing country and through the use and allocation of their funds 
(Calomiris and Mason 2003). This group exerts political pressure by lobbying governments not 
by mobilizing voters at election time. Left governments will use the political leverage of the IMF 
to implement reforms that impose short-run costs on large and dysfunctional financial sectors. 
Right governments, because they are more sensitive to political pressure from capital, will be 
less likely to implement reforms when they face opposition from a large financial sector. Due to 
lack of electoral effects, these expectations should be true irrespective of regime type. 
1.2 SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND CASE STUDIES  
This study provides a mixed method approach in understanding the implementation of labor 
market and financial sector reforms and to test these expectations. The first chapter introduces 
the IMF, presents the literature review, theory and contribution of this study. By utilizing a new 
and unique dataset extracted from the IMF's MONA database, which covers the IMF 
arrangements concluded with borrowing countries between 1992 and 2014, I then provide a 
quantitative analysis of implementation.  
Chapter 2 provides a quantitative analysis of the implementation of labor market reforms. 
The findings show that these reforms are driven by partisan preferences, electoral concerns and 
the interaction between the borrowing country governments and labor unions. When faced with 
an increasing number of strikes, perhaps counterintuitively, left-wing governments are more 
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likely to implement labor market reforms in non-election years than center/right wing 
governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international 
commitments when labor groups are militant during election years. Left governments are less 
likely to accept and implement labor market conditionality when labor is militant during election 
years. These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions with 
regards to the labor market and its trade-off between long-term goals of having a healthy labor 
market and short term incentives to win elections and appeal to the party base.  
Chapter 3 provides a quantitative analysis of the implementation of financial sector 
reforms and shows the effect of strong financial interests on the design and implementation of 
financial sector conditionality. When the share of the financial/business interests in the GDP 
increases, it is more likely that the program will include financial sector conditionality. This 
confirms the expectation that the IMF maximizes conditionality when the financial sector is 
strong. Moreover, the programs that are signed by the left wing governments are more likely to 
have financial sector conditions than the programs signed by the right wing governments. Unlike 
labor market reforms, the effect of the financial sector is not necessarily mediated by the partisan 
politics and democratic institutions in the implementation stage due to lack of broader electoral 
appeal and mobilization capacity. The implementation of financial sector conditionality 
significantly goes down in the presence of strong financial interests, irrespective of the regime 
type and partisan ideology. In summary, the findings in the empirical chapters highlight the 
interaction between partisan preferences and organized interests in the borrowing country.  
This dissertation also provides two detailed case studies: the recent Fund programs in 
Ireland and Greece. I conducted fieldwork in these countries and interviewed domestic 
stakeholders such as business groups, trade union leaders, members of the government and the 
IMF mission team.5 Accordingly, these detailed cases provide nuanced insights related to 
determinants and consequences of IMF programs in democratic regimes and politics of economic 
reform in Europe, specifically focusing on labor market and financial sector reforms. First, IMF 
maximized financial sector conditionality in Ireland to respond to problems in the financial 
sector and labor market conditionality in Greece to respond to role/influence of unions and 
dysfunctional labor market practices. Moreover, while Ireland has successfully concluded its 
program, successive Greek governments faced a difficult political environment and strong 
                                                 
5 I provide a full list of my interviews in the Appendix. 
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opposition. This is explained by the strength of the organized interests in Ireland and Greece.  
The Irish coalition government implemented labor market and financial sector reforms 
without significant resistance by the trade unions and the financial sector interests. The Irish 
experience provides several interesting insights regarding the design and implementation of 
financial sector and labor market reforms. First, the Irish financial sector has been relatively 
weak and did not have significant influence over the government. Thus, the implementation of 
the financial sector reforms was not significantly opposed as expected. However, the analysis of 
the interaction between the financial sector, debtors such as the mortgage borrowers in the 
country and the government provides insights regarding particular contentions with respect to the 
financial sector reforms. The analysis also highlights the role of the bureaucracy and the intricate 
legislative processes that might lengthen the implementation of the reforms. Secondly, the unions 
in Ireland have not been strong and militant. Despite their weaknesses, the unions were able to 
gain concessions through their links to the minority party in the government, the Labor Party. 
The empirical analysis on the labor market suggests that the right wing governments would find 
it easier to implement labor market reforms when they do not face significant opposition, 
especially in non-election years. The analysis of the Irish program supports this expectation. 
However, it also highlights the unique role of the Labor Party and social partnership process in 
Ireland that enabled the unions to have access to policy-makers. Accordingly, it highlights the 
structure of the labor market coordination and its mediating effect on the organized interests, 
which is not common in typical IMF borrowers.  
Contrary to Ireland, Greece is one of the most adversarial political systems in Europe and 
has a socio-political environment that has been inimical to reform. By analyzing the 
implementation of labor market conditionality in Greece, I provide further evidence to the 
empirical findings that it is the left governments who can build pro-reform coalitions by isolating 
the militant trade unions rather than the right, which faces constant opposition and fails to 
implement labor market conditionality. Detailed account of implementation by left-wing PASOK 
government and right-wing New Democracy government highlight these partisan differences in 
their ability to implement labor market reforms. Despite its problems in the implementation of 
labor market conditionality, Greek governments have been relatively more successful in the 
financial sector reforms. This is because financial interests are relatively weaker in Greece. Thus, 
the focus on the implementation records of different governments and in different policy areas in 
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Greece highlights the effects of organized interests with respect to their policy areas and partisan 
responses by different governments. These case studies also focus on the broader politics of 
design and implementation, by focusing on how differences within the TROIKA, the interaction 
between the IMF and the borrowing country government, and the capacity of the bureaucratic 
apparatus are critical in understanding implementation records of these countries. 
1.3 CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
By focusing on the implementation of labor market and financial sector reforms, the results 
confirm that a disaggregated approach is fruitful for studying IMF structural conditionality. We 
can only predict the successful implementation of specific policy-related conditions when we 
know and account for the role of strong organized interest groups and stakeholders and their 
relationship to governments. More importantly, different policy areas are driven by idiosyncratic 
political and economic factors, especially by the partisan differences and electoral concerns.  
Understanding this heterogeneity is critical for several reasons. First, the IMF’s 
interaction with borrowing country governments vary across different policy areas and are 
constrained by the strength of domestic interest groups. While a country like Greece might have 
problems in labor market conditionality, it might easily pass legislations regarding financial 
sector conditionality. Previous work on implementation has failed to account for this within 
program variation and diverse effect of organized interests in the borrowing country. For 
instance, while a program might fail in one policy area, success in other policy areas might lead 
to positive outcomes. Thus, it is necessary to take into account heterogeneity in both design and 
implementation to understand policy effects of IMF programs.  
Secondly, the effect of implementation or therefore lack of it on certain economic 
outcomes still remains to be investigated. We need to have a systematic understanding of the 
IMF’s effect on domestic economy by integrating the implementation records in specific 
policies. Do the governments that implement the IMF structural conditionality perform better 
than the ones that do not? Does implementation in certain areas contribute to economic growth 
more than others? Does implementation in certain areas affect implementation in other areas? 
How should governments prioritize strategies during economic crisis? These questions are 
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relevant in understanding the politics of reform during economic crisis and the IMF’s 
effectiveness in introducing change in the borrowing countries. Especially during economic 
crisis when diagnosing and implementing correct recipes of structural reforms are critical, an 
understanding of IMF program design, its effects on implementation, cross-policy heterogeneity 
and interdependence enable a richer discussion of the links between political and economic 
outcomes.  
Lastly, the findings not only enables an understanding of the politics of reform under 
IMF programs but also contribute to the broader literature on international institutions in which 
domestic preferences affect compliance with the WTO rulings (Rathbun 2007, Epstein, 
O’Halloran et al. 2009), preferences regarding international trade (Milner and Judkins 2004), 
participation to the UN Peacekeeping Missions (Rathbun 2004) and positions on European 
Integration (Hooghe, Marks et al. 2002). This study also raises a question regarding 
compatibility of the IMF programs with democratic institutions. Most importantly, to the extent 
that the IMF conditions go against citizens’ and organized interests’ policy preferences, the 
success of implementing IMF conditions might be a proxy of the loss of sovereignty in a 
globalized and inter-connected economy.  
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2.0  THE IMF AND STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY 
The IMF has been the main international financial institution that provides lending to the 
countries under economic distress.6 With the aim of addressing short term balance of payments 
problems and ensuring long term sustainable economic recovery, the Fund requires borrowing 
countries to implement specific policy conditions in return for the disbursement of its loans 
(Stone 2002). These conditions, which are known as the Conditionality Requirements, come out 
of a negotiation process between the Fund and the borrowing countries’ finance ministries and 
are reflected in the official Letter of Intent signed by the executive branch of the borrowing 
government. By the approval of this letter by the Fund, the agreement goes into effect. With the 
subsequent reviews, the Fund disburses the loan in series of installments to monitor compliance. 
Thus, each subsequent loan disbursals depends on the successful compliance of the borrowing 
country.    
 The scholarly work on the IMF focuses on several important questions. An important 
strand of this literature focuses on the economic, political and social impacts of the IMF 
programs and the IMF Conditionality. Various studies documented the IMF’s impact on 
financial liberalization (Chwieroth 2009), government spending (Nooruddin and Simmons 
2006), labor and wages (Vreeland 2002, Nooruddin and Vreeland 2010), economic growth and 
development (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000, Vreeland 2003), currency crisis (Dreher and 
Walter 2010), capital market liberalization (Stiglitz 2004), inequality (Garuda 2000), human 
rights (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009), civil war (Hartzell, 
Hoddie et al. 2010) and government crisis (Dreher and Gassebner 2012).  
 Other works primarily focused on the design and implementation of the conditionality 
requirements. In its broad sense, the IMF conditionality covers two main type of policies: the 
                                                 
6 Each country holds a currency reserve at the Fund which depends on the size and importance of 
the member country’s economy. Traditionally, countries such as the US, Japan, Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom have been the largest contributors and have had the most voting power. 
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macroeconomic and structural. While the macroeconomic conditionality identifies specific 
macroeconomic targets such as growth/deficit rates, the structural conditionality focuses on 
specific policy reforms that have to be undertaken by the borrowing country government.7 This 
study primarily focuses on the structural conditionality, which is critical for long-term economic 
growth and development.  
2.1 THE IMF STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY 
The IMF structural conditions span across many policy dimensions according to their targeted 
economic sector.  
1. General government reforms: revenue measures and administration, expenditure 
measures and administration; debt management, fiscal transparency, budget 
preparation. 
2. Central bank: operations, reforms, auditing, transparency and financial controls.  
3. Civil service and public employment reforms and wages.  
4. Pension and social sector reforms including social safety nets, health and 
education 
5. Public enterprise reform and restructuring, public enterprise pricing and subsidies, 
price controls and market restrictions 
6. Financial sector legal reforms, regulation and supervision; restructuring and 
privatization of financial sector institutions.   
7. Exchange rate systems and restrictions (current and capital) 
8. International trade policy measures 
9. Private sector labor market  
10. Measures related to statistical capacity building 
11. Measures related to private sector legal and regulatory environment (excluding 
financial sector)  
12. Natural resource and agricultural policies 
                                                 
7 For detail see: https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/02/21/28/IMF-
Conditionality 
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13. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) development and implementation 
14. Anti-corruption legislation and policy. 
 By focusing on these different policies, Figure 1 provides an overview of the IMF 
structural conditionality between 1992 and 2014.8 There are a total of 13905 conditions in more 
than 500 IMF programs since 1992. General government reforms, financial sector regulations 
and privatization reforms are the most common reforms throughout these years.  
 
 
Figure 1. Total Number of Policy Conditions Across Policy Areas IMF Programs between 1992-2014 
 
2.1.1 The Design of Structural Conditionality  
Relying on new datasets created through the study of official documents and databases such as 
the Monitoring of Fund Arrangements (MONA), several studies indicated substantial 
heterogeneity in the conditionality targets, policy areas, depth and stringency (Dreher and Vaubel 
                                                 
8 This table is created based on the author’s own coding of structural conditionality from the 
MONA database.  
 13 
2004, Dreher 2004, Dreher 2009, Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012, Dreher, Sturm et al. 2013). What 
factors explain the design of conditionality and variation among different policies? The structural 
conditions attached to the IMF programs are essentially an outcome of negotiations between 
national governments and the Fund. The scholarly work on the IMF suggests three important 
explanations that determine the outcome of these negotiations and the design of conditionality.  
 First set of factors regarding the IMF structural conditionality focuses on borrowing 
country’s economic circumstances. The IMF agreements are signed as a response to crises and 
borrowing country’s relative economic vulnerabilities. The economic conditions matter through 
various mechanisms. First, the more severe the crisis, the more the borrowing country relies on 
the IMF’s financing. Thus, the borrowing country under severe economic distress would be more 
willing to participate in the IMF programs (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000, Stone 2002). Second, 
the severity of crisis and the need for IMF financing impacts borrowing country’s bargaining 
power during the negotiations. The IMF targets important sectors of the economy and maximizes 
conditionality, especially when they seem dysfunctional. For instance, when organized labor is 
strong and militant, it signals generous welfare systems and rigid labor laws that increase labor 
costs and reduce pro-market incentives and competitiveness. The most vulnerable countries and 
economic sectors with more structural problems receive the largest number of conditions since 
the Fund maximizes conditionality in the neediest countries to stabilize the economy (Pop-
Eleches 2008). Moreover, the design of conditionality is driven by the changes in the knowledge 
expertise and dominant ideology of IMF staff (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). For instance, 
Chwieroth (2009) documents the effect of neoclassical economists among IMF senior staff on 
the IMF’s policies regarding capital account liberalization. Lastly, the IMF responds to specific 
structural problems in the borrowing country and designs the programs accordingly (Pop-Eleches 
2008, Pop-Eleches 2008, Woo 2010). For instance, certain macroeconomic indicators such as the 
real GDP per capita, the government deficit and the percentage of foreign reserves affect the 
number of conditions included in a program (Dreher and Vaubel 2004, Dreher and Jensen 2007, 
Dreher, Sturm et al. 2009).  
 Secondly, the negotiations with the IMF and the conditions attached the loan programs 
are affected by geopolitical concerns and especially by the major shareholders within the Fund, 
most importantly the US. Scholarly work has shown that the US intervenes in the IMF 
negotiations during times of economic crisis by favoring its allies and the countries that are 
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critical for its economic interests (Stone 2004, Dreher and Jensen 2007, Stone 2008). For 
instance, several studies documented the link between the US financial interests and the IMF 
conditionality (Oatley and Yackee 2004, Broz and Hawes 2006, Broz and Hawes 2006). 
Pop‐Eleches (2009) extends this argument by showing that the Fund’s preferential treatment 
extends to systematically important countries, that are critical for broader regional or global 
economic stability. Lastly, Dreher, Sturm et al. (2009) show that the temporary members of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) receive preferential treatment in return for their votes 
in the United Nations General Assembly.  
 Lastly, other studies focus the role of domestic political and domestic institutions in 
mediating the effect of the IMF. These studies pay particular attention to political constraints that 
impel governments to pay greater attention to the domestic policy preferences. The IMF 
conditions involve reforms with crucial distributional consequences. Thus, they lead to political 
backlash by various actors. The scholarly work identifies the relevant actors and the domestic 
institutional structure that mediates their effects. For instance, governments can use the IMF as a 
mechanism to lock-in their preferences and evade the constraints of domestic politics (Vreeland 
2003). When the economic conditions worsen and the country requires an IMF program, the 
borrowing country governments can increase their leverage against domestic opponents of 
economic reform and push through reforms that would not be otherwise approved by tying their 
hands with conditionality (Vaubel 1986, Vreeland 2002, Mayer and Mourmouras 2008). By 
shifting the responsibility to the politically unaccountable IMF and using conditionality as a 
political cover, the borrowing country government accepts more conditions especially when 
faced with strong resistance by the vested interests (Smith, Vreeland et al. 2006, Vreeland 2006). 
On the other hand, governments that are constrained by domestic interest and opposition groups 
would be willing to bargain harder and receive fewer conditions. For instance, Caraway, Rickard 
et al. (2012) focus on the design of labor market conditionality and document the effect of 
powerful labor groups on its stringency. In another study, Rickard and Caraway (2014) show that 
democratic governments can leverage upcoming elections to receive less stringent conditions. 
Moreover, Dreher, Sturm et al. (2009) focus on the effect of the UNSC temporary membership 
on receiving conditions on particular policies. Lastly, Woo (2010), who focuses on the design of 
public sector reforms, finds that strong domestic interests reduce the number of public sector 
conditions in an autocratic country. 
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2.1.2 The Implementation of Structural Conditionality  
This review of the literature on the IMF program design provides the initial puzzle for this study. 
While the scholarly work has increasingly focused on heterogeneity regarding specific policy 
areas, the potential consequences of policy heterogeneity for implementation have not attracted 
similar attention. For instance, if certain factors regarding domestic politics are influential in 
explaining the stringency of the labor market reforms, the effect of the same factors on the 
implementation remains to be explored. Anecdotal evidence highlights why the failure to 
account for this heterogeneity in implementation records might be problematic. Scholars have 
shown that non-compliance with structural conditionality is common and is contingent upon a 
variety of factors (Stone 2002, Nsouli, Atoian et al. 2004, Stone 2008, Pop‐Eleches 2009, 
Edwards and Martin 2010). 
 There is significant variation in the implementation of different policy reforms under the 
IMF programs (Dreher 2003, Vreeland 2006). For instance, an analysis of all IMF arrangements 
between 1992-2014 reveals significant across policy differences in compliance. Figure 2 
provides a summary of implementation records across policy areas. 
 
Figure 2. Implementation Records of Different Policy Areas  
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During this period, the overall implementation record remains around 61%. While only 
51% of the pension reforms were implemented, 56% of privatization and 64% of financial sector 
reforms were implemented respectively. In fact, many case studies documented the difficulties in 
implementing privatization reforms due to intense domestic opposition (Biglaiser and DeRouen 
2011). Recent Fund programs in Greece and Ireland also highlight across policy differences. 
While Greece was able to implement 70% of all the financial sector reforms and 80% of the 
labor market reforms pertaining to private sector; it had difficulties in especially passing 
legislations regarding civil service and pension reforms. While Irish government had difficulties 
in implementing reforms pertaining to financial sector privatization and restructuring (60%), it 
was more effective in pushing for financial sector regulations (91%). The experiences of these 
countries are not unique. Overall program implementation rates range from about 80 percent in 
some countries (e.g., Brazil, Guinea, and Mozambique) to less than one-third in others (e.g., 
Croatia, Ecuador, and Tajikistan). 
 These observations raise important questions: What accounts for the differences in 
implementation across countries and across policy areas? Why do some countries are more 
effective in implementing IMF reforms than others, and in some policy areas than others? The 
research on the implementation of IMF conditionality requirements in general fails to capture the 
particular contentions and dynamics surrounding specific policy reforms, which can be attributed 
to the following reasons: the common approach of looking at the initial letter of intent, using 
aggregate measure of implementation, and the lack of a systematic understanding of how interest 
groups effect the implementation of specific policies. There is, thus, a remaining need to 
systematically investigate which policies are eventually adopted and how the IMF interacts with 
the struggling countries in specific policy areas. 
 I will first summarize the literature on the implementation of IMF conditionality and then 
focus on the shortcomings of these studies addressing the heterogeneity in implementation 
records of different policies. In the final section, I will provide a theory of implementation for 
labor market and financial sector reforms.  
 Many studies documented relevant economic, geopolitical and political factors in 
understanding implementation. Initially, the literature emphasizes certain economic factors. The 
expectation is that negative economic conditions increase the need for IMF loans, which leads to 
successful implementation. However, the empirical work has produced mixed results regarding 
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these economic controls (Steinwand and Stone 2008, Dreher 2009). By analyzing the actual 
credit disbursement by the end of a program relative to the amount initially committed as a 
criterion for implementation, Killick (1995) shows that while the countries with higher external 
debts tend to have breakdowns in their IMF programs, the ones with better current account 
deficit tend to successfully complete their IMF programs. Nsouli, Atoian et al. (2004) find that 
economic variables such as GDP per capita, inflation, fiscal deficit, current account, investment 
profile rating, size of the IMF quota, or economic growth do not have an effect on 
implementation. On contrary, other studies have shown that initial and external macroeconomic 
conditions matter (Edwards and Sebastian 1989, Mecagni 1999). 
Secondly, geopolitical interests play a role in the disbursement of loans and program 
suspensions. The research on the conditionality suggests that the major stakeholder in the Fund, 
such as the US, favor its strategic allies (Stone, 2008). The incentives for non-compliance can be 
higher for countries that are strategically and politically important to the major stakeholders in 
the IMF. In turn, the IMF is also less likely to suspend programs in the politically relevant 
countries which are identified by the size of their IMF quotas, and the availability of the US and  
the OECD aid (Stone 2002). This has been especially true for countries such as Brazil and 
Turkey due to their strategic importance to the US. Moreover, the UNSC temporary members are 
less likely to implement reforms (Dreher 2009).  
 In addition to these economic and geopolitical factors, domestic political factors are at the 
center of understanding implementation. For instance, by using the overall implementation rates 
from the MONA database, Ivanova, Mayer et al. (2001) find that the presence of strong special 
interests in the legislature, degree of political cohesion, political instability, effective bureaucracy 
and political turnover are critical for compliance. By relying on an expanded dataset, Nsouli, 
Atoian et al. (2004) find that lower levels of political violence lead to lower disbursements of the 
loan and greater chance of an irreversible interruption. They also show that political variables 
such as democratic accountability, external conflict, religious tensions, and socioeconomic 
conditions have no impact on compliance. Similarly, Mecagni (1999) points out the political 
changes and the civil instability as sources of program breakdowns. 
Within this focus on the political factors, other specifically focus on regime 
characteristics and democratic institutions. Dreher (2006) and Joyce (2003) find that democracies 
are more likely to comply than dictatorships. Joyce (2003) also points out that higher degree of 
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partisan polarization makes implementation less likely under democracies. However, Dreher 
(2006) by using a different measure of implementation, argues that these political factors are not 
relevant. Lastly, Edwards (2004) shows that democratic countries with fractionalized legislatures 
tend to have poorer records of compliance. The scholarly work, which focuses on the effect of 
electoral concerns and timing of elections, show ambiguous results. For instance, Dreher (2003) 
argues that program suspensions are more likely to occur prior to elections. Surprisingly, this 
effect is smaller in democratic countries than in autocracies. By contrast, Arpac, Bird et al. 
(2008) do not find any systematic significance of the electoral cycle. 
Moreover, not only political institutions and characteristics but also preferences of 
relevant actors in the domestic level are critical in explaining implementation. Schadler (1995) 
argues that it is necessary to have national commitment to successfully complete the IMF 
programs. Similarly, several studies, including the IMF’s own evaluations, point out the 
importance of the willingness of governments and domestic ownership (Khan and Sharma 2001, 
Drazen 2002, IMF 2011). However, what domestic ownership means and how it is formed is not 
clear. By focusing on the divergence of interests in the domestic level, Vreeland (1999) argues 
that pro-reform governments can use the IMF programs to lock in their preferences and gain 
bargaining leverage over the domestic opposition. On contrary, Drazen (2002) and Mayer and 
Mourmouras (2002) emphasize the importance of special interest groups and veto players that 
can block reforms.   
 Other studies focus on the role of partisanship. Pop-Eleches (2008) focuses on the 
interaction between partisanship and crisis. By analyzing whether the IMF’s policy prescriptions 
are compatible with partisanship of the government, Pop-Eleches shows that the relative salience 
and resilience of ideology depends on the particular nature of the economic crisis in a given 
region and period as well as on the scope of conditionality. While primarily interested in 
showing the effect of ideology on program initiation, Pop-Eleches (2008) also shows that 
partisan politics is critical in understanding the implementation of reforms. He finds that while 
the right-wing governments are more likely to implement reforms in low inflation periods, the 
center and center-left governments’ likelihood of implementation increases with higher pre-
program inflation. In his case studies, Pop-Eleches also points out the importance of organized 
labor and business groups, whose cooperation was critical for successful implementation in Latin 
America. 
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 More recently, in their analysis in the Central and Eastern European countries, Beazer 
and Woo (2015) argue that the effect of conditionality on public sector reform depends on 
partisan politics. Having the scope of conditionality (number of conditions) as the main 
independent variable, Beazer and Woo (2015) show that leftist governments undertake more 
ambitious public sector reforms when their IMF programs include more conditions; whereas, the 
opposite holds for right-leaning governments. It is the left governments in Central and Eastern 
European countries that can build pro-reform coalitions to reform the public sector. However, 
organized labor has been traditionally weak in Central and Eastern European countries (Pop-
Eleches 2008). 
2.1.3 Shortcomings in the Literature and Focus of the Study  
The scholarly work on the implementation of IMF reforms highlights several domestic political 
and economic factors. However, there is still an ambiguity regarding the nature of their effect 
since different studies highlight different factors as being relevant. For instance, the research on 
the IMF has examined the role that organized interest groups plays in the implementation of IMF 
reforms. While the theoretical work on special interest groups argues that they would be 
effective in preventing implementation of IMF conditionality (Grossman and Helpman 2001, 
Drazen 2002, Khan and Sharma 2003), the empirical research on their effects has produced 
mixed results. While Arpac, Bird et al. (2008) and Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) find 
significant effects of veto players, Dreher (2003) and Joyce (2006) find insignificant results for 
special interest groups. Similarly, while some studies highlight certain macroeconomic variables 
(Mecagni, 1999 and Edwards, 1989) and domestic factors such as bureaucratic capacity (Pop-
Eleches, 2008b), others fail to support their findings (Nsouli et al., 2004).  
 More importantly, the literature has not benefited from the recent advances made possible 
with the increasing access to the Fund official documents. Despite increasing number of studies 
on the design of conditionality explaining variation in the conditionality (Dreher and Vaubel 
2004, Dreher 2004, Dreher 2009, Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012, Dreher, Sturm et al. 2013), the 
potential consequences of policy heterogeneity for implementation have not been systematically 
studied (Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012).  
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 Several anecdotal evidence also highlight why the failure to account for this 
heterogeneity in implementation might be problematic. Many case studies documented the 
difficulties in implementing privatization reforms due to domestic opposition and bureaucratic 
processes and technicalities that lengthens the time to sell asserts (Biglaiser and Derouen, 2004). 
Moreover, on February 2010, various professional groups in Greece suspended work and 
marched to the parliament to protest against the reform aimed at cutting health spending and 
liberalizing their profession (Independent 2010). In Dublin, public sector union members took to 
the streets to protest against the public service reform measures and wage cuts planned under the 
IMF program.9 These groups have not been necessarily interested in every policy condition 
attached to the loans but the ones that have a direct effect on their welfare. While Ireland has 
successfully concluded its program, implementation process has been stalled for months in 
Greece as a result of severe opposition both within and outside the parliament. However, at the 
same time, while the IMF Resident Representative in Greece has welcomed the reforms in the 
financial sectors (McGrew, Athens 2014)10, the Representative in Ireland pointed out the 
difficulties that delay the process for similar set of reforms in Ireland (Breuer, Dublin 2014)11 .  
 These examples highlight the heterogeneity in the implementation outcomes and the need 
to take into account unique factors in the domestic level with respect to specific policy areas. For 
instance, certain economic factors such as inflation might be more relevant in driving 
implementation on labor market reforms while budget deficits would be more relevant for 
understanding compliance in public spending or privatization. Similarly, while having an 
understanding of the role of labor unions might be more relevant to understand implementation 
with labor market reforms, bureaucratic capacity might be more critical for areas that require 
greater competence to design and implement reforms such as overhauling tax or pension 
                                                 
9 These kinds of protests have been common in countries that attempt to pass the necessary 
legislations promised under the IMF programs. For instance, a report by World Development 
Movement, an UK based NGO focusing on poverty and development related issues, reveals that, 
only within 2002, there were 113 separate episodes of civil unrest directed at the IMF involving 
more than a million people protesting in 25 countries. Given the widespread of political upheaval 
against the IMF programs, we lack systematic evidence that documents whether these organized 
interest groups are successful in blocking reforms promised by their respective governments. 
10 Personal Interview with Wes McGrew, the IMF Resident Representative to Greece, Athens, 
September 2014. 
11 Personal Interview with Peter Breuer, the IMF Resident Representative to Ireland, Dublin, 
April 2014. 
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systems. Thus, the borrowing countries’ political and economic structural factors, strength of 
different interest groups and their access to political apparatus would influence implementation 
in different areas. Rather than looking at overall measures such as program interruptions and 
disbursement of loans, we need to study the implementation of IMF structural conditionality with 
a disaggregated approach that recognizes the heterogeneity in the programs and assumes that the 
determinants of implementation in different policy dimensions may not be the same (Vreeland 
2006).  
 More importantly, this study argues that one of the most important the sources of this 
heterogeneity lies in the strength of organized interests who are affected by these policies and 
their ability to affect implementation outcomes through their linkages to the policymakers. 
However, the research on the effect of organized interests on the implementation of IMF reforms 
has suffered from some problems. These studies employ imperfect measures of special interests 
such as maximum shares of seats held by parties representing religious, nationalistic, regional 
and rural groups (Ivanova, Mayer et al. 2003), the veto players in the political system (Arpac, 
Bird et al. 2008) or a dummy whether the government represents a special interest group (Joyce, 
2006). Although these factors might be relevant in understanding parliamentary oppositions, they 
do not necessarily capture the effect of organized interests, which generally operate outside the 
parliament. Even if we assume that these measures are satisfactory, they fail to address the 
questions regarding heterogeneity in the Fund arrangements and its effect on implementation 
since they fail to account for various distributional consequences of each specific reform on 
different groups within the borrowing country. Although the previous scholarly work assumes 
that different organized interests might have different preferences, they fail to directly model 
these differences (Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012). Thus, organized interests are generally modeled 
as opposition or veto players who would attempt to block reforms. It is not necessarily correct to 
assume that each organized interest group would be interested in every reform in the program. 
They are most likely to focus on the reforms that affect their welfare. Thus it is necessary to 
make connections between specific actors, their preferences and possible effects on 
implementation, which this study aims to satisfy by focusing separately on the labor market and 
financial sector conditionality.  
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2.1.4 Understanding Implementation 
The implementation of IMF conditionality is a process of interaction between the IMF, the 
borrowing country government and the relevant domestic stakeholders with heterogeneous 
preferences. The Fund is concerned with various objectives such as maintaining the international 
financial stability, its interests as a bureaucratic organization or might be constrained by the 
interests of its major shareholders. Similarly, the borrowing country governments are motivated 
by multiple objectives including enhancing public welfare, holding the office and satisfying the 
interests of their constituents. Lastly, the domestic stakeholders are concerned with the welfare 
of their constituents.  
The borrowing country government not only needs to contend with active domestic 
interest groups such as labor unions, but also with the pressures coming from the Fund and its 
donors. Thus, successful implementation of the IMF conditionality depends on the government’s 
ability to strike a difficult balance between its own economic and ideological agenda, the 
demands of the IMF and the political pressures from domestic interest groups vying for policy 
reforms. In other words, building a pro-reform coalition whose consent is required for the 
reforms to be implemented is necessary for the successful implementation of IMF conditionality.  
Existing research already documents how adversely affected groups stall reform 
initiatives (Przeworski 1991, Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The more powerful these groups are, 
the less likely that the reforms are implemented. However, since the IMF conditionality spans 
many dimensions and the distributional consequences of each specific reform vary, we need to 
directly link the organized interests to the policy areas that are in their interests and study 
idiosyncratic domestic institutional and/or political factors in each policy area (Vreeland 2006). 
Thus, analyzing politics of implementation requires understanding relevant stakeholders in each 
country who are adversely affected by specific policies and how they relate to decision makers in 
enabling or preventing formation of pro-reform groups.  
This study focuses on two policy areas: labor market and financial sector reforms. By 
relying on the existing literature, I identify the main groups who would be adversely affected by 
these reforms. Typical labor market reforms in the IMF programs may involve wage freezes or 
cuts, layoffs in the public sector, changes in the law and regulations regarding employment rights 
and social benefits. Accordingly, these types of reforms in general adversely affect workers, 
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which are therefore the main domestic interest group affected by the labor market reforms. Their 
strength should increase the costs of reform for the policymakers. Various studies documented 
the advantageous position of organized labor to pressure their respective governments and gain 
concessions by delaying or preventing in labor market reforms (Murillo 2001, Murillo and 
Schrank 2005, Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012). 
 Financial sector reforms involve stricter regulations regarding financial transactions, 
riskier behavior in the financial sector, liberalization and/or privatization of the financial 
institutions. These regulations may adversely affect financial actors by increasing the costs of 
doing business, leading to profit losses, increasing competition or scrutiny. I assume that the 
financial actors such as banks in the borrowing countries are the main interest groups for the 
financial sector reforms. There is anecdotal evidence that documents the effect of business and 
financial actors on policy outcomes. For instance, Haggard (2000) argues that the close ties 
between business and government have long been a distinctive feature of many of the rapidly 
growing Asian economies prior to the Asian Financial Crisis. Thus, when the crisis hit in 1997, 
while Korea had easier time to implement financial reforms due to its control over the banks, 
countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, where business support was a crucial element 
of the political formula, faced difficulties (Haggard 2000).    
2.2 A THEORY OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION 
2.2.1 Partisan Politics and Implementation 
Who would be more successful in forming the pro-reform coalitions with respect to labor market 
and financial sector reforms under the IMF conditionality? The IMF targets these important 
sectors of the economy, especially when they seem dysfunctional. When organized labor is 
strong and militant, it signals generous welfare systems and rigid labor laws that increase labor 
costs and reduce pro-market incentives and competitiveness. When the financial sector is strong, 
the IMF maximizes conditionality to ensure the stability and transparency of the sector, enable 
access for the foreign institutions, especially the ones from the major stakeholders. In summary, 
when organized labor and financial interests are strong, IMF increases conditionality to address 
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structural problems in these markets and achieve long-term sustainable economic growth and 
development. However, whether the borrowing country government responds to the IMF 
pressures in the presence of strong organized interests is function of partisan interests and 
electoral process. 
Partisan models of policy-making suggest that different parties have divergent policy 
preferences and respond to different constituencies (Alt 1985, Hibbs 1987). The right represents 
upscale groups such as employers, the upper middle class, the business and the financial 
community (Rueda 2007). These groups, as capital owners and high-income earners, are more 
inflation-averse and are against generous unemployment insurance. Thus they prefer stable and 
market friendly orthodox economic policies that lower spending and inflation as well as favor 
labor market flexibility (Rueda 2007). The left, which is more sensitive to preferences of low-
skilled workers, organize their platforms around their preferences, reward them by targeting 
unemployment and increasing social spending (Rueda 2007). These partisan differences have 
been supported by many studies that documented the variations in macroeconomic priorities 
(Hibbs 1987, Garrett 1998), the interaction between partisanship and various domestic 
institutions such as labor organizational structure (Alvarez 2001), labor market organizations 
(Boix 2000), central bank independence as well international constraints (Garrett 1998, Boix 
2000).12  
2.2.2 Partisan Politics and Labor Market Reform 
Accordingly, left governments respond to low-income groups and trade unions, and the right 
governments protect the owners of the capital such as businesses as their respective 
constituencies. When when faced with reforms that are costly to their constituents, the left may 
                                                 
12 For instance, Garrett (1998) shows that policy reform is most likely where partisanship and 
labor institutions are congruent. This could be left government and strong organized labor or 
right government and weak/decentralized labor. Although some argued the decreasing relevance 
of partisan politics in the face of globalization, others show that it is still relevant. Garrett (2001) 
shows that the international market exposure actually induces greater government spending on 
redistribution programs that compensate for market-generated inequalities. Garrett’s analysis 
highlights the ability of labor-market institutions to effectively negotiate between government 
and labor. Thus left-labor movements, and, consequently, cross-national partisan differences are 
still relevant. 
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be less willing to implement labor market reforms and the right would be less willing to 
implement financial sector reforms. The scholarly work on the IMF also suggests that borrowing 
country governments can increase their leverage against domestic opponents of economic reform 
and push through reforms that would not be otherwise approved by tying their hands with 
conditionality (Vreeland 2002). By shifting the responsibility to politically unaccountable IMF, 
politicians seek to avoid political costs of reform.  
 Partisan theories suggest that right-wing governments use IMF reforms to politically 
weaken workers and organized labor, the core constituency of the political left. Moreover, right 
wing governments want to increase labor market flexibility, which their core constituency, 
businesses, favor. During normal times, the right would find it difficult to push for reforms 
against powerful labor. Organized labor increases the political costs of reforms through lobbying, 
protests and electoral means and can stall reform initiatives (Przeworski 1991, Haggard and 
Kaufman 1995). Organized labor has been effective by delaying or preventing labor market 
reforms in Latin America (Murillo 2001, Murillo and Schrank 2005). Similarly, other European 
governments faced strong political resistance to implementing pro-market policies that required 
changes in labor markets and pensions to boost employment and increase economic growth 
(Featherstone and Tinios 2006, Featherstone 2008, Alexiadou 2013). Ongoing protests and 
strikes in France provide a clear example of resistance to labor market reforms by the unions. 
Thus, the right would find it difficult to push for reforms against a powerful labor due to intense 
opposition both outside the parliament and within the parliament from left wing parties, which 
defend its main constituency during normal times. Opposition by the unions and (possible) 
coalition between them and left wing parties increase the political costs of economic reform. 
However, when the economic conditions worsen and the country requires an IMF program, 
governments can increase their leverage against domestic opponents of economic reform and 
push through reforms that would not be otherwise approved by tying their hands with 
conditionality (Vreeland 2002). By shifting the responsibility to the politically unaccountable 
IMF and using conditionality as a political cover, the right wing governments should find it 
easier to push for labor market reforms. On the other hand, the left, which politically responds to 
low-income groups and trade unions, would be less willing to implement labor market reforms, 
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that affect their main constituency (Rueda 2007).13 When labor is strong, which leads to higher 
political costs, left-wing governments would want to avoid a clash with unions and 
implementation would decrease. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
 H1: Left (right) governments will be less (more) likely to implement labor market reforms 
when labor is strong (during economic crisis) 
2.2.3 Partisan Politics and Financial Sector Reform 
Left wing governments use IMF reforms to weaken owners of the capital politically, the core 
constituency of the political right. The left would find it difficult to reform the financial markets 
during normal times due to heightened political costs. During crisis, the left would have greater 
incentives to target strong financial interests by increasing their leverage against the financial 
sector and push through reforms that would not be otherwise approved by tying their hands with 
the conditionality (Vreeland 2002). Moreover, the core constituency of the political left, low-
income groups and workers, benefit from financial sector reforms since it would provide cheaper 
credit for these groups. Since the implementation of IMF financial sector conditionality is critical 
for receiving IMF loans and long-term economic growth, the left wing governments use IMF 
reforms to weaken owners of the capital politically, the core constituency of the political right. 
Since the right is politically dependent on owners of the capital and high-wage earners. When the 
right wing governments are able to influence the design and implementation process they will 
delay and/or block reforms to shield the financial sector from the costs of reform. 
 H2: Left (right) governments will be more (less) likely to implement financial sector 
reforms when financial sector interests are strong (during economic crisis)   
2.2.4 Electoral Politics and Labor Market Reform 
Both the left and right governments benefit from a properly functioning labor market and 
financial sector in the long term. Under IMF programs, the short and long-term interests of 
                                                 
13 Although Rueda (2007) argues that partisan preferences matter, he shows that the left does not 
necessarily defend the interests of every worker and highlights the need for divisions between 
insiders and outsiders. Rueda (2007) shows that Social Democrats are increasingly interested in 
defending the interests of insiders rather than outsiders.  
 27 
political parties and partisan governments can diverge. Despite the long-term benefits of 
structural reforms, these reforms also result in significant short-term costs to the welfare of 
organized interests and partisan constituencies. Scholars argue that politicians are not blind 
ideologues who only pursue partisan agendas. Instead, given political parties have both 
ideological and electoral concerns, they act pragmatically in response to the political 
environment they face (Garrett 1998, Rueda 2007). They should respond to their core 
constituencies as long as their prospects of re-election are not threatened. If there is a clash 
between their ideological and electoral concerns, politicians are better off pursuing strategies that 
improve their prospects of re-election rather than their partisan preferred strategies.14  
Especially, in democracies, elections cause political parties to focus on the short-term 
costs when these costs directly affect a large number of potential voters. Electoral concerns 
motivate policy-makers to respond to their constituencies to secure their support and vote for 
elections rather than long term incentives and benefits of correcting problems in the labor market 
and financial sectors. This should especially be true around elections. The party elite takes the 
long run view of establishing a healthy markets and are less averse to the short term costs of 
reforms outside election years. In addition to the partisan interests that help us to identify 
constituencies for the borrowing country government, electoral concerns also matter for 
understanding reform coalitions with respect to labor market and financial sector. 
Workers in the borrowing countries, who are adversely affected by the labor market 
conditionality, are collectively organized through trade unions. Both their size and influence is 
greater on the policymakers since they can increase the visibility of the reforms through protests 
and demonstrations. Moreover, they can also appeal to the broader public who can sympathize 
with their cause. Accordingly, there are strong domestic interests in the labor market 
conditionality that put electoral pressure on the borrowing country government and rally the 
public around their cause. The unions and their effect on electoral process are particularly 
                                                 
14 The literature on the IMF, which focuses on the effect of electoral concerns and timing of 
elections, show ambiguous results. As an example, Dreher (2003) argues that program 
suspensions are more likely to occur prior to elections. Surprisingly, this effect is smaller in 
democratic countries than in autocracies. By contrast, Arpac, O., et al. (2008) do not find any 
systematic significance of the electoral cycle. 
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important in democracies due to their mobilization and organizational abilities.15 For instance, on 
February 2010, various professional groups in Greece suspended work and marched to the 
parliament to protest against the reform aimed at cutting health spending and liberalizing their 
profession (Independent 2010).16  
The success of reform attempts in democracies still depends on the right wing 
government’s ability to co-opt the opposition groups, especially the left and the militant labor. In 
the presence of strong organized labor, the right would still be vulnerable to increased 
politicization of the issue, which leads to higher political and electoral costs. When the labor is 
militant and opposes reforms, its legitimacy and bargaining power increases if the labor can 
secure the support of opposition parties (Alexiadou 2013). Traditionally, left parties rely on the 
votes of unions to win elections. Especially when the unions are strong, the left benefits from 
appealing to their interests or using their political ties to the unions. Thus, to electorally benefit 
from the right’s attempt to reform the labor market and protect its core constituency, the left 
aligns with the unions against the right. That is why, even single party majority governments led 
by the right wing parties have failed in many instances to reform the labor market (Alexiadou 
2013). In summary, since successful implementation requires pro-reform coalitions, the right has 
still a harder time to strike a deal with the organized labor and the left parties in democracies 
(Edgerton and Colitt 2016, Rapoza 2016).17  
Perhaps counterintuitively, research suggests that the left-wing governments may be 
better able to form a pro-reform coalition that also includes right-wing parties, which 
ideologically support these reforms. 18 For instance, the German social democratic party initiated 
                                                 
15 I do not assume that organized interests do not matter in autocracies. Although these groups 
might also have access to decision makers in autocratic settings through certain clientelist 
linkages, their effect on average should be larger in democratic settings. 
16 Similarly, in Dublin, the public sector union members took to the streets to protest against the 
public service reform measures and wage cuts planned under the IMF program. Through their 
mobilization capacity, the labor unions are critical in increasing the visibility of reforms and 
political costs for decision makers. 
17 For instance, Michel Temer, who has recently replaced Dilma Rousseff as the President of 
Brazil, aims to push for long-waited labor and pension reform. However, Temer faces a 
challenging political environment and needs to secure the support of the left-wing Worker’s 
Party and the unions. His Finance Minister Henrique Meirelles even mentioned that they might 
need to bring in the IMF.  
18 The theory presented here might not be consistent with some institutional settings such as 
corporatist structures in which labor market reform can be achieved through other means such as 
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a major labor market reform in 2003, cutting unemployment benefits and changing employment 
protection rules (Lunz 2013). Scholarly work has also shown that the left governments are 
effective in initiating changes in the labor market and forming a grand coalition of reform 
involving both the unions and the right parties (Garrett 1998, Beazer and Woo 2015). For 
instance, Garrett (1998) shows that policy reform is most likely when left-wing governments 
work together with strong organized labor or where right governments are faced with 
weak/decentralized labor. Similarly, Beazer and Woo (2015) argue that it is the left governments 
in Central and Eastern European countries that build these coalitions to reform the public sector. 
They show that leftist governments undertake more ambitious public sector reforms when their 
IMF programs include more conditions; whereas, the opposite holds for right-leaning 
governments. 
When labor unions are strong and militant, it signals two crucial pieces of information to 
the government and the IMF. 19 First, the labor market might be dysfunctional and problems need 
to be corrected for long term economic prosperity.20 Both the left and right governments benefit 
from a properly functioning labor market in the long term. Recent examples from Europe 
highlights the left’s willingness to reform the labor market. The Socialist government led by the 
prime minister Manuel Valls emphasizes the need for labor market reforms and argues that the 
reforms are needed to tackle unemployment, achieve labor market flexibility and long-term 
economic sustainability (Reuters 2015, Ekathimerini 2016, Henley and Inman 2016).21 Second, 
the highly militant unions signal to left parties that the base is upset. Thus, left governments face 
                                                                                                                                                             
social partnership/social dialogue between organized labor, business interests and government. 
These processes are especially common in advanced industrial societies such as Scandinavian 
countries. However, the countries included in the IMF sample do not have such features. 
19 I am particularly interested in cases where different partisan governments respond to the 
demands of strong organized interests under the IMF programs. When organized interests are 
non-existent or weak, we should expect strong implementation by the borrowing country 
government in a given policy area. However, when the organized labor is strong, the baseline 
level of implementation should be lower due to increasing political costs.  
20 This perspective is especially true for the IMF.  
21 Matteo Renzi, the Prime Minister of Italy since early 2014 and the secretary of center-left 
Democratic Party, initiated a significant labor market reform despite resistance by the unions 
(Reuters 2015). Even the highly criticized Greek prime minister Tsipras underlined the need to 
have a flexible labor market. His Labor Minister, Katrougalos, has been working on a pension 
reform, that would bring country’s finances into balance (Ekathemerini 2016).  
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a dilemma of responding to their base’s demand to protect labor versus long term incentives of 
correcting problems in the labor market. The voters, unions and party backbenchers oppose these 
reforms due to possible welfare losses. This opposition may arise despite the knowledge of or 
due to uncertainty regarding the expected long term benefits of reform (Fernandez and Rodrik 
1991). However, when the economic conditions worsen and the country requires an IMF 
program, the left increases its leverage against the labor by tying its hands with conditionality 
and seeking to reduce the political costs of reform (Vreeland 2002). Even if the left still wants to 
appeal to workers and labor unions, it must implement the IMF’s conditions since it needs the 
Fund’s loans for economic recovery or to address short term balance of payment problems. The 
implementation of the program also benefits leftist governments more than center and right 
parties by increasing their credibility in the international markets and enabling cheaper access to 
capital needed to address macroeconomic imbalances (Cho 2014).22 Overall, the party elite take 
the long run view of establishing a healthy labor market and are less averse to the short term 
costs of reforms. Given pressures from the IMF and long-term benefits, party elite form an elite 
pro-reform coalition, going against (possible) opposition by the rank-and-file and party base. In 
other words, without any viable alternative, the left collaborates with the right, which 
ideologically favors these reforms, by isolating the militant labor.  
 In summary, when faced with strong organized and militant labor, the left-wing 
governments should be more likely to form a pro-reform coalition because they are better able to 
isolate the unions or coerce them into accepting reforms (even if reluctantly).23 This leads to the 
third hypothesis: 
H3a: Left (right) governments will be more (less) likely to implement labor market reforms than 
right governments when organized labor is strong in democracies (during economic crisis) 
 
Since policy makers act pragmatically in response to the political environment they face 
(Garrett 1998, Rueda 2007), they should respond to their core constituencies as long as their 
                                                 
22 The logic is explained by Cho (2014) by referring to the “Nixon goes to China” idea. Since the 
international markets do not expect the left governments to implement neoliberal reforms, which 
do not accord well with their ideology, their implementation is rewarded more than the center 
and right wing parties.  
23 Median voter theory also suggests that, when labor is militant, it is easier for the left 
government to move to center and form a grand coalition against the (more radical) labor.  
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prospects of re-election are not threatened. Accordingly, the left government’s willingness to 
implement reforms should be stronger especially in non-election years, when the political costs 
of reform for the left is lower compared to election years. The party leaders also depend less on 
the rank-in-file support in non-election years. They might strategically position themselves so 
that they implement tough reforms in the middle of the electoral cycle in the hope that their 
electoral chances improve as the economy stabilizes (Garrett 1998). During non-election years, 
left-wing governments will focus on the long-run benefits of labor market reforms and, because 
of their unique ability to build pro-reform coalitions, be more likely (than right-wing 
governments) to implement these reforms. 
H3b: In non-election years, left governments will be more likely to implement labor market 
reforms than right governments when organized labor is strong (during economic crisis) 
 
 If there is a clash between government’s ideological and electoral concerns, politicians 
are better off pursuing strategies that improve their prospects of re-election rather than their 
partisan preferred strategies.24 The costs for political reform that would adversely affect labor 
would be higher in election years, when the left wing party leaders rely more on the support of 
rank-in-file, who are more sympathetic to the demands of the labor. Thus short-term concerns of 
maximizing the chances of being elected prevail during election years and the left governments 
cater even more to the interests of their core constituencies.  During election years, left-wing 
governments will focus on the short-run costs of labor market reform for labor rank-and-file and 
therefore be less likely (than right-wing governments) to implement these reforms. During non-
election years, left-wing governments will focus on the long-run benefits of labor market reforms 
and, because of their unique ability to build pro-reform coalitions, be more likely (than right-
wing governments) to implement these reforms. 
H3c: During election years, left governments will be less likely to implement labor market 
reforms than right wing government when organized labor is strong (during economic crisis) 
                                                 
24 The literature on the IMF, which focuses on the effect of electoral concerns and timing of 
elections, show ambiguous results. As an example, Dreher (2003) argues that program 
suspensions are more likely to occur prior to elections. Surprisingly, this effect is smaller in 
democratic countries than in autocracies. By contrast, Arpac, O., et al. (2008) do not find any 
systematic significance of the electoral cycle. 
 32 
2.2.5 Electoral Politics and Financial Sector Reform 
The politics of financial sector reform are different that the labor market reforms due to the 
nature and the extent of opposition. Even when domestic financial interests are strong, they do 
not create significant electoral pressure on their respective governments. Similar to the labor 
market reforms, when the financial sector is strong, the IMF maximizes conditionality to ensure 
the stability and transparency of the sector, enable access for the foreign institutions, especially 
the ones from the major stakeholders. Moreover, restoring stability to the financial sector is 
crucial and requires rapid process of reform for economic recovery (Calomiris and Mason 2003). 
Labor unions can politicize the labor market reforms and mobilize workers to vote for certain 
parties. They increase the visibility of the reforms in the public space and the political costs of 
reforms for the policy-makers. However, financial sector interests do not collectively organize 
and mobilize electoral groups. The financial sector resists to these reforms through their 
discretionary control over the economic interactions in the borrowing country and through the 
use and allocation of their funds (Calomiris and Mason 2003). Rather than public demonstrations 
and electoral mobilization, financial interests exert their influence through negotiations behind 
closed doors and their access to policymakers. For instance, prior to the crisis, Irish banks had 
privileged access to the Central Bank officials and members of Fianna Fail. Relying on these ties 
and their control over economic activities, the Irish Banks were able to affect policies that would 
target their business practices (Honohan 2016).25  
Lacking significant electoral effects, scholarly work has also suggested that the effect of 
financial interests do not vary across different regime types (Haggard and Maxfield 1996). 
Governments in both democratic and non-democratic regimes benefit from financial sector 
reforms such as capital account liberalization, which increases their credibility in the 
international markets and help them solve short and long term exchange rate problems (Haggard 
and Maxfield 1996). However, the borrowing country governments, especially in the developing 
world, also benefits from certain restrictions in the financial sector. Autocratic leader can use 
their control over the financial sector to advance their political interests such as allocating credit 
to their inner circle and providing cheaper financing for their clientele (Rosenbluth and Schaap 
                                                 
25 Personal interview with Patrick Honohan, former Governor of the Irish Central Bank (2009-
2015). Washington D.C., October 2016. 
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2003). This is easier when the financial sector is not liberalized and does not face competition 
from the foreign banks (Haggard and Maxfield 1993). Moreover, autocratic regimes are more 
likely to respond to the interests of narrower factions within the society (Bueno De Mesquita 
2005). Contrary to the democratic regimes in which large and populous groups such as farmers 
and labor who benefit from financial liberalization and cheaper access to capital, the autocratic 
regimes are more open to the influence of narrower interests such as the financial sector. 
Autocracies would be less willing to reform the financial sector and open their markets to foreign 
competition. However, similar incentives also exist in democratic countries in which the 
governments can benefit from shielding their markets from foreign competition and having 
political benefits (Hutchcroft 1998). Thus, unlike the study of labor market conditionality in 
which the interest of the unions are mediated through electoral politics in democracies, similar 
effects do not exist in democratic borrowers in the case of the financial sector conditionality.  
In summary, both the left and right governments benefit from a properly functioning 
financial sector in the long term. Despite the long-term benefits of structural reforms, these 
reforms also result in significant short-term costs to financial sector interests. The short-run costs 
of financial sector reform are borne by a numerically small but economically important and 
politically influential group. Left governments will use the political leverage of the IMF to 
implement reforms that impose short-run costs on large and dysfunctional financial sectors. 
Right governments, because they are more sensitive to political pressure from capital, will be 
less likely to implement reforms when they face opposition from a large financial sector. Due to 
lack of electoral effects, these expectations should be true irrespective of regime type. 
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3.0  IMPLEMENTATION OF LABOR MARKET CONDITIONALITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Labor market reform is essential to restore competitiveness and create jobs, which are critical for 
long term economic growth (Topel 1999, Henrekson 2014). However, initiating changes in the 
labor market is often politically contentious and difficult to implement, especially in the presence 
of strong opposition. Organized labor has been effective in delaying or preventing labor market 
reforms in Latin American countries (Murillo 2001, Murillo and Schrank 2005). Similarly, 
successive Greek governments were unable to reform their labor markets and pension schemes 
due to strong opposition by the unions and clientelist linkages prior to the collapse of the 
economy in 2010 (Featherstone and Tinios 2006, Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2013). 
Scholarly work has shown that governments often rely on the IMF to implement politically 
difficult reforms (Vreeland 2003). However, even during the crisis and under international 
commitments to the IMF, Greece has been particularly unsuccessful at reforming its labor market 
and downsizing its public sector (IMF 2010).26 In stark contrast, Ireland has successfully and 
quickly completed its IMF program. The Irish coalition government of Fine Gael and Labor was 
able to cut public sector wages and pensions while maintaining social stability.  
The research on the implementation of IMF conditionality requirements in general fails to 
capture the particular contentions and dynamics surrounding labor market reforms. Why are 
some democratic governments, such as Ireland, more effective in implementing politically 
contentious labor market conditionality than others, such as Greece? By analyzing how 
democratic borrowers implemented the IMF labor market conditionality between 1992 and 2014, 
I show how both governments' ideology and electoral concerns, and their interaction with 
interest groups with varying strength determine implementation, with the former factor being 
                                                 
26 For a summary of the IMF’s advice on labor market issues, see: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/labor.htm 
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particularly important. Specifically, the empirical analysis provides strong evidence that 
successful implementation of the labor market reforms depends on the left-wing government’s 
ability and incentives to overcome opposition by strong organized labor. I show, perhaps 
counter-intuitively, that the left-wing governments can more successfully reform the labor 
market than the right-wing governments when pressed by the IMF. This is particularly the case 
when the left is faced with strong organized unions in non-election years, when long-term goals 
prevail over short term electoral concerns. However, during election years, perhaps more 
intuitively, the left-wing governments are less likely to accept and implement labor market 
reforms in the presence of strong and militant labor. In such cases, the political costs of reform 
are too severe for the left due to its dependence on the votes of rank-in-file union members. 
These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions with regards to 
the labor market and the IMF’s conditional effect on removing domestic political oppositions to 
reform.   
3.2 LABOR MARKET CONDITIONALITY  
The IMF programs focus on increasing efficiency and competitiveness in the global markets 
especially in developing economies. Thus, during times of crisis, the Fund aims to lower fiscal 
expenditure in the short term and improve productivity in the medium to long term through 
certain structural reforms. That is why the IMF has frequently conditions its lending activities to 
diagnose and correct dysfunctional labor market practices and generous welfare systems that 
increase labor costs and reduce pro-market incentives and competitiveness. Depending on the 
severity of the fiscal trouble and the need for rapid adjustment, the IMF requires borrowing 
country governments to initiate cuts in pensions, social spending, public sector employment and 
wages (including the minimum wage).  
This study defines the labor market reforms in a broader sense and follows the previous 
studies on the IMF labor market conditionality (Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012, Rickard and 
Caraway 2014). Accordingly, the labor market conditionality includes reforms in the labor 
market pertaining to private sector, the social policy including reforms in pension, health and 
education systems, the changes in the civil service employment such as public sector 
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wages/employment and the privatization of the public institutions (excluding the financial 
sector). Although there is a significant drop in recent years, between 1990-2014, nearly 71% of 
all of the IMF programs included at least one labor market condition. Especially during the 
height of the Washington Consensus policies, from early 1990s to mid-2000s, the IMF regularly 
required the borrowing country governments to address their problems in their labor markets. 
Within the last decade, with increasing efforts to streamline conditionality and target poverty 
especially in low-income countries, the percentage of programs with the labor market 
conditionality has declined. However, more than fifty percent of the programs still include labor 
market conditionality, which the IMF defines critical for restoring competitiveness, creating jobs 
and economic growth. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Percentage of Programs with Labor Market Conditionality: 1992-2012 
 
Despite fluctuations over time, the IMF programs with labor market conditionality on 
average includes 3 conditions during the same period. 
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Figure 4. The Average Number of Labor Market Conditions per Program: 1992-2012 
3.2.1 Why Labor Market Conditionality 
There are several reasons for focusing on the implementation of the IMF labor market 
conditionality. First, a well-functioning labor market is critical to achieving sustainable long term 
growth through its effects on competitiveness and creating jobs (OECD 1994, Siebert 1997). 
Since the effectiveness of IMF conditionality depends on the degree of compliance by the 
recipient country (Dreher 2009), understanding the conditions under which labor market reforms 
are implemented is critical for the success of IMF programs and long-term economic recovery.  
Second, in addition to their economic impacts, the labor market reforms also matter due 
to their effects on the lives of citizens in the long run. Typical labor market reforms in the IMF 
programs involve wage freezes or cuts, layoffs in the public sector, changes in the law and 
regulations regarding employment rights and social benefits. For instance, compared to 2010, 
workers in Greece have lost on average € 1,500 in annual earnings by 2012 (Lanara 2012). The 
national minimum wage was cut by 22% and by 32% for young workers (Lanara 2012). Pensions 
were reduced by 10 to 12% for both public and private employees. Moreover, the structural 
conditions in the Greek program included changes in the employment conditions in the public 
sector and collective action rights. These reforms have crucial distributional consequences, 
affecting employment, income inequality and social cohesion (Steinwand and Stone 2008, 
Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009, Blanton, Blanton et al. 2015). Accordingly, they generate 
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political backlash from the adversely affected groups such as labor unions. Thus, the 
implementation remains especially low in areas such as the privatization of public institutions 
and pension and civil service reform, which directly affect welfare of specific groups, such as 
union members. Workers in the borrowing countries, and the unions as their representatives, are 
the relevant stakeholders in each country who are adversely affected by specific policies. 
Analyzing how the unions interact within the context of labor market conditionality provides a 
window to study and isolate the effects of organized interests in IMF programs. 
Lastly, the unions are particularly important in democracies due to their organizational 
abilities and effect on elections. The IMF has been increasingly dealing with more democratic 
countries in the last decades. Figure 5 shows the average democracy scores for the IMF 
borrowing countries since 1980. While the average democracy score for an IMF borrower was 
around 7 in early 1980’s, it has risen to nearly 17 in 2014.27 This has been more visible during 
the recent global financial crisis when advanced industrial democracies, such as Ireland, Portugal 
and Greece, signed arrangements with the IMF. Similar trends were observed during the Asian 
Financial Crisis such as the program with South Korea and the 2002 stock market crashes in 
democracies such as Argentina and Turkey. Moreover, this period coincides with the collapse of 
Communism and the increasing pace of integration in Europe that led to the democratization of 
post-Soviet countries. Thus, the compatibility of democracy with structural conditionality has 
become an essential question. The politics of labor market reform informs us about this debate 
since labor market reforms are especially difficult in democracies, in which the IMF has 
increasingly been active.  
 
                                                 
27 I standardized the Polity2 scores by adding 10 each.  
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Figure 5. IMF Borrower Democracy Scores Between 1980-2013 
3.2.2 Empirical Analysis- Dataset 
This study uses a new dataset extracted from the IMF's MONA database, which covers the IMF 
arrangements concluded with borrowing countries between 1992 and 2014 to test these 
expectations. There is a total of 473 IMF programs in the dataset, with more than 13,000 policy 
conditions for nearly 100 different countries across the globe. The focus of this analysis is on the 
programs with labor market policy reforms. I follow the definition by Caraway, Rickard et al. 
(2012) to identify labor market policy, which includes reforms in the labor market, the social 
policy including reforms in pension, health and education systems, the public sector 
wages/employment and the privatization. Only non-concessional IMF programs in democratic 
countries are included in the final analysis. The IMF non-concessional loans are provided 
through Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), the Precautionary and 
Liquidity Line (PLL), and the Extended Fund Facility. Unlike concessional loans, non-
concessional loans are subject to the IMF’s market-related interest rate. By contrast, concessional 
loans are provided interest free to low-income countries with the goals of poverty reduction and 
growth. The IMF concessional loans are provided through Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust 
(PRGT), Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the Standby Credit Facility (SDF) and 
the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). Given the objective and priority differences, labor market 
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conditionality varies across concessional and non-concessional programs. While 75% of all non-
concessional program year has at least one labor market condition, 68% of all concessional 
program/year observations have at least one labor market condition. The average is higher for 
non-concessional (3.35) than concessional programs (2.3). Lastly, while non-concessional 
programs rely more heavily on fiscal measures and labor market conditions than social policy 
measures, which are more common in concessional programs. Thus, the analysis includes only 
the non-concessional programs.  
 As part of the arrangements, the IMF reviews and records the implementation of each 
condition in the MONA database. After coding the number of policy conditions, we code 
whether the borrowing country meet these conditions or not. If the condition is met (meaning 
that the actual reform is undertaken), it is coded as 1 and if it is not met, it is coded as 0. If the 
condition is not met or half-met, we consider it as not implemented and code it as 0. The unit of 
analysis for this paper is program/year to capture the dynamic nature of IMF programs. Thus, we 
calculate the total number of policy conditions under review for each year and then create a 
corresponding measure for the implementation record for each program/year as a percentage of 
total conditions implemented.  
 There is a total of 388 non-concessional program years in democratic countries between 
1993 and 2014. 281 of these program/years include at least one labor market condition. On 
average, there are 3.5 labor market conditions in each program year, with an average 
implementation rate of 38%.  
3.2.3 Research Design  
One of the main concerns for the empirical analysis of implementation is selection into IMF 
conditionality is not random. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that the 
factors that affect labor market conditionality might also affect its implementation. For instance, 
Caraway, Rickard et al. (2012) and  Beazer and Woo (2015) argue that labor market and public 
sector conditionality are affected by certain domestic factors and strategic concerns. Thus, if 
political factors that condition the negotiations on the IMF loan agreements and lead to fewer 
conditions, we cannot distinguish whether the compliant behavior with these conditions is 
attributable to an independent set of factors or the factors that determine them in the first place. It 
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is possible to correct for this selection bias by controlling for the observable determinants of 
nonrandom selection of the countries under the IMF programs through implicit assumptions 
regarding the drivers of the selection process. Are countries under the IMF programs that receive 
labor market conditionality are systematically different than countries that do not receive these 
conditions? By accounting for the observable factors such as domestic political factors, 
economic conditions and geopolitical factors that are discussed in the literature review, one can 
account for selection mechanism. However, some of the factors that are critical in understanding 
conditionality and compliance are not readily observable. They might have a systematically 
significant effect on determining the countries that receive labor market conditions and the rate 
of implementation. Previous studies have cited the willingness of the government or societal trust 
to the government as some unobservable political characteristics in the borrowing country 
(Vreeland 2003).  
When we take into account the observables in the analysis, we predict the outcomes on 
the basis of the variation in these variables, which might be different than the actual observed 
outcomes (Vreeland, 2003). The difference between the two is the error term which actually 
accounts for the unexplained or the unobserved. If these error terms are randomly distributed 
across countries that receive social conditions and that do not, there should not a correlation 
between the error terms of the selection (conditionality) and outcome (implementation) 
equations. However, a correlation between the two would indicate non-random distribution of 
unobserved factors across the countries with and without labor market conditions attached to 
their IMF programs (Vreeland, 2003). This necessitates the use of selection-corrected estimates 
of implementation.   
 Moreover, for some of the critical control variables, the data sources contain a high 
proportion of missing values.28 List-wise deletion techniques is the common approach to deal 
with missing data. This approach necessarily omits observations with missing values on any 
variable. Accordingly, nearly 2/3 of the observations are lost when list-wise deletion is 
employed. This technique is criticized to be inefficient and biased, creating higher standard 
errors, and wider confidence intervals, and leading to the loss of statistical power (Rubin 1996, 
Rubin 2004). I use multiple imputation techniques to address these problems. Multiple 
                                                 
28 I provide a complete list of missing observations for each variable and analysis in the 
appendix. 
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imputation technique replaces missing values with multiple sets of simulated values based on 
information contained in observed data  (Rubin 2004). By utilizing all observed values, 
preserving their important characteristics and keeping incomplete observations within the 
sample, it addresses the limitations of list-wise deletion in real world settings. Thus, multiple 
imputation does not aim to ‘predict missing values as close as possible to the true ones but to 
handle missing data in a way resulting in valid statistical inference’ (Rubin 1996)  
3.2.4 Summary of Expectations  
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons to expect that the design and implementation of 
conditionality is affected by similar factors and might be interdependent. Thus, I focus both on 
the design and implementation of labor market conditionality and reiterate the expectations from 
the theoretical chapter. The IMF targets important sectors of the economy, especially when they 
seem dysfunctional. When organized labor is strong and militant, it signals generous welfare 
systems and rigid labor laws that increase labor costs and reduce pro-market incentives and 
competitiveness. Countries with dysfunctional labor markets are more likely to have labor 
market reform as a part of their loan package. However, whether the borrowing country 
government responds to the IMF pressures in the presence of strong organized interests is 
function of partisan interests and electoral process. Left governments respond to low-income 
groups and trade unions, and the right governments protect the owners of the capital such as 
businesses as their respective constituencies. When when faced with reforms that are costly to 
their constituents, the left may be less willing to accept labor market reforms. Partisan theories 
suggest that right-wing governments use IMF reforms to politically weaken workers and 
organized labor, the core constituency of the political left. Thus, left (right) governments will be 
less (more) likely to accept and implement labor market reforms when labor is strong during 
economic crisis. The short and long-term interests of political parties and partisan governments 
can diverge. Structural reforms bring long-term benefits at significant short-term costs. In 
democracies, elections cause political parties to focus on the short-term costs when these costs 
directly affect a large number of potential voters. During election years, left-wing governments 
will focus on the short-run costs of labor market reform for labor rank-and-file and therefore be 
less likely (thank right-wing governments) to accept and implement labor market conditionality. 
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During non-election years, left-wing governments will focus on the long-run benefits of labor 
market reforms and, because of their unique ability to build pro-reform coalitions, be more likely 
(than right-wing governments) to accept and implement these reforms. 
3.2.5 Explanatory Variables  
The relevant domestic interest groups for labor market reforms is organized labor, and the 
strength of organized labor is proxied by the number of general strikes in a year. The general 
strikes data come from the Cross National Time Series Data Archive and measures “Any strike 
of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is 
aimed at national government policies or authority” (Banks and Wilson 2015). The strikes 
variable proxies for the organizational capacity and militancy of organized labor. Although 
militancy may not be perfectly correlated with “strength” in terms of size or influence, the 
number of strikes is a good measure to test the political costs of reforms for decision makers.  
There are a couple of reasons why I choose strikes over other alternative measures such 
as PLP and union density/membership. First, strikes capture the causal mechanism provided in 
the theory section. The variable measures strike at the general-public level rather than sectoral or 
firm level. Thus, it shows a broad based labor participation to strikes. General strikes mean that 
the labor can overcome collective action problems and resist to government’s attempts for 
reform. They increase the visibility of the demands of organized labor and pressure on the 
decision makers. Accordingly, the political costs of reform in the labor market increases with the 
increasing number of strikes. The alternatives available in the literature cannot perfectly capture 
this collective action mechanism and increasing pressure/costs on the policymakers. 
Alternatively, I also test my arguments by widely used labor surplus measure and the main 
findings are robust to this specification. Another alternative, union density/membership, does not 
have global coverage and is limited to selective number of countries.29  
                                                 
29  One critique to strikes as a measure of strength of labor is that it might actually be a sign of a 
weakening labor movement. However, if it is considered as a sign weakening labor, it still 
suggests that the labor can organize and initiate strikes at the national level. This still shows that 
the labor (relatively) has enough strength compared to the labor who cannot organize and strike. 
For instance, we can assume that strikes in Greece are a sign of weakening labor. However, 
given the fact that they can still strike increases the visibility of the reforms and changes the 
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The ideology variable in this study comes from various sources. For the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, I rely on Frye (2010), who classifies executives in these countries as 
belonging to the left, center or right according to their economic policy orientations. For the 
Latin American countries, I rely on Coppedge (1997) and Pop-Eleches (2008) to identify 
government/executive ideology along the same lines. For the remaining countries in the dataset, I 
rely on the World Bank Database on Political Institution’s (WDI) ‘executive partisanship’ 
variable. I then create a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 for the left governments and 0 
for the others. Since this study relies on a conditional hypothesis regarding the interaction 
between the organized labor and partisanship, I also create interaction terms equal to the product 
of partisanship dummy and the militancy of organized labor. All models that include the 
interaction term also include both constitutive terms.  
This study identifies election years from the “National Elections Across Democracy and 
Autocracy (NELDA)” dataset, which provides detailed information on all election events from 
1960-2014 (Hyde and Marinov 2011). I create a dummy variable for each year in which the 
borrowing country has either executive or legislative elections.  
To reduce the worries of omitted variables bias, I control for a number of variables that 
are likely confounders. The higher number of veto players make it less likely to implement 
policies (Tsebelis 2002). Thus, I control for the political constraints index (Henisz 2004). This 
measure estimates the feasibility of policy change by taking into account veto players and the 
heterogeneity within the legislative branch among different parties and within different branches 
of government (Henisz 2004). The higher values of this index indicate higher political 
constraints, and thus higher policy predictability.30 I expect countries with higher political 
constraints to have more conditions included in the programs since the government would use 
the IMF conditionality to overcome domestic oppositions such as the veto points. However, the 
higher the political constraints, the more difficult it should be to implement labor market 
reforms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
political responses by the right and the left. The labor in Ireland attempted to strike but could not 
secure the ballot. Accordingly, it does not affect my causal mechanism. Basically, strikes acts as 
a measure of cost of reform, increasing the visibility of the reforms and putting extra pressure on 
the policymakers even if the labor strikes as an act of desperation.  
30 In alternative models, I also use veto players and polarization variables from the World Bank’s 
Database on Political Institutions.  
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The research on the conditionality suggests that the US favors its strategic allies (Stone, 
2008). Dreher and Jensen (2007) argue that temporary membership to the United Nations 
Security Council better proxies the donor influences on the IMF decisions than other measures 
such as bilateral aid from the United States and United Nations General Assembly voting 
similarities. The UNSC temporary membership information comes from Dreher and Jensen 
(2007) and indicates whether the borrowing country has been a temporary member of the UNSC 
when signing or implementing the IMF program. Since this dataset only covers members until 
2012, we code the missing variables from the UNSC website. I expect UNSC temporary 
members to have a lower likelihood of receiving and implementing domestically costly labor 
market reforms since they are more likely to be treated favorable and less likely to be punished 
by the IMF for non-compliance.  
I use a number of commonly consulted economic controls such as GDP Growth, 
Inflation, Unemployment, Trade as a percentage of GDP, and the Total Debt Service as a 
percentage of Exports to control for the macroeconomic environment in the borrowing country. 
These economic controls come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The 
empirical work has produced mixed results regarding these economic controls (Steinwand and 
Stone 2008, Dreher 2009). However, the expectation is that negative economic conditions 
increase the need for IMF loans, which maximizes IMF conditionality to address structural needs 
and also increases implementation. I provide the summary statistics for all the independent 
variables included in the analysis in the appendix.  
Lastly, in terms of institutional structure, several scholars highlight the capacity of the 
borrowing country governments to implement reforms. The richer economies and the countries 
with better bureaucracies are found to have better program implementation records (Pop-Eleches, 
2008b). Thus, I also control for bureaucratic capacity, which comes from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Dataset. This variable proxy the institutional strength and quality of 
the bureaucracy. Higher points in this variable means that the bureaucracy is strong and has 
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services and 
autonomous from political pressure. I expect a better bureaucratic apparatus to negotiate harder, 
which leads to fewer conditions and then make it easier for government to implement complex 
rules and regulations.  
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3.2.6 Statistical Analysis  
The unit of analysis is program/year. All the models are estimated using multiple imputation 
ordinary least square regressions with country clusters and robust standard errors. I also include 
cubic polynomial time trends to account for the dynamic nature of IMF programs and lag all the 
independent variables, except the ideology variable, one year. Thus, the models presented show 
the design and implementation by borrowing country government at time t in response to strikes, 
economic and political conditions at t-1. Election and non-election years are defined at time t as 
well.  
To correct for selection problems, I first run Heckman selection models. The first stage of 
the model predicts selection into sample, receiving labor market conditionality. The second stage 
predicts the implementation of labor market conditionality. Since the first stage requires an 
instrument, I use the total number of IMF programs with labor market conditions in the previous 
year as an instrument.31 The logic behind this instrument is that it proxies the technocratic nature 
of the IMF in the program design stage in assigning labor conditionality to borrowers. Any 
political and economic factor that determines the design of IMF programs would also be likely to 
affect implementation as well. Thus, to satisfy exclusion restriction criteria, I choose this variable 
that is necessarily driven by the IMF’s own technocratic considerations and assessments of the 
global economy rather than political/economic characteristics of the borrowing country. Since 
this variable is coded annually, it also accounts for shifts in the ideological orientations of the 
IMF. This instrument is driven by the IMF's technocratic considerations, which is independent of 
the domestic political processes that drive implementation. The IMF's effect on the design stage 
should be larger due to vulnerabilities of the borrowing country government and their expertise 
advantage vis a via the government. Thus, its technocratic judgement and assessment on 
assigning conditionality should apply to different countries under similar economic/political 
conditions, within the same year. However, the implementation process is driven more by 
domestic characteristics, which is (relatively) more independent of the IMF's technocratic 
preferences.  
                                                 
31 I also use percentage of program rather than total number of program both in the global and 
regional level. The results are robust to these specifications as well.  
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The IMF program design stage has no significant effect on the implementation of 
conditionality. The evidence of selection on unobservables is weak for the labor market 
conditionality since the correlation is not significant. Therefore, I focus on simple regression 
models since it is inefficient to estimate selection models when they are not needed. I present the 
results for the Heckman selection model in the Appendix. 
3.2.7 Results and Discussion: Design of Labor Market Conditionality  
I first discuss the design of labor market conditionality. The dependent variable for this analysis 
is the total number of labor market conditions for each year.  Table 1 and models 1-3 report the 
effect of strikes on the number of labor market conditions. Models 4-6 report the interactive 
effect of strikes and government ideology. I provide three sets of results for these effects: full 
sample, including all program/year observations with labor market conditionality; sample for 
only non-election years; and sample for only election years. 
 Models 1-3 show the effect of strikes and ideology on the number of labor market 
conditions. As expected, IMF increases labor market conditionality when faced with increasing 
number of strikes in the full sample and during non-election years. Number of conditions 
decrease with increasing number of strikes during election years. However, these effects are not 
significant. Interestingly, left governments receive 1 more labor market condition than right wing 
governments. This effect is significant for the full sample but not for the split samples focusing 
on election and non-election years. This might be due to two reasons. On the one hand, IMF 
increases labor market conditionality when faced with left governments. On the other hand, left 
governments might be more willing to accept IMF conditionality to tie their hands with IMF 
conditionality and overcome domestic opposition. 
  Models 3-6 focus on the interactive effect of strikes and left governments. The left 
governments respond to strikes only during election years. This supports the partisan expectation 
that elections force parties to focus on short-term costs. Thus, left parties protect their main 
constituency during election years, in which number of labor market conditions significantly 
decrease. This also supports the idea that the IMF is sensitive to domestic vulnerabilities of the 
borrowing country government during election years (Rickard and Caraway 2014). However, 
unlike Caraway, Rickard et al. (2012), I show that the effect of organized labor is mediated by 
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partisan and electoral concerns. In terms of control variables, only unemployment and political 
constraints are significant with expected signs. Higher unemployment leads to higher number of 
labor market conditions. Moreover, countries with higher political constraints to have more 
conditions included in the programs since the government would use the IMF conditionality to 
overcome domestic oppositions such as the veto points. Other economic and political controls 
are not significant determinants of number of labor market conditions. 
 
Table 1. Labor Market Design Models  
  1) Full Sample 
2) Non-
Election 
3) 
Election 
4) Full 
Sample 
5) Non-
Election 6) Election 
       Strikes 0.047 0.116 -0.081 0.051 -0.456 1.045 
 
-0.271 -0.275 -0.766 -0.389 -0.473 -0.96 
Left Government 1.047* 0.869 1.105 1.234** 0.758 2.027 
 
-0.546 -0.612 -1.195 -0.586 -0.65 -1.327 
Strikes*Left 
   
-0.342 0.603 -2.830* 
    
-0.64 -0.713 -1.669 
GDP Growth -0.056 -0.047 -0.071 -0.055 -0.041 -0.0508 
 
-0.038 -0.043 -0.084 -0.038 -0.044 -0.084 
Inflation -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.001 0 -0.001 
 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 
Unemployment 0.057* 0.075** 0.018 0.061* 0.079** -0.007 
 
-0.033 -0.035 -0.072 -0.034 -0.036 -0.073 
UNSC Member 0.069 0.102 1.22 0.1 0.13 -0.644 
 
-0.819 -0.83 -2.512 -0.806 -0.822 -2.665 
Trade % of GDP -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 0.001 
 
-0.006 -0.007 -0.015 -0.007 -0.007 -0.015 
Debt 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.011 0.01 
 
-0.024 -0.023 -0.089 -0.024 -0.023 -0.089 
Bureaucracy -0.446 -0.418 -0.659 -0.383 -0.412 -0.772 
 
-0.287 -0.317 -0.636 -0.296 -0.319 -0.642 
Political Constraints 3.459** 3.110** 4.444 3.546** 3.201** 6.041 
 
-1.442 -1.517 -3.576 -1.473 -1.532 -3.687 
period -0.129 0.181 0.943 -0.158 0.26 1.718 
 
-3.635 -4.124 -8.156 -3.594 -4.122 -8.071 
period 2 -0.002 -0.379 -0.065 0.013 -0.396 -0.457 
 
-1.568 -1.802 -3.476 -1.551 -1.8 -3.443 
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period 3 0.021 0.11 -0.033 0.017 0.11 0.025 
 
-0.204 -0.237 -0.448 -0.202 -0.237 -0.444 
Constant 2.372 2.266 1.709 2.169 2.232 0.704 
 
-2.62 -2.932 -5.775 -2.604 -2.935 -5.794 
       # of Observations 357 241 116 357 241 116 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
3.2.8 Results and Discussion: Implementation of Labor Market Conditionality  
Table 2 and models 1-3 report the unconditional effect of strikes on the implementation of labor 
market reforms. Models 4-6 report the interactive effect of strikes and government ideology. I 
provide three sets of results for these effects: full sample, including all program/year 
observations with labor market conditionality; sample for only non-election years; and sample 
for only election years. These models, which do not include any economic or political controls, 
provide initial support to these expectations that partisan and electoral concerns mediate the 
effect of organized labor. Especially, the results support the expectation that the interactive effect 
of strikes/ideology to be positive and significant in non-election years and negative and 
significant in election years. 
 
Table 2. Labor Market Implementation Basic Models 
 
  1) Full Sample 
2) Non-
Election 
3) 
Election 
4) Full 
Sample 
5) Non-
Election 
6) 
Election 
       
Strikes -0.011 -0.021 0.025 -0.034 -0.082 0.049 
 -0.024 -0.035 -0.022 -0.028 -0.051 -0.033 
Left    -0.075 -0.096 0.009 
    -0.067 -0.084 -0.102 
Strikes*Left    0.05 0.107* -0.172* 
    -0.044 -0.056 -0.124 
period 0.272 0.129 0.545 0.237 0.095 0.475 
 -0.302 -0.395 -0.526 -0.304 -0.407 -0.527 
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period 2 -0.148 -0.079 -0.274 -0.134 -0.066 -0.25 
 -0.119 -0.159 -0.206 -0.12 -0.166 -0.205 
period 3 0.016 0.007 0.033 0.015 0.006 0.03 
 -0.014 -0.019 -0.024 -0.014 -0.02 -0.024 
Constant 0.296 0.382 0.117 0.334 0.427 0.184 
 -0.221 -0.284 -0.377 -0.22 -0.289 -0.38 
       
# of Observations 265 187 78 265 187 78 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 Models 1-3 show that the number of strikes has no significant unconditional effect on the 
implementation of labor market reforms. Although the effects are negative for the full sample 
and in non-election years, it is positive during election years. The interactive models, presented 
in models 4-6, reflect the expectation that the effect of interest groups operates through their 
links to the different partisan governments. The interaction variable is positive for the full sample 
and during non-election years. In non-election years, the left is more likely to implement labor 
market reforms than the center and right parties when faced with an increasing number of strikes. 
The opposite is true for election years in which the left is less likely to implement labor market 
reforms. Although the coefficient of the interaction term is borderline significant at the .1 level, 
the marginal effect of strikes*left is significant (Berry, Golder et al. 2012). This provides initial 
evidence that partisan politics and electoral concerns matter for the implementation of labor 
market reforms. 
 The findings are robust to the inclusion of the control variables as seen in Table 3. More 
importantly, the interactive effect of strikes and government ideology display the expected signs 
and the significance in both election and non-election years. Similar to Table 3, Models 7-9 of 
Table 3 provide the results without the interaction term. Although they have the expected signs, 
neither strikes nor the ideology variable have a statistically significant effect on implementation. 
The findings in models 10-12 provide additional support for the interactive effect of ideology 
and strikes. In both the full sample and during non-elections years, the left-wing governments are 
more likely to implement labor market reforms even in the presence of strong organized labor by 
2 percentage points. Although this effect is only significant during the non-election years, it is 
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not a substantively significant effect. More importantly, in model 12, I show that governments in 
the borrowing countries respond to the demands of strong organized labor in election years 
during which the implementation of labor market reforms are 20 percentage points lower for left 
governments than center/right wing governments.  
 
Table 3. Labor Market Implementation Full Models 
 
 
7) Full Sample 8) Non-Election 
9) 
Election 
10) Full 
Sample 
11) Non-
Election 
12) 
Election 
Strikes -0.019 -0.028 0.009 -0.057** -0.102** 0.054 
 
-0.032 -0.041 -0.042 -0.028 -0.041 -0.056 
Left -0.035 -0.007 -0.04 -0.061 -0.057 0.024 
 
-0.07 -0.087 -0.096 -0.073 -0.093 -0.098 
Strikes*Left    
0.071 0.121** -0.257** 
    
-0.044 -0.049 -0.124 
GDP Growth -0.005** -0.006** -0.003 -0.005** -0.006** -0.005 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unemployment -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.006 
 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 
UNSC 
Member 0.164* 0.176 0.127 0.193** 0.209 0.037 
 
-0.095 -0.128 -0.131 -0.091 -0.129 -0.178 
Trade % of 
GDP 0 0 0.002 0 -0.001 0.002 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Debt 0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.002 
 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 
Bureaucracy -0.02 -0.033 0.011 -0.022 -0.038 0.024 
 
-0.032 -0.038 -0.049 -0.032 -0.039 -0.049 
Political 
Constraints -0.008 0.03 -0.244 -0.015 0.016 -0.303 
 
-0.157 -0.15 -0.335 -0.155 -0.147 -0.343 
period 0.242 0.161 0.502 0.196 0.108 0.573 
 
-0.315 -0.409 -0.576 -0.31 -0.402 -0.563 
period 2 -0.131 -0.09 -0.254 -0.111 -0.069 -0.298 
 
-0.125 -0.165 -0.225 -0.123 -0.164 -0.22 
period 3 0.014 0.008 0.03 0.011 0.006 0.036 
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-0.015 -0.02 -0.026 -0.015 -0.02 -0.026 
Constant 0.34 0.447 0.064 0.38 0.505 0.034 
 
-0.253 -0.314 -0.466 -0.251 -0.306 -0.478 
       # of Observa. 265 187 78 265 187 78 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
 These effects are clearly shown in the marginal effect figures for the non-election year 
and election year samples. The solid line in Figure 6 represents the marginal effect of moving 
from right to left government on the implementation of labor market conditions strikes during 
non-election years when the number of strikes increases. Since both the upper and lower bounds 
of the confidence interval are above the zero line, the relationship is statistically significant. The 
magnitude of this effect varies with different number of strikes. As strikes increase, the positive 
marginal effect of strikes becomes larger in magnitude. In overall, the left governments are 
significantly more likely to implement labor market reforms by 15 percentage points than right 
governments when we increase the number of strikes from 0 to 8 per year. The opposite 
relationship holds true for the effect of strikes during election years, as shown in Figure 7. The 
left governments are significantly less likely to implement labor market reforms by 25 
percentage points than right governments when we increase the number of strikes from 0 to 8 per 
year. Both graphs also show that, when number of strikes is zero, there is no significant 
difference between the left and the center/right wing governments. Thus, the government 
responds to the demands of the labor when they have the collective ability to organize and strike 
especially during election years in which the left government relies on the support of the 
organized labor to win election. 
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Figure 6. Marginal effect of Left on the implementation of labor market reforms (Non-Election Year) 
 
 
Figure 7. Marginal effect of Left on the implementation of labor market reforms (Election Year) 
 
 These findings provide support to the idea that it is only the left-wing governments who 
are able to build the pro-reform coalitions for labor market reforms. This echoes the findings by 
Beazer and Woo (2015), who point out a similar effect for the left-wing governments in Central 
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and Eastern Europe. Moreover, the results confirm the expectation that the left still responds to 
strong organized labor in election years, whose support is critical to winning elections. In terms 
of the controls, neither the economic or political controls are consistently significant across 
different models.  
 Some of these variables, such as GDP growth, have the expected signs. Countries that 
have higher levels of growth are less likely to implement labor market reforms. Others such as 
inflation and UNSC temporary membership do not have the expected signs. These findings 
appear somewhat counter-intuitive given the fact that IMF policies are designed based on 
economic conditions in the borrowing countries. However, these factors might be more relevant 
in the program design stage than the implementation or might be more relevant for other 
conditions such as fiscal consolidation rather than labor market policies. To sum up, I conclude 
that the implementation of labor market conditionality is driven more by partisan politics in the 
presence of strong organized interests than other political conditions or macroeconomic 
conditions. Overall, the findings point to the left-wing governments’ ability to form pro-reform 
coalitions during non-election years by isolating the militant labor and their incentive to protect 
the labor, their main constituency, during election years despite their commitments to 
international institutions.   
 Recent episodes in Greece exemplify the left’s ability to overcome resistance and the 
right’s inability to form a pro-reform coalition due to strong opposition by the left and the 
unions. The newly elected coalition government in Greece, under the leadership of social 
democratic PASOK party, given the loss of market access and huge amount of debt, negotiated 
the terms of the first IMF program in 2010 (IMF 2010). The coalition government announced 
certain austerity measures with a mix of spending cuts and tax increases on May 2010. These 
reforms especially relied on decreasing pensions and wages and eventually brought down the 
government deficit from 15.8% in 2009 to 10.7% in 2010 (IMF 2010).32 The Greek authorities 
also made a strong start to the IMF program implementation by initiating pension and labor 
market reforms. The first review on August 2010 welcomed the efforts by the Greek authorities 
(IMF 2010). A joint statement by the TROIKA partners indicated that major reforms in public 
administration and pension system were ahead of the schedule. Despite the lack of broader 
political support from some political parties and even within his own party, severe political 
                                                 
32 This program had achieved a significant fiscal consolidation corresponding to 5% of the GDP. 
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upheaval outside the parliament and several strikes by the unions, the Greek Prime Minister 
Papandreou was successful in initiating the first round of reforms. Even the Fund praised the 
government’s willingness and effort to undertake difficult reforms defined this as an impressive 
effort and achievement by even international standards (IMF 2010, Wyplosz and Sgherri 2016).  
3.2.9 Robustness  
For robustness, I also run models with random and fixed effects. The main findings are robust to 
these specifications as well.33 I also use an alternative measure of the labor strength, labor 
surplus, which is a proxy for the informal sector of the working population. (Rudra 2004).34 
Rudra (2004) argues that the larger the informal sector is, the more difficult it gets for labor to 
organize. Thus, in countries with larger number of surplus workers, the labor would find it harder 
to collectively organize and pressure their respective governments. This measure also is similar 
to the PLP measure used by Caraway, Rickard et al. (2012). I transform this variable to have the 
higher values indicate higher organized labor strength and lower values indicate lower strength 
of organized labor. I then run the same models presented in the empirical section. The results, 
which are in in the Appendix, provide quantitatively similar insights to the power of organized 
labor and its effects on the implementation of labor market reforms. 
3.2.10 Conclusion 
One of the main arguments in this dissertation is that implementation should be analyzed at a 
disaggregated level by analyzing specific policy areas in which different organized interests have 
distinct effects. This chapter provides one of the initial efforts to analyze the disaggregated rates 
of implementation in IMF Conditionality by focusing on the labor market reforms. Accordingly, 
this study focuses on organized labor and its impact on the labor market reforms through partisan 
linkages. When faced with increasing number of strikes, left governments are more likely to 
                                                 
33 I provide the results from these models in the appendix. 
34 Surplus labor is calculated as the (working age population minus students enrolled in 
secondary education minus students enrolled in 'post-secondary' education) minus (laborforce/the 
workingage population) 
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implement labor market reforms than right/center governments in non-election years. However, 
during election years, they respond to strong labor and are less likely to accept and implement 
labor market reforms. These findings provide support to the idea that left governments are more 
capable of building the pro-reform coalitions regarding labor market reforms than center/right 
governments. This echoes the findings by Beazer and Woo (2015) who show similar effects in 
Central and Eastern European countries. However, organized labor has been traditionally weak 
in Central and Eastern European countries (Pop-Eleches 2008). This study generalizes Beazer 
and Woo (2015)’s finding by providing two crucial pieces of evidence. First, it shows that this 
effect is strong and present within a global sample. In fact, left governments not only are able to 
form pro-reform coalitions better than center/right governments but they can do so even when 
organized labor is strong and militant. Second, this study shows that electoral considerations 
remain even in the presence of major economic crises. Despite the left’s implementation success 
outside of election years, the left is less likely than the right to fulfill its international 
commitments when labor groups are strong and militant during election years. These findings 
highlight the left’s trade-off between the long-term goal of having a healthy labor market and 
short term incentives to win elections and appeal to the party base. Lastly, partisan politics 
matter only during election years for the design of conditionality. Their effects are much stronger 
during implementation of conditionality, where domestic political preferences still prevail under 
strong international pressures.  
 Moreover, this study builds on the previous literature that identifies the effect of 
organized interests on the design of conditionality (Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012). Strong and 
militant labor not only has an effect on the number of labor market conditions but also has a 
conditional effect on the implementation through their partisan linkages. By focusing on the 
implementation of labor market reforms in democracies, the results confirm that a disaggregated 
approach is fruitful for studying IMF structural conditionality. We can only predict the 
successful implementation of specific policy-related conditions when we know and account for 
the role of strong organized interest groups and stakeholders and their relationship to 
governments.  
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4.0  IMPLEMENTATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR CONDITIONALITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION   
The recent financial crisis has once again signified the need for having and maintaining a well-
functioning, sound and transparent financial sector. These generally require laws and regulations 
to tightly regulate financial sector activities, to establish supervision mechanisms and corrective 
actions in insolvent banks. The IMF has been one of the most significant and active promoters of 
financial sector reforms in developing countries to address these needs. Financial sector 
conditionality has become more salient since early 1990s, as a response to increasing critique of 
IMF programs that led to massive capital outflows and severe banking crisis. Especially during 
the Asian Financial Crisis, in which weak financial sector regulations were to blame, the Fund 
oriented its lending activity to preserve financial sector stability. In the light of studies that link 
financial sector development to economic growth (Levine 1997) and the IMF reforms to 
prevention of banking crises (Papi, Presbitero et al. 2015), understanding the determinants and 
implementation of IMF financial sector conditionality is critical.  
We still lack a systematic analysis of the conditions under which IMF programs include 
financial sector conditions, more importantly the conditions under which these reforms are 
implemented. There is a significant variation in the implementation of financial sector 
conditionality. For instance, when the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997, while Korea had easier 
time to implement financial sector reforms, countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
faced difficulties (Haggard 2000). Why do governments respond so differently to the IMF 
programs? What are the political conditions for successful implementation of financial sector 
reforms? How do the financial interests matter? 
This chapter highlights the role of domestic financial interests in the implementation of 
the IMF programs. Scholarly work has shown that the domestic financial interests either play a 
minimal role or support financial sector reforms (Woo 2010). However, I show the strength of 
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the financial sector interests is critical in understanding the implementation of IMF financials 
sector conditionality. Unlike the implementation of labor market conditionality, the effect of 
financial sector is not filtered through the partisan politics and electoral concerns in the 
implementation stage. Countries with stronger financial sectors are more likely to receive 
financial sector conditionality and in turn are less likely to implement those conditions.  
4.2 FINANCIAL SECTOR CONDITIONALITY 
Healthy and effective financial sector is critical for macroeconomic stability and economic 
growth (Levine 1997). Financial sector and its intermediaries play a crucial role in economic 
activities such as saving decisions, efficient allocation of resources, supporting sustainable public 
finances and sound macroeconomic policies (Giustiniani and Kronenberg 2005). As recent 
examples from the Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis show, unsound 
financial systems create or become the channel through which macroeconomic shocks are 
transmitted and lead to full-blown economic crisis. Consequently, the IMF has become 
increasingly focused its lending activities to diagnose and correct problems in the banking sector 
such as strengthening the financial soundness, enhancing the institutional and legal framework 
and putting the right incentives in place (IMF 2011).  
 
Figure 8. Percentage of Financial Sector Conditionality in the IMF Programs Between 1992-2015 
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Following the Asian Financial Crisis, financial sector conditionality has become common 
in the IMF programs and are the second most important area of structural reforms (IMF 2011). 
Figure 8 provides percentage of IMF programs that include at least one financial sector condition 
since 1992. The focus on the financial sector peaks especially at the onset of the financial crisis. 
Today, typical IMF programs include on average two financial sector conditions. Figure 9 
provides a summary of the evolution of the number of financial sector conditions since 1992. 
During its peak around mid-2000s, a typical IMF program included nearly 5 financial sector 
conditions. 
 
Figure 9. Average Number of Financial Sector Conditions in IMF Programs  
 
Financial sector reforms involve regulations regarding financial transactions, riskier 
behavior in the financial sector, liberalization and/or privatization of the financial institutions. 
For instance, Korea Program in 1997 included the following measures: “Call special session of 
Nat Assembly to pass: (i) bill on central bank independence with price stability as main mandate; 
(ii) bill to consolidate bank supervision; (iii) bill on corporate financial statement transparency 
(by 2nd biweekly review, 1/8/98)”. Moreover, the program included measures to allow foreign 
bank participation in the market such as, “Allow foreign banks & brokerage houses to establish 
subsidiaries (3/31/98”. Similarly, from 2010 to 2013, the Irish government and the Irish Central 
Bank have implemented a series of reforms that reduce the vulnerabilities of the financial 
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sector.35 For instance, given the extent of the problems in the financial sector, the Irish IMF 
program included measures to diagnose and correct problems such as: “Complete stress tests, 
diagnostic evaluation of banks’ assets and (…) a full assessment of credit unions’ loan 
portfolios”. Moreover, the program aimed to restructure financially troubled banks with 
measures such as “Submit to Oireachtas the Supervision and Enforcement Bill” and “The merger 
of Irish Nationwide Building Society and Anglo-Irish bank”. Moreover, the financial sector 
conditionality required regulatory standards on practice of lending, corporate governance code 
and capital requirements as well as a new risk-based supervisory authority.  
The IMF programs are signed around economic downturns such as currency, sovereign 
debt and banking crisis. In many cases such as the Asian Financial Crisis and the Eurozone 
crisis, the financial sector is at the center of the structural problems in the borrowing country 
(Haggard 2000, IEO 2016). Thus the IMF tries to diagnose and correct the structural problems in 
the borrowing country through policies. For instance, certain prudential regulations increase the 
bank’s reserve requirements to maintain systemic stability in case of sudden capital flows or 
bank runs (Rosenbluth and Schaap 2003). The Fund also invests in the financial oversight 
mechanisms such as creation of independent financial regulation authorities or increasing the 
role and independence of the central bank. These institutions detect and prevent risky behavior in 
the financial sector. Lastly, the Fund also imposes conditions that require downsizing, 
restructuring or privatization of the financial institutions in the borrowing country. 
Moreover, the IMF conditionality requires liberalization of foreign ownership 
restrictions. While benefiting from the cheaper access to foreign capital through capital account 
liberalization, the domestic financial interests favor restrictions on the inflow of foreign capital 
and foreign ownership rights (Pepinsky 2013). They especially prefer restrictions on the ability 
of foreign firms to own and operate in their home country to maintain their control as primary 
lenders. Especially in developing countries, the domestic financial institutions are weaker 
relative to their foreign counterparts from the developed economies. Thus, when the financial 
markets are liberalized, they would face severe competition from their foreign counterparts 
(Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2001, Pepinsky 2013). Foreign financial institutions have 
comparative advantage due to their ability to offer lower interest rates, mobilize greater funds 
                                                 
35 For detailed information on the IMF program in Ireland, please see: 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/IRL/. 
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and maintain higher profit margins than the domestic banks in the borrowing country (Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2001). 
These regulations affect financial actors by increasing the costs of doing business, 
leading to profit losses, increasing competition or scrutiny. As a result, the financial actors are 
adversely affected by these changes either through direct changes in their organizational 
structures or through the changes in their regulatory environment. That is why the financial 
actors such as banks are the main interest groups in understanding the financial sector reforms in 
the borrowing countries. Banks and firms experiencing stress have strong interests in delaying 
reforms since timing of these decisions affect their survival. For instance, they would claim that 
they are viable. There is anecdotal evidence that documents the effect of business and financial 
actors on policy outcomes. For instance, Haggard (2000) argues that close ties between business 
and government had long been a distinctive feature of many of the rapidly growing Asian 
economies prior to the Asian Financial Crisis. Thus, when the crisis hit in 1997, while Korea had 
easier time to implement financial reforms due to its control over the banks and the financial 
sector, countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, where the business support was a crucial 
element of the political formula, faced difficulties (Haggard 2000). 
4.2.1 IMF and Financial Sector Conditionality  
The scholarly work on the IMF-financial sector relationship has focused mainly on the 
determinants of capital account liberalization. Three sets of factors are relevant for understanding 
financial sector reform. First, learning among competitors in the global markets and diffusion 
mechanisms are important drivers of adopting new economic policies (Simmons and Elkins 
2004). Second, scholarly work has focused on the domestic political institutions. For instance, 
Mukherjee and Singer (2010) point out the interactive effect of welfare spending and the IMF 
loans. They show that large loans from the IMF provide an opportunity for borrowing 
governments to initiate capital account liberalization since the IMF loans help governments to 
compensate the adversely affected groups (Mukherjee and Singer 2010). When welfare spending 
is adequate to compensate losers from financial sector reform in a borrowing country, the large 
IMF loans shield the governments from the possible costs. Perhaps surprisingly, in one of the 
most comprehensive studies of financial sector reforms, Mody and Abiad (2003) find that the 
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ideology of the government does not matter. Third, discrete event such as formation of new 
governments and changes in macroeconomic circumstances are important drivers of the financial 
sector reforms. Among these factors, the role of the IMF has been emphasized. Simmons and 
Elkins (2004) show that the use of IMF credits are associated with more restrictive capital 
controls. On the other hand, Chwieroth shows that participation in the IMF programs is 
associated with capital account liberalization (Chwieroth 2009).  
 Similar to the research on the labor market conditionality, scholarly work mainly focused 
on the analysis of certain financial outcomes, rather than the determinants of the design and 
implementation of the financial sector conditionality. The only exception to this is a study by 
Gould (2003), who shows how the conditionality is influenced by private financiers such as the 
commercial banks who supplement the Fund’s loans to borrowers. By focusing primarily on 
“bank friendly conditions” which requires the borrowing country to pay back commercial bank 
creditor as a condition of its loan,  Gould (2003) shows that these supplementary financiers 
influence the terms of the Fund conditionality. Thus, the research on the IMF financial sector 
requirements fails to capture the particular contentions such as the effect of financial interests. 
Why are some governments more likely to implement financial sector conditions than others? 
This study shows that the implementation of financial sector reforms is driven by idiosyncratic 
domestic institutional and/or political factors, such as the strength of the financial interests. 
Unlike the labor market conditionality and the effect of the unions, the financial interests’ effect 
is not filtered through partisan differences and electoral concerns in the implementation stage but 
partisan politics matter for the design of financial sector conditionality.  
4.2.2 Summary of the Theoretical Argument  
Due to their importance, the IMF targets these important sectors of the economy, especially 
when they seem dysfunctional. When the financial sector is strong, the IMF maximizes 
conditionality to ensure the stability and transparency of the sector, enable access for the foreign 
institutions, especially the ones from the major stakeholders. Countries with large and 
dysfunctional capital markets are more likely to have financial sector reforms as a part of their 
loan package. However, whether the borrowing country government responds to the IMF 
pressures in the presence of strong organized interests is function of partisan interests. Left 
 63 
governments respond to low-income groups and trade unions, and the right governments protect 
the owners of the capital such as businesses as their respective constituencies. The short-run 
costs of financial sector reform are borne by a numerically small but economically important and 
politically influential group. Financial sector interests do not collectively organize and mobilize 
electoral groups. The financial sector resists to these reforms through their discretionary control 
over the economic interactions in the borrowing country and through the use and allocation of 
their funds (Calomiris and Mason 2003). This group exerts political pressure by lobbying 
governments not by mobilizing voters at election time. Left governments will use the political 
leverage of the IMF to accept and implement reforms that impose short-run costs on large and 
dysfunctional financial sectors. Right governments, because they are more sensitive to political 
pressure from capital, will be less likely to accept and implement reforms when they 
face opposition from a large financial sector. 
4.2.3 Research Design   
I rely on the same dataset extracted from the IMF's MONA database to analyze financial sector 
conditionality, which covers the IMF arrangements concluded with the borrowing countries 
between 1992 and 2012. The financial sector reforms include changes in the financial sector 
regulations/supervision and restructuring and privatization of the financial institutions. 
 As part of the arrangements, IMF reviews and records implementation of each condition 
in the MONA database. I first code the number of policy conditions in the financial sector. Then 
I code whether the borrowing country meets these conditions or not. If the condition is met 
(meaning that the actual reform is undertaken), it is coded as 1 and if it is not met (meaning that 
the reform is not undertaken), it is coded as 0. If the condition is not met or half-met, I consider it 
as not implemented and consider 0. The unit of analysis for this paper is program/year to capture 
the dynamic nature of IMF programs. Thus I calculate total number of policy conditions under 
review for each year and then create a corresponding measure for the implementation record for 
each program/year as a percentage of total conditions implemented. This variable, which 
measures the percentage of financial sector conditions implemented in a program/year 
observation, is the dependent variable in this study. There is a total of 1495 program years 
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between 1993 and 2012. 1134 of these program/years include at least one financial sector 
condition.  
4.2.4 Empirical Approach   
Unlike the study of labor market conditionality in which the interest of the unions is mediated 
through electoral politics in democracies, I do not necessarily focus on democratic borrowers in 
the case of the financial sector conditionality. The quantitative analysis includes a global sample 
of all the borrowers since 1992. Secondly, the sample also includes both concessional and non-
concessional programs. In the case of labor market conditionality, there are significant 
differences in the IMF’s goals and priorities between concessional and non-concessional 
programs. However, no significant difference exists in the case of the financial sector 
conditionality. The Fund aims to increase the stability of the financial sector through policies that 
reduce the vulnerabilities by building capacity for crisis contingency and investing in the 
soundness of the financial sector and that enable development of the market and the financial 
infrastructure. Although concessional programs rely less on bank restructuring due to relatively 
weaker financial sectors in the low income countries, the overall program goals are quite similar 
and negatively affect financial interests.  
 Similar to the analysis of labor market conditionality, one of the main concerns for the 
empirical analysis of implementation is the sample selection problem and effect of 
unobservables. If political and economic factors that condition the negotiations on the IMF loan 
agreements and lead to fewer conditions, we cannot distinguish whether the compliant behavior 
with these conditions is attributable to an independent set of factors or the factors that determine 
them in the first place. To correct for these problems, I first run Heckman selection models. The 
first stage of the model predicts selection into sample, receiving financial sector conditionality. 
The second stage predicts the implementation of financial sector conditionality. Since the first 
stage requires an instrument, I use the total number of IMF programs with labor market 
conditions in the previous year as an instrument.36 The logic behind this instrument is that it 
proxies the technocratic nature of the IMF in the program design stage in assigning labor 
                                                 
36 I also use percentage of program rather than total number of program both in the global and 
regional level. The results are robust to these specifications as well.  
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conditionality to borrowers. Any political and economic factor that determines the design of IMF 
programs would also be likely to affect implementation as well. Thus, to satisfy exclusion 
restriction criteria, I choose this variable that is necessarily driven by the IMF’s own technocratic 
considerations and assessments of the global economy rather than political/economic 
characteristics of the borrowing country. Since this variable is coded annually, it also accounts 
for shifts in the ideological orientations of the IMF. This instrument is driven by the IMF's 
technocratic considerations, which is independent of the domestic political processes that drive 
implementation. The IMF's effect on the design stage should be larger due to vulnerabilities of 
the borrowing country government and their expertise advantage vis a via the government. Thus, 
its technocratic judgement and assessment on assigning conditionality should apply to different 
countries under similar economic/political conditions, within the same year. However, the 
implementation process is driven more by domestic characteristics, which is (relatively) more 
independent of the IMF's technocratic preferences.  
 Unlike labor market conditionality, the error term that accounts for the unexplained or the 
unobserved is significant in the financial sector analysis. There is a significant and negative 
correlation between the error terms of the selection (conditionality) and outcome 
(implementation) equations. This means that distribution of unobserved factors across the 
countries with and without financial sector conditions attached to their IMF programs are not 
non-randomly distributed (Vreeland, 2003). This necessitates the use of selection-corrected 
estimates of implementation. Thus, I present the Heckman models for both design and 
implementation stages. 
 For some of the critical control variables, the data sources contain a high proportion of 
missing values.37 Similar to the analysis in the labor market chapter, I use multiple imputation 
techniques to address these problems. The unit of analysis is program/year. All the models are 
estimated using multiple imputation and Heckman selection models. I also include cubic 
polynomial time trends to account for the dynamic nature of IMF programs and lag all the 
independent variables, except the ideology variable, one year. Thus, the models presented show 
the likelihood of receiving IMF conditionality and implementation by borrowing country 
                                                 
37 I provide a complete list of missing observations for each variable included in analysis in the 
appendix.   
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government at time t in response to the financial sector strength, the economic and political 
conditions at t-1.  
4.2.5 Explanatory Variables 
To proxy for the strength of the financial sector, I use a measure of “capital stocks”, which 
comes from the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar et al. 2015). This variable captures the 
strength of capital owners in the borrowing country and proxies for the financial/business 
interests within a given economy. I use capital stocks variable as a percentage of the GDP, to 
account for the share and importance of the financial sector for the economy of the borrowing 
country. Higher values of the capital stock means that financial interests contribute to a higher 
percentage of the economy and are stronger in the borrowing country. The capital stock variables 
ranges from 0.15 to 9.5, which means that the share of the capital stock in GDP has a maximum 
value of 0.15, very small contribution, and a maximum value of nearly 10 percent, significant 
portion of the economic activity. Its mean is 2.88 percent of the GDP.  
Ideology variables come from various sources. For the countries in the Central and 
Eastern Europe, I rely on Frye (2010) that classifies executives in these countries as belonging to 
left, center or right according to their economic policy orientations. For the Latin American 
countries, I rely on Coppedge (1995) and Pop-Eleches (2009) to identify government/executive 
ideology along the same lines. For the remaining countries in the dataset, I rely on World Bank 
Database on Political Institution’s (WDI) ‘executive partisanship’ variable. I then create a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for the left-wing governments and 0 for the others. 
Since I rely on conditional hypothesis regarding the interaction between the interest groups and 
partisanship, I also create interaction terms equal to the product of the right-wing dummy and 
capital stocks variable. All models that include the interaction term also include both constitutive 
terms. 
To reduce the worries of omitted variables bias, I control for a number of variables that 
are likely confounders. The design and implementation of the IMF programs are determined in 
response to the borrowing country’s financial problems, domestic characteristic and geopolitical 
factors. The higher number of veto players make it less likely to implement policies (Tsebelis 
2002). Thus, I control for the political constraints index (Henisz 2004). This measure estimates 
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the feasibility of policy change by taking into account veto players and the heterogeneity within 
the legislative branch among different parties and within different branches of government 
(Henisz 2004). The higher values of this index indicate higher political constraints, and thus 
higher policy predictability. I expect countries with higher political constraints to have more 
conditions included in the programs since the government would use the IMF conditionality to 
overcome domestic oppositions such as the veto points. However, the higher the political 
constraints, the more difficult it should be to implement financial sector reforms.  
The research on the conditionality suggests that the US favors its strategic allies (Stone 
2008). Dreher and Jensen (2007) argue that temporary membership to the UNSC better proxies 
the donor influences on the IMF decisions than other measures such as bilateral aid from the 
United States and United Nations General Assembly voting similarities. The UNSC temporary 
membership information comes from Dreher and Jensen (2007) and indicates whether the 
borrowing country has been a temporary member of the UNSC when signing or implementing 
the IMF program. Since this dataset only covers members until 2012, I code the missing 
variables from the UNSC website. We expect the UNSC temporary members to have a lower 
likelihood of receiving financial sector conditions and implementing these reforms since they are 
less likely to be punished by the IMF for non-compliance. I define democracies by relying on the 
the Polity2 scores. The countries with scores of 6 and higher are defined as democracies. As 
summarized in the theory section, the expectation regarding the effect of democracies is 
ambiguous.  
I also control for some standard correlates of financial liberalization and financial sector 
reforms such as the bank non-performing loans to gross loans (%). Conditionality in the financial 
sector will be more important when there are larger problems, with higher non-performing loans. 
I also control for capital account openness which comes from Chinn and Ito (2006). In order to 
account for some structural features of the financial sector, I control for Bank concentration (%), 
percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets (%) and credit to government and 
state-owned enterprises to GDP (%). The Bank concentration variable measures the ratio of the 
assets of the country's three largest banks to total banking assets. Especially in the developing 
countries, a small group of lenders might control the market and profit from their dominant 
access (Pepinsky 2013). Highly concentrated banking sector would lead the IMF to open the 
market to competition and increase the likelihood of financial conditionality. However, these 
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actors, by using their market power, would also try to maintain their dominance and attempt to 
block the implementation of reforms. Moreover, when the government controls the financial 
institutions, they allocate credit to themselves and connected firms. I control for the amount of 
credit to government and state enterprises to measure the extent of the government control over 
the financial sector. The government might not be willing to give up their control over financial 
authority and thus the implementation should go down. Lastly, I control for the influence of 
foreign banks in the domestic market. Foreign financial institutions seek policies that provide 
cheaper access to capital and better regulatory environment. Thus if they control the domestic 
market, they would seek financial conditionality and its implementation. These variables come 
from the Global Financial Development Data (GFDD) (Čihák, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2012).  
I use a number of commonly consulted economic controls such as GDP Growth, GDP 
Per Capita, Inflation, Trade as a percentage of GDP, and the Total Debt Service as a percentage 
of Exports to control for the macroeconomic environment in the borrowing country. These 
economic controls come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The GDP 
Growth and the GDP Per Capita measures proxy the country's level of economic development. 
Wealthier countries may find it easier to resist pressures for financial protectionism due to more 
diversified economic bases. Moreover, in terms of institutional structure, several scholars 
highlight the capacity of the borrowing country governments to implement reforms. The richer 
economies and the countries with better bureaucracies are found to have better program 
implementation records (Pop-Eleches, 2008b). Thus, I also control for bureaucratic capacity, 
which comes from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Dataset. This variable proxy the 
institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy. Higher points in this variable means that the 
bureaucracy is strong and has expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services and autonomous from political pressure. I expect a better 
bureaucratic apparatus to negotiate harder, which leads to fewer conditions and then make it 
easier for government to implement complex rules and regulations.  
Other macroeconomic indicators (inflation, debt and exports) relate to the overall 
economic conditions in the borrowing country. The negative economic conditions increase the 
need for IMF loans, which in turn increases the implementation. Lastly, I control for the size of 
the IMF Loan by including the total access variable, which is coded from the IMF official 
website with respect to each program. Total access to the IMF Funds is the amount of Fund loans 
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as a ratio of the country’s quota. The ratio increases with larger loans. As total access increases, 
it is easier for the the borrowing country government to compensate for the loss to the domestic 
interests, thus the implementation increases (Mukherjee and Singer 2010). The choice of control 
variables for the financial sector models is guided by the analysis of Mody and Abiad (2003). I 
provide the summary statistics for all the independent variables included in the analysis in the 
appendix. 
4.2.6 Results and Discussion   
I present the results from the Heckman selection models. I briefly focus on the selection equation 
(the design of conditionality) and then on the outcome equation, the implementation of financial 
sector reforms. This is necessary to account for selection and effect of unobservables. Table 5, 
models 1-2, reports the unconditional effect of capital stocks. Model 3 reports the interactive 
effects capital stocks and right wing government. Finally, models 4 and 5 report the full models 
without and with interaction effects. The results provide strong support to the idea that the 
countries with stronger financial sectors are more likely to receive financial sector conditionality. 
 
Table 4. Financial Sector Conditionality Models (Heckman Model Selection Equation) 
 
  1) 2)  3)  4)  5) 
      Capital Stocks 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.083*** 0.043* 0.012 
 
-0.025 -0.026 -0.03 -0.032 -0.037 
Left Government 
 
0.181** -0.042 0.208** -0.246 
  
-0.081 -0.203 -0.096 -0.223 
CapitalStocks*Left 
  
0.076 
 
0.161** 
   
-0.062 
 
-0.069 
Democracy 
   
-0.049 -0.051 
    
-0.096 -0.103 
Political 
Constraints 
   
0.165 0.128 
    
-0.233 -0.241 
Bureaucracy 
   
0.06 0.071 
    
-0.07 -0.078 
GDP Growth 
   
0.012 0.012 
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-0.007 -0.008 
GDP Per Capita 
   
0.000 0.000 
    
0.000 0.000 
Inflation 
   
0.002*** 0.002*** 
    
0.000 0.000 
Capital Account 
   
0.065** 0.064** 
    
-0.032 -0.032 
Trade % of GDP 
   
0.002* 0.003* 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
Debt 
   
-0.002 -0.005 
    
-0.008 -0.008 
UNSC 
   
-0.207 -0.184 
    
-0.177 -0.177 
Non-Performing Loans 
  
0.011* 0.010* 
    
-0.005 -0.006 
Bank 
Concentration 
   
-0.006** -0.006** 
    
-0.002 -0.002 
% of Foreign 
Banks 
   
-0.002** -0.002** 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
Credit to State 
Insti.  
   
0.010** 0.008 
    
-0.006 -0.006 
Total Access 
   
0.000*** 0.000*** 
    
0.000 0.000 
Instrument 3.370*** 3.334*** 3.610*** 2.120** 2.307** 
 
-0.414 -0.415 -0.431 -0.849 -0.877 
period -0.004 -0.001 -0.043 -0.069 -0.106 
 
-0.49 -0.491 -0.506 -0.514 -0.531 
period 2 -0.023 -0.025 -0.022 0.017 0.021 
 
-0.194 -0.193 -0.198 -0.202 -0.207 
period 3 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 
 
-0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 
Constant -1.834 -1.836 -1.96 -0.721 -0.731 
 
-0.47 -0.47 -0.487 -0.865 -0.898 
# of Observations 1495 1495 1495 1495 1495 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 In all the models, the capital stocks variable is positive and significant (except the full 
model with interactions, Model 5, unconditionally and conditionally with the inclusion of control 
variables. When the share of the financial/business interests in the GDP increases, it is more 
likely that the program will include financial sector conditionality. Figure 10 provides the 
marginal effect of capital stocks on the likelihood of receiving financial sector conditionality. 
When the share of the capital stocks in GDP rises from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 9 
percent, the predicted probability of receiving financial sector conditionality increases by 25 
percent. 
 
Figure 10. Marginal Effects of Capital Stocks on Financial Sector Conditionality 
 
It is also interesting to note that the coefficient of the left wing dummy is also positive 
and significant (Models 2-4). This also supports the partisan expectations. The programs that are 
signed by the left wing governments are more likely to have financial sector conditions. 
Moreover, as it is seen in Model 5, this is especially true when strong financial interests and left 
wing governments are both present. Figure 11 shows the effect of ideology in response to 
increasing financial sector importance for the economy. Both left wing and right wing 
governments are more likely to receive financial sector conditionality when we move from an 
economy where the financial sector has minimal importance to where they have maximum 
importance. However, the left wing governments on average more likely than the right wing 
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governments to receive the financial sector reforms and this difference increases when the 
financial sector gets stronger. This supports the idea that the left wing governments might use the 
IMF conditionality to weaken financial sector interests.  
 
Figure 11. Marginal Effect of Ideology on Financial Sector Conditionality 
 
Models 4 and 5 also show that the financial sector conditionality is designed in response 
to underlying economic and structural conditions in the borrowing country. The likelihood of 
receiving financial sector conditions increase with higher inflation and more open economies 
(trade as a percentage of GDP and capital account openness). The IMF also responds to 
structural features of the financial sector since credit to state enterprises and higher non-
performing loans are significantly associated with higher financial sector conditionality. 
However, when major banks control the market, the likelihood of receiving conditionality 
significantly goes down. As expected, larger IMF programs in terms of the size of the loans 
include more financial sector conditions. Lastly, political factor does not seem to matter in the 
design of conditionality since democracy, bureaucratic quality and political controls do not have 
a significant effect. Although the UNSC temporary membership has a negative effect as 
expected, it is not significant. In summary, the design of IMF conditionality is driven by the 
strength of the financial interests and partisan preferences and the underlying economic 
conditions in the borrowing country.  
 73 
Why might be the case? Despite the importance of the financial sector and their control 
over the economy, why do these programs with strong financial sector interests receive more 
conditionality? When the financial sector is strong, the IMF maximizes conditionality to ensure 
the stability and transparency of the sector, enable access for the foreign institutions, especially 
the ones from the major stakeholders. Moreover, restoring stability to the financial sector is 
crucial and requires rapid action during the design stage by the IMF (Calomiris and Mason 
2003). Thus, similar to the labor markets, the economic importance of the financial sector makes 
them an obvious target for reform by IMF. The IMF has long been one of the main drivers of 
financial sector liberalization. 
4.2.7 Implementation of Financial Sector Conditionality    
I focus on the second stage of the Heckman model, the determinants of the implementation of the 
financial sector conditionality. Firstly, the disturbances are significantly and negatively 
correlated between the selection and outcome equations. Unobservable characteristics increase 
the likelihood of receiving financial sector conditionality and decrease the likelihood that these 
reforms will be implemented.  
 
Table 5. Financial Sector Implementation Models (Heckman Model Outcome Equation) 
 
  1) 2)  3)  4) 5) 
      Capital Stock -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.023* -0.016* -0.013 
 
-0.016 -0.017 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 
Left Government 
 
-0.049 0.022 -0.029 0.027 
  
-0.038 -0.075 -0.027 -0.057 
CapitalStock*Left 
  
-0.019 
 
-0.014 
   
-0.021 
 
-0.016 
Democracy 
   
-0.036 -0.011 
    
-0.028 -0.029 
Political 
Constraints 
   
0.148** 0.147** 
    
-0.069 -0.07 
Bureucratic Quality 
   
-0.039** -0.033* 
    
-0.018 -0.019 
 74 
GDP Growth 
   
0.000 0.000 
    
-0.002 -0.002 
GDP Per Capita 
   
0.000* 0.000 
    
0.000 0.000 
Inflation 
   
0.000 0.000 
    
0.000 0.000 
Capital Account 
   
0.003 0.005 
    
-0.009 -0.008 
Trade % of GDP 
   
0.001*** 0.001*** 
    
0.000 0.000 
Debt 
   
-0.002 -0.001 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
UNSC 
   
0.093* 0.090* 
    
-0.052 -0.052 
Non-Performing Loans 
  
0.000 0.000 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
Bank 
Concentration 
   
0.000 0.000 
    
0.000 0.000 
% of Foreign 
Banks 
   
0.000*** 0.000*** 
    
0.000 0.000 
Credit to State 
Insti.  
   
0.001 0.001 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
Total Access 
   
0.000 0.000 
    
0.000 0.000 
period -0.046 -0.047 -0.077 -0.06 -0.105 
 
-0.24 -0.243 -0.224 -0.169 -0.172 
period 2 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.006 0.021 
 
-0.097 -0.098 -0.09 -0.069 -0.07 
period 3 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
-0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 
Constant 0.761 0.771 0.743 0.491 0.493 
 
-0.182 -0.186 -0.17 -0.141 -0.146 
Mills -0.589*** -0.595*** -0.530*** -0.112* -0.093 
 
-0.117 -0.119 -0.101 -0.08 -0.074 
# of Observations 1134 1134 1134 1134 1134 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results provide strong support to the idea that, once the agreement is signed, the 
financial sector pressures their governments to not to implement conditionality. Table 6, Model 1 
reports the unconditional effect of capital stocks on the implementation of financial sector 
conditionality. This effect is consistently shown in models 2, 3 and 4 as well. As the financial 
interests get stronger, the implementation of financial sector conditionality goes down. When we 
move from an economy where financial/business sector does not contribute significantly to the 
economy (capital stocks is 1) to an economy where they contribute significantly (capital stocks I 
10), the implementation of financial sector conditionality goes down nearly by 27 percent (model 
1), 22 percent (model 3) and 15 percent (model 4) respectively. Figure 12 provides the effect of 
the capital stocks in the implementation of financial sector reforms (based on model 4). The 
average implementation rate for the financial sector conditionality is around 40 percent. As 
shown in the figure, the implementation goes down by nearly 15 percent when we compare an 
economy with no financial sector to an economy with a significant financial sector. This is a 
substantively significant effect.  
It is also interesting to note that, the effect of the financial sector does not depend on the 
ideology of the government since neither the unconditional effects of the left wing dummy nor 
the interactive effects are significant. Unlike the labor market reforms, the effect of the financial 
interests is mediated neither by the partisan politics nor by the democratic institutions such as 
electoral process during the implementation process.38 In summary, countries with large financial 
sectors are more likely to have financial sector reforms than countries that do not have large 
financial sectors due to incentives to correct structural problems in the economy. However, when 
the financial sector is large, their economic importance and influence over the economy also 
increases. Thus, the implementation of financial sector conditionality is more difficult in 
countries with large financial sectors. 
 
 
                                                 
38 I run similar models to labor market models by splitting the sample for democracies and non-
democracies and during and outside the election years. However, the capital stocks variable is 
not significant in these models. Moreover, I also run fixed and random effect models. The main 
results are robust to these specifications as well.  
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Figure 12. Marginal Effect of Capital Stocks on Financial Sector Implementation 
 
 
 In terms of the controls, some of the economic controls have the expected signs. The 
countries that have more open economies are more likely to implement financial sector 
conditionality. This is probably because they want to send more positive signals to the 
international markets. However, neither the macroeconomic conditions and nor the level of 
economic development have a significant effect on the implementation of the financial sector 
conditionality. As expected, the number of foreign banks operating in the borrowing country 
increases implementation since these actors would benefit from a more stable and sound 
financial system. They would also benefit from the reforms associated with the financial sector 
conditionality such as increasing openness. Interestingly, other structural characteristics such as 
the concentration in the financial sector and state’s control over the industry do not have a 
significant effect. Similarly, larger IMF loans are not significantly associated with better 
implementation of conditionality. Lastly, the geopolitics play an unexpected role. The temporary 
members of the UNSC are significantly more likely to implement the financial sector reforms by 
nearly 1 percent. Although unexpected, this is not a substantially significant effect.   
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 The political controls, that do not have a significant effect during the design stage, are 
important drivers of the implementation. Countries with higher political constraints are more 
likely to implement the IMF reforms. This supports the idea that the government might use the 
IMF conditionality to implement reforms that might be otherwise costly. Unexpectedly, better 
bureaucracies are associated with lower implementation rates. When bureaucracy is strong, it has 
professional expertise to govern and independent of the political pressure, the implementation of 
the financial reforms goes down.  
 To sum up, we can conclude that the implementation of financial sector conditionality is 
driven the preferences of strong organized interests and some structural features in the financial 
sector. Overall, the findings point to the incentives of the financial interests in the 
implementation stage rather than underlying political conditions such as ideology of the 
government and democratic institutions. Moreover, some international factors such as the 
openness of the economy and the presence of foreign banks have significant effect on 
implementation.  
4.2.8 Conclusion  
One of the main arguments in this dissertation is that implementation should be analyzed at a 
disaggregated level by analyzing specific policy areas in which different organized interests have 
distinct effects. In addition to the previous chapter that documented the mechanisms through 
which the organized labor affects the implementation of labor market reforms, this chapter shows 
the effect of strong financial interests on the design and implementation of financial sector 
conditionality. IMF borrowers with stronger financial sectors are more likely to receive financial 
sector conditionality.  IMF maximizes conditionality to ensure the stability and transparency of 
the sector, enable access for the foreign institutions, especially the ones from the major 
stakeholders. Moreover, left wing governments on average more likely than the right wing 
governments to receive the financial sector reforms, especially when financial sector is stronger. 
Left wing governments use the IMF conditionality to weaken financial sector interests in the 
design stage. Due to lack of broader electoral appeal and organizing capacity, the effect of the 
financial interests is not necessarily mediated by the partisan politics and electoral concerns 
during the implementation stage. Their effect operates through their importance and control over 
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the economy irrespective of regime type and government ideology. As the financial interests get 
stronger, the implementation of financial sector conditionality goes down. 
 This chapter provides additional proof that a disaggregated approach is fruitful in 
studying the IMF structural conditionality. We can only predict the successful implementation of 
specific policy-related conditions when we know and account for the role of strong organized 
interest groups and stakeholders.  
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5.0  IRELAND 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
Quantitative analysis of the labor and financial sector reforms provide strong evidence regarding 
the effect of organized interests in specific policy areas. I now analyze the politics of the 
structural adjustment programs initiated during the Euro-zone crisis, with specific focus on the 
proposed policy measures and their implementation in Ireland and Greece. 
Although the IMF’s involvement in the Eurozone programs has been highly criticized, 
this involvement posed extraordinary challenges and raises interesting questions. First, the IMF 
programs in Europe accounted for nearly 80% of the total IMF lending for the period of 2011-
2014 (De Las Casas 2016). The programs in Ireland, Greece and Portugal were granted on the 
basis of exceptional access to the Fund’s resources (IEO 2016). 39 The IMF programs normally 
limit access to 200 percent of quota for any 12-month period or 600 percent cumulatively over 
the life of the program (Schadler 2016). The Greek program, equivalent to 3200 percent of 
Greece’s quota in the Fund, was in fact the largest access granted to a member country.  
Second, the IMF rarely has programs in industrialized democracies. The West European 
countries under the IMF programs are among the most developed countries, with strong 
democratic institutions and traditions. Thus, these case studies on Ireland and Greece are ideal to 
study and further explain causal mechanisms that rely on the role of domestic interest groups and 
their relationship with their respective governments. Third, although the IMF participates in 
common currency areas, the Eurozone is unique by uniting advanced and highly integrated 
economies, and by possessing a strong institutional structure with the European Central Bank 
                                                 
39 Countries such as Brazil, Turkey and South Korea have previously been granted access to 
exceptionally large programs. The largest program relative to quota (1938 percent) was South 
Korea SBA program in 1997.  
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(ECB) and the European Commission (EC). Thus, focusing on the politics of implementation in 
European programs not only provides a nuanced understanding of politics of reform in specific 
issue areas but also enables an analysis of the IMF’s unique role in the Eurozone crisis. I focus 
on the role of IMF in the Eurozone by analyzing the design and implementation of programs in 
Ireland and in Greece, with a specific focus on the politics of labor market and financial sector 
conditionality. 
I will first discuss the origins of the economic crisis in Ireland and then the initial policy 
responses. After outlining the major political actors, their preferences and policy-making 
traditions in Ireland, I will detail the IMF program and the determinants of the design of 
conditionality by analyzing the interaction within TROIKA, the preferences of the coalition 
government members and their interaction with the domestic interests. I will then focus on the 
implementation of labor market and financial sector conditionality and then conclude.  
5.2 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN IRELAND  
Ireland has been recovering from its worst economic crisis since independence. The crisis started 
with the sudden collapse in the construction sector which led to sharp increase in public deficit, 
unemployment and intensified with problems in the banking sector (Dellepiane and Hardiman 
2012). Between 2007 and 2011, the real GDP declined by 5.4%, the real domestic demand fell 
cumulatively by 26%, and the unemployment rose from 4.5% to almost 15%. Due in part to the 
increasing effects of the global financial crisis, the Irish government deficit reached an 
unsustainable 10% at the end of 2010. As a result, along with increasing pressure from the EC 
and ECB, Ireland entered into an adjustment program in November 2010. The program in Ireland 
aimed to ‘restore the strength of the financial sector and re-establish fiscal credibility’ (IMF 
2010). The adjustment strategy rested on two critical pillars: fundamental downsizing and re-
organization of the banking sector and an ambitious fiscal consolidation with structural 
conditions (IMF 2010).  
From November 2010 to December 2013, Ireland implemented reforms in the financial 
market supported by significant fiscal consolidation and structural measures. Ireland was able to 
reduce its structural primary deficit to .5 percent of GDP in 2013. Especially employment and 
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wages in the public sector were cut tremendously. The government implemented a series of labor 
market reforms along with a new residential property tax, a social welfare bill and a modest job-
stimulus package. As a result, Ireland was able to successfully conclude its Program in 
December 2013.   
The strong willingness of the coalition government and bureaucratic capacity to 
implement the reforms are among the reasons for this success. The center-right and left coalition 
composed of Fine Gael and Labor Party was able to maintain both intra-party and inter-party 
cohesion. Moreover, a highly efficient and professional Irish bureaucratic apparatus was crucial 
both during the design and implementation process, providing significant bargaining power. One 
of the critical aspects of Irish experience has been that the government was able to secure the 
support of key social actors such as the unions and employer organizations through social 
dialogue and serious of negotiations. As the Fund puts it, “the social dialogue has established a 
stable framework for change in a very challenging context and has dampened down levels of 
conflict within the public sector’ (IMF 2013). The Labor party, in particular, had been critical in 
integrating the relevant stakeholders to the policymaking process and in moderating the 
government agenda in several ways.  
The Irish experience provides several interesting insights regarding the implementation of 
financial sector and labor market reforms. First, the Irish financial sector has been relatively 
weak and did not have significant influence over the government. Thus, the implementation of 
the financial sector reforms was not significantly opposed. However, the analysis of the 
interaction between the financial sector, debtors such as the mortgage borrowers in the country 
and the government provides insights regarding particular contentions with respect to the 
financial sector reforms. Secondly, the unions in Ireland have not been strong and militant. 
Despite their weaknesses, the unions were able to gain concessions through their links to the 
minority party in the government, the Labor Party. The empirical analysis on the labor market 
suggests that the right wing governments would find it easier to implement labor market reforms 
when they do not face significant opposition, especially in non-election years. The analysis of the 
Irish program supports this expectation. However, it also highlights the unique role of the Labor 
Party and social partnership process in Ireland that enabled the unions to have access to policy-
makers and maintained social order. This exemplifies how the effect of unions is mediated by 
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their access to individual ministers (Alexiadou 2016) and also highlights the structure of the 
labor market coordination and its mediating effect on the organized interests.  
I will first focus on the nature of the economic crisis in Ireland, the signing of the IMF 
program and the program conditions. Then I will specifically focus on the politics of reform with 
respect to the financial sector and labor market reforms with an analysis of the Irish decision 
making process, the relevant social and political actors, their preferences and effect on the 
process.  
5.2.1 The Irish Financial Crisis 
Declining growth rates, doubts about fiscal sustainability and a fragile banking sector were the 
main problems, which feed each other and undermined the confidence in the Irish economy (IMF 
2010). The roots of the problems lie in the Celtic Tiger years (1994-2007) that were fueled by a 
decade of export and FDI related growth (IMF 2012). A number of factors such as favorable 
demographics, a well-educated workforce, high productivity and a business-friendly 
environment have contributed to this growth (Commission 2014). Between 1995 and 2002, the 
Irish economy became increasingly productive, the unemployment rate fell to 4% and the fiscal 
conditions remained strong (Commission 2014). However, from 2002 onwards, the economic 
growth increasingly relied developments in the property markets that benefited from lax lending 
practices. The productivity gains began to decline and inflation remained high (Commission 
2014). Rapidly rising property prices led to increasing fixed investment in commercial and 
residential property. This boom in the real estate markets sustained raising wages and led to 
continued prize increases, however at the same time eroding competitiveness and compressing 
real interest rates.40 By 2006, the state still seemed to be strong fiscally due to the revenues 
created through stamp duty and capital gains tax, the VAT paid by developers and income tax 
paid by workers (Commission 2014). Heavy reliance on these property-related avenues also 
masked the very narrow tax base, creating vulnerability for the state finances. The state had also 
invested heavily in expensive capital projects, leading to a rapid increase in the public 
                                                 
40 For instance, the housing prices rose by 240 percent in Ireland between 1997 and 2007. The 
change was 175 percent in the US, 180 percent in Spain and 210 percent in Britain (Krugman 
and Wells 2010). 
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expenditure.  
This bubble in the property market was mainly financed by a surge in the bank lending. 
Parallel to the global increase in risky lending practices in the financial markets and soft 
regulatory and supervisory oversight, the Irish banks also concentrated in property markets.41 
Moreover, the close personal and financial links between the actors in the financial sector, 
construction businesses and politicians especially from Fianna Fail was critical (Dellepiane and 
Hardiman 2012). The Irish banks’ foreign borrowing rose from €15 billion to €100 billion from 
2004 to 2008, fueled by access to extensive funding within the Eurozone (IMF 2012). As a 
result, the Irish banks’ net foreign liabilities increased nearly 50 percent from 20 percent to 70 
percent of the GDP. In 2007, the balance sheets of the Irish banks were at its peak, five times the 
size of the economy and already over-exposed to the property market (IMF 2012). Most of these 
loans were borrowed on three-month rollover basis to fund development and commercial real 
estate projects that would not create revenue for a couple of years (Commission 2014). Thus, 
when the initial sign of crisis appeared in early 2007, the Irish economy and fiscal balance was 
already highly vulnerable to shifts in the international financial markets.  
The Irish economy started contracting in 2007 as a consequence of recession intensified 
by the sudden collapse of the construction boom and the house price bubble. Thus, tax revenues 
began to decline, leading to a sharp increase in the public deficit. When the crisis hit the property 
markets, tax revenues decreased accordingly by nearly 30 percent in 2007, leading to budget 
deficit of €2.3 billion (5% of GDP) (Commission 2014). Thus, the deficit increased nearly 10 
percent per year from 2007 onwards with decreasing tax revenues, totaling to the 33 percent 
increase of the net public debt until 2010. The deficit was actually more severe than the Greece’s 
by 2009 (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012). The unemployment also significantly increased by 
8.75% to 11.4% on February 2009, the highest level since 1996. While the government revenues 
fell significantly in 2008-2009, the rapid rise of the unemployment led to significant rise in the 
associated social protection payments (Regan 2012, Monastiriotis, Hardiman et al. 2013). 
Accordingly, the government expenditure increased from 37 to 47 percent of GNP, creating 
                                                 
41 The international surveillance agencies as well as the IMF also failed to issue proper warnings 
as a vast commercial and residential property bubble inflated and bank assets grew to some 500 
percent of the GDP IEO (2016). The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal: An 
Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Office. Washington, International Monetary Fund. 
 .  
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additional fiscal pressures.42 The country also faced significant emigration, nearly 42,000 people 
leaving the country from April 2009 to 2010 (27,700 Irish nationals) (IMF 2012). The problems 
quickly spread to the banking sector, which began to report arrears on their loan book. The 
market confidence started declining as well leading to significant deposit outflows. This initial 
period of economic slowdown and the problems in the banking sector was greatly intensified by 
the wider global financial crisis that limit the banks’ access to inter-bank lending (IMF 2012).  
5.2.2 The Initial Policy Responses to the Crisis 
In September 2008, Ireland became the first country within the Eurozone to enter recession. The 
Irish government, composed of the centre-right Fianna Fail, the small Green Party and the 
Progressive Party, responded first issuing a blanket guarantee of the banks’ liabilities on 29 
September 2008. 43 Since the short-term inter-bank lending that would help the Irish banks was 
not possible due to the global financial crisis, the government also decided to recapitalize them 
using public funds (IMF 2010). Thus, the state injected funds to two failed banks (€3.5 billion 
for each), the Anglo Irish and the Irish Nationwide Building Society on February 2009. Similar 
injections were made available throughout the crisis for these and other Irish financial 
institutions. The government constantly revised the costs of these operations, with a final a fiscal 
cost of nearly 40 percent of the GDP (nearly €50 billion). With declining tax revenues, these 
operations put immense pressure on public finances. The general public debt increased from 
27.5% to almost 118% and the general government deficit rose to 7.3% in 2008, 31.2% in 2010 
due to bank re-capitalizations and fell to 8% in 2012 (Commission 2012). Accordingly, the 
banking crisis in Ireland had been one of the costliest ones in the advanced economies. The Irish 
Stock Exchange (ISEQ) fell to a 14 year low 1,987 points on 24 February 2009.44 The country 
also lost its AAA debt rating due to deteriorating public finances and amid recession on March 
2009. The government announced the plans for the National Asset Management Agency 
                                                 
42 The numbers of people living on unemployment benefits rose to 326,000 in January 2009—the 
highest monthly level since records began in 1967.  
43 This guarantee, totaling nearly to €440bn of liabilities at six Irish-owned institutions and a 
foreign-owned bank, included all retail and corporate deposits (to the extent not covered by 
existing deposit protection schemes in the State or any other jurisdiction), interbank deposits, 
senior unsecured debt, asset covered securities, and dated subordinated debt. 
44 http://www.rte.ie/news/2009/0224/114382-markets/ 
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(NAMA) on April 2009, which was later established on November. The NAMA, with a mandate 
to take control of the large distressed property development and real estate assets, made its first 
purchases on April 2010. However, the NAMA had actually been a quite expensive instrument 
and led to deterioration of government deficit due to increased debt exposure (Dellepiane and 
Hardiman 2012).  
At the same time, immediate steps had been taken to close the budget deficit (Dellepiane 
and Hardiman 2012). The government strategy relied on prioritizing spending cuts rather than 
tax increases (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012). There was no fundamental disagreement over the 
policy objectives among the coalition partners over the policies required to adopt or over the 
means of achieving them. In several steps, the government initiated  
x expenditure adjustments of €1 billion through efficiency cuts (July 2008) 
x total of €2 billion fiscal effort involving income levy, spending cuts including 
welfare for nearly €2 billion (October 2008) 
x total of €2.1 billion fiscal effort involving cuts to public sector pay, increase in 
pension levy and stop to public sector pay increase (February 2009)  
x total of €5.3 billion fiscal effort involving tax increases, €1.2 billion current and 
€600 million capital spending cuts (April 2009) 
x total of €4.2 billion fiscal effort involving spending cuts on all welfare, public 
sector pay and numbers and capital cuts (December 2009) (Hardiman and 
MacCarthaigh 2013) 
The deteriorating conditions and the reaction to these initial austerity measures led to 
several protests in Ireland. On February 2009, nearly 100,000 people gathered in Dublin to 
protest the government’s policies (BBC 2016). Although it was not as severe as Greece, there 
were several sit-in protests and strikes in several state facilities due to lay-offs and wage cuts. 
For instance, 13,000 civil servants voted for industrial action in early 2009, went strike for 24 
hours (RTE 2009). Throughout the 2010, several notable protests were visible all around the 
country against the austerity measures, especially by the students and farmers (RTE 2011). 
 Despite the vulnerability of the trade unions in mobilizing public and initiating industrial 
action in general, the government approached the public sector unions in mid-2010. Given the 
extent of the reforms in the public sector with initial round of direct pay levies and direct pay 
cuts, this move aimed to ease the dissatisfaction and ensure stability in the public level 
 86 
(O’Connor, Dublin 2014; Cody, Dublin 2014).45 As a result of the negotiations, the Croke Park 
Agreement, covering the period 2010-2014 was reached with the Public Services Committee of 
ICTU and the government. The government committed to:  
x no further reductions in their pay rates, other than those applied in 2009 and 2010; 
x no compulsory redundancies (where they do not currently apply) as long as public 
servants are flexible about redeployment; 
x an extension of the period within which the January 2010 pay reductions are disregarded 
for the purposes of calculating pensions, now to February 2012; 
x a review of the position on public service pay in the Spring of each year of the 
Agreement.46 
The agreement also set out a process for reversing the earlier pension levy and pay cuts, 
once adequate savings are delivered. In return, the trade unions committed to the continued 
operation of public service, restructuring of the public service including staff redeployment and 
limits on industrial action. This deal had actually excluded ‘weakest power in the labor market of 
both public and private sector, growing number of temporary workers and part-time workers, 
rising numbers of unemployed’ (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2013).  
However, along with the declining tax revenues and increasing unemployment, the 
banking operations added significant costs to the already deteriorating Irish fiscal position and 
intensified the concerns over the sustainability of the Irish sovereign debt. The European Central 
Bank urged the Irish authorities not to use any private sector involvement in sorting out their 
debts. 47 Thus, the Irish government deficit reached an unsustainable 9% at the end of 2010. The 
                                                 
45 Personal interview with Shay Cody, General President, IMPACT. Dublin, April 2014.  
46 The details of the agreement and the original document is available at: 
http://www.per.gov.ie/croke-park-agreement.  
47 In fact, letters from (then) the president of ECB Jean-Claude Trichet to Minister of Finance 
Brian Lenihan had been published in several newspapers recently. The letters clearly indicate the 
pressure on Lenihan to accept a TROIKA programme and warnings that the ECB could no 
longer provide unconditional support for the Irish Banks without a programme. ECB was highly 
concerned that the Irish crisis would threaten the stability of the whole European banking 
system. The letters also suggest that Lenihan actually resisted to the pressures of the ECB but 
had to give up when it became inevitable and when the governor of Central Bank Honohan 
declared that bailout was necessary (Irish Times, 2012). Lenihan also mentioned this in his 
famous BBC interview after the elections of 2011. Lenihan told the BBC reporters that: ‘I had 
fought for two and half years to avoid this conclusion. I believed I fought the good fight and 
taken every measure possible to delay such an eventuality and now hell was at the gates”.  
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government was effectively locked out of international bond markets. Unable to borrow to fund 
the deficit, the Irish government initiated a severe adjustment to public services and spending in 
order to roll over its debt. Under these extreme conditions, which were also exacerbated by an 
adjustment strategy within the Eurozone that prioritized fiscal retrenchment above recovery, 
Ireland was required to enter an IMF loan program in November 2010. This decision was 
associated mainly with the pressure coming from the European Commission and the ECB in 
order to prevent the spread of the crisis to Eurozone and to protect the interests of German and 
French banks who were heavily exposed to the Irish financial system (Breen 2012). 
5.2.3 The IMF Program in Ireland 
The IMF program in Ireland involved financing of up to €85 billion until the end of 2013. €22.5 
billion of this financing came from the IMF through an arrangement under the Extended Fund 
Facility (EFF), along with support of €45 billion from the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism and the rest through the bilateral loans from the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Denmark (IEO 2016).  
In return for this financing, the IMF program in Ireland aimed to restore the strength of 
the financial sector and re-establish fiscal credibility (IMF 2010). The Irish program rested on 
two critical pillars: fundamental downsizing and re-organization of the banking sector 
(addressing market perceptions of weak bank capitalization, overhauling the bank’s funding 
structure) and an ambitious fiscal consolidation with structural conditions (IMF 2010). These 
policy measures were required to be implemented between 2011 and 2013 with subsequent 
reviews in each quarter.  
The fiscal measures in the program required adjustments of €15 billion between 2011 and 
2014, €10 billion in spending cuts and €5 billion in taxation (IMF 2010).48 The structural 
conditions also included reducing minimum wage, tackling unemployment and poverty traps, 
increasing the pension age, removing barriers to competition in sheltered sectors such as the 
legal profession, medical services and pharmacy, reform of bankruptcy laws and reform of fiscal 
                                                 
48 The Memorandum had not specified the financial sector restructuring but size reductions in 
Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank as well as closure of Anglo Irish Bank and Irish 
Nationwide were among the possible targets. 
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governance requirements.  
5.3 THE IRISH POLITICAL SYSTEM  
The Irish political system has been traditionally dominated by two parties, which are almost 
identical ideologically (Budge 2010). One is Fianna Fail, a center-right party that has dominated 
the political sphere for most of the history of the Republic. Traditionally, Fianna Fail has 
represented large sections of working class, the small subsistence farmers of the west and the 
small town bourgeoisie (Budge 2010). The other major party is Fine Gael, also a centrist right 
wing party. Its constituencies traditionally have been the white-collar workers, the large farmers 
of the east and big business in Dublin (Budge 2010). Given the strength of these two parties, the 
other relevant ones are the electorally weak Progressive Democratic Party (the PD) and the 
Labor Party. The PD, which has been electorally small but influential right wing party, had been 
in many coalitions with Fianna Fail.49 Founded in 1985 from a group of politicians who split 
from Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, the PD had a liberal stance on many social and economic issues 
such as lower taxation, fiscal conservatism, privatization, and welfare reform. The party was 
formally disbanded in 2009. There is no large social democratic party in Ireland (Hloušek and 
Kopecek 2013). The Labor party, which grew out of the union movements, has been in coalitions 
mainly with Fine Gael (Budge 2010). Given this electoral structure, Irish political institutions are 
characterized by extraordinary stability and the party politics is relatively loose and un-
ideological. For most of the major issues, there is a widespread consensus among major political 
parties (Budge 2010). However, under the influence of strong center-right parties, the political 
system has also had strong biases towards the right and center right.  
Outside of the party competition structure, the trade unions and the employer 
organizations have been relevant within the Irish policymaking apparatus as the social partners. 
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), which is the umbrella organization of the trade 
unions in Ireland, has been active in Irish politics but does not endorse any particular party.50 
                                                 
49 The PD has been in government with Fianna Fail from: 1989-1992, 1997-2002, 2002-2007 and 
2007-2009.  
50 For more information, see: http://www.ictu.ie 
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Within ICTU, two unions are critical for Irish policy making. The first one is the Services, 
Industrial, Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU), which is the largest union in Ireland with 
over 200,000 members from both public and private sectors.51 Secondly, with over 63,500 
members, the Irish Municipal, Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT) is Ireland’s largest and 
most influential public service trade union with also members from voluntary and community 
sector, semi-state organizations and private sector companies.52 The trade unions have been one 
of the central pillars of economic policy making in Ireland for nearly two decades prior to crisis. 
Their association with the Labor party has been mixed with cooperative relations at certain times 
and disagreements at others (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2013). Despite the fact that the unions 
have been closer to the Labor Party, they also have strong relations with Fianna Fail. They have 
been mostly unease with Fine Gael (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2013).  
The union membership is heavily weighted towards the public sector representation in 
Ireland. While the unionization rates are about 80% in the public sector, it is around 20% in the 
private sector (Hardiman 2006). It is especially lower in the most productive foreign-owned 
sectors of the economy. For instance, the US-owned multinational companies (MNCs) do not 
recognize or bargain with trade unions (Hardiman 2006). While the unionization rates are around 
80% for the European owned MNCs, it is only around 14% for the US-owned MNCs. The trade 
union density within the private sector is further on the decline within the last decade since the 
sectors that generate new employment such as private sector services and in retail trades are 
more difficult to organize (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2011).  
In the employer side, the Irish Business and Employer Confederation (IBEC), which 
represents the business in Ireland, is a critical actor in economic policy making.53 The IBEC’s 
representation does not extend to the interests of the largest companies such as the foreign-
owned MNCs and exporters in the country. Lastly, the Irish Small and Medium Enterprises 
(ISME)54, the only independent representative of the SMEs in Ireland, has nearly 9000 members 
nationwide. Although there are nearly 200,000 SMEs in Ireland, accounting for nearly 99.7 
percent of the active enterprises and 52 percent of employment, the ISME acts mainly as a 
lobbying organization, representing the SME owners through providing advice and information. 
                                                 
51 For more information, see: http://www.siptu.ie 
52 For more information, see: http://www.impact.ie 
53 For more information, see: http://www.ibec.ie 
54 For more information, see: http://isme.ie 
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Thus, neither the IBEC nor ISME represents the interests of the largest and the most wealth 
generating companies in Ireland, the MNCs. Lastly, the Irish financial sector is represented by 
the International Financial Services Centre (IFSC).55 However, the financial sector in Ireland is 
mainly dominated by MNCs or international banks who have headquarters in other countries. 
Despite the importance of the industry for the Irish economy and their ties to certain political 
parties, the domestic financial interests are relatively weaker in Ireland.  
Prior to the crisis, the Irish economy has remained a highly open and business friendly 
economy with a highly flexible labor market focusing on services and high-tech industries. The 
industrial policy depends heavily on foreign direct investment and tax incentives (Barry 1999). 
The relatively low corporate tax rate of 12.5% has attracted significant inward capital flows, 
especially from the US. The economy has mainly concentrated on the service sector that 
contributed to nearly half of the national GDP and 67% of the total employment (Dellepiane and 
Hardiman 2011). The country is one of the largest exporters of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, 
medical devices and software-related goods and services in the world. 
5.3.1 The Social Partnership in Ireland   
Ireland is not a corporatist country as Netherlands and did not have the collective bargaining 
arrangements characteristics of coordinated market mechanisms. However, given the slight 
ideological differences between the major parties, the policy-making process relied more on 
compromise and coalition bargaining rather than confrontation especially since the late 1980s. 
Within this period, the political parties generally have responded to the veto points and 
agreements with employer organizations and trade unions under the ‘social partnership’ have 
been common. Creating a complex ‘network of bipartite and tripartite negotiating capabilities, 
policy working groups, and consultative mechanisms’ (Hardiman 2006), the Irish social 
partnership was born as a response to the economic crisis in early 1980’s and had become critical 
for the Irish economic boom in the following decades. 
Similar to the experience of other European countries, the successive Irish governments 
throughout the 1980s had faced macroeconomic challenges such as inflation and high 
unemployment (Murphy and Hogan 2008). After the failures to centralize industrial relations 
                                                 
55 For more information, see: http://www.ifsc.ie 
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under the Fine Gael-Labor coalition between 1981 and 1986, Ireland returned to firm-level wage 
bargaining by excluding the trade unions from policymaking (Culpepper and Regan 2014). The 
fragmented trade union movement without little or no effective coordination by ICTU had 
continued to use wage militancy in the core sectors of the economy to push for higher wages as 
well as industrial action throughout the 1980s (Hardiman 1988). This led to higher 
unemployment and increase in the public expenditure on social policy by over 200% (Culpepper 
and Regan 2014). Along with the rise of inflation that was also attributed to the actions of the 
unions at the expense of competitiveness, the country continued to experience crucial 
macroeconomic problems. The Fine Gael-Labor coalition responded by cutting social welfare 
payments and raising income taxes. This had crucial consequences since ICTU was able to 
organize unprecedented mass protests against the government’s tax regime followed by a series 
of mass demonstrations initiated by the Dublin Congress of Trade Unions as well. These protests 
had also coincided with significant industrial unrest directed at employers (Culpepper and Regan 
2014). The Labor Relations Commission reported that roughly 600,000 days in the 1970’s and 
400,000 days in the 1980’s were lost to industrial action (The Labor Relations Commission 
Annual Report, 2009). These significant domestic and industrial relations problems eventually 
increased the pressure on the Labor Party, which subsequently pulled out of the government in 
1986. 
This period was critical in two respects regarding the role of ICTU56 in the Irish politics. 
Initially, a new trade union leadership gained strength within ICTU with the political support to 
unify the organization and overcome the problems of fragmentation. This was critical since 
ICTU emerged as one of the key players in mobilizing public opinion against austerity (O'Leary 
1987). The new leadership also recognized that the strategy of wage militancy proved to be 
counterproductive for them.57 This led to a change in the position of ICTU that considered 
coordinated wage restraint as better serving the collective interest of its members along with 
investments by the employers to create more employment (Culpepper and Regan 2014) .  
                                                 
56 Electoral rule within ICTU- if more than 50 percent of members within a particular union 
chose a given option, all the delegates of the union voted for that same option in the national 
convention. Then, depending on their membership translates into individual weight within ICTU.  
57 One ICTU study actually showed that their members negotiated a 73 % increase in nominal 
wages from 1980 to 1986. However, as a result of the increases in income taxes and inflation, the 
real take home pay declined by 7%. Thus, the unions were not able to gain any real wage gains 
through the deals that they made. 
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It was against this political and social background that Fianna Fail came to power in 
1987. The elections were critical since it led to a significant shift in urban working-class support 
towards Fianna Fail (Laver 1987). Due to intense problems of controlling public expenditure, 
severe unemployment and growth problems, Ireland was thought to be weeks away from an IMF 
program. There was also a wide perception in the country that dramatic changes were needed for 
the economic recovery. Thus, given also its constituency, Fianna Fail changed the government’s 
approach to industrial relations and sought a centralized political deal with ICTU (Culpepper and 
Regan 2014). The newly elected government was actually a minority government with 48.8 % 
percent of seats in the parliament. Given the government’s weak position within the parliament, 
the support by ICTU was critical for a stable policy and economic environment. Thus, 
representing nearly half of the work force and its ability to mobilize consent among both its 
unions and public, ICTU had become a critical partner for the government. In order to generate 
the stability of an export led economic recovery based on attracting FDI and overcome the 
inflation problems, the government needed ICTU to accept wage restraint and support their fiscal 
program. The Irish unions were willing to negotiate with the government in return for an access 
to policy-making, especially to the fiscal policy of the state. ICTU became a negotiating partner 
in Irish politics and gain a central pillar in social partnership by promising to end wage militancy 
and industrial action (Culpepper and Regan 2014). The government secured the support of the 
unions, which provided political legitimacy to their fiscal retrenchment program. The organized 
employer organizations (IBEC) were also supportive of this process and the government’s 
strategy because it was favorable to the Irish business, especially in the thriving high-tech sector 
(Baccaro and Simoni 2008).  
As a result, the Fianna Fail government and its social partners successfully negotiated the 
famous Programme for National Recovery (PNR) in 1987, which introduced a 3-year national 
tax based incomes policy. This was followed by the Programme for Economic and Social 
Progress (PESP) in 1990. The PNR and PESP had covered over nearly 70% of the workforce and 
were critical for the following period of the rise of the Celtic Tiger (Culpepper and Regan 2014). 
Following the first two critical agreements and the Irish social partnership produced series of 
agreements extending over 21 years until 2008. 58 An institutional framework has also supported 
                                                 
58 Although they were abandoned in 1970’s, there are many examples of tri-partite agreements 
signed in 1960s.  
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the social partnership. The National Economic and Social Council (NESC) emerged as an 
important institution in coordinating the social partners, setting the agenda for successive rounds 
of pay talks and research on policy issues (Hardiman 2006).59 Apart from this institutional 
structure, the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) had been key in maintaining 
effective communication between the government and the social partners (Hardiman 2006). Over 
time, the Taoiseach’s timely interventions by exercising leverage or signaling approval have led 
to successful conclusions of the pay talks.60  
The social partnership worked efficiently until 1997 along with the growth in the world 
and European economy and single currency (O’Connor, Dublin 201461). However, tensions 
began emerging with the rise of liberal tendencies in the successive governments that pursued 
free market agenda with privatization along with problems of labor shortages, growing inflation 
and rising Irish banking debt (O’Connor, Dublin 2014). Gradually increasing domestic 
inflationary pressures had especially been critical for the employers that attempted to build in 
new safeguards against inflationary wage demands (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012).62 Despite 
certain tensions, the social partnership survived until 2009 due to the vested interests of the 
actors in staying in the process. Public sector unions still wanted to have an effect on the process 
while the private sector unions were concerned about collective bargaining rights. The employer 
organizations could not afford wage restraints and also wanted predictability. The governments 
                                                 
59 Other relevant institutions were created over time such as the National Centre for Partnership 
(NCP), with a mandate to encourage and promote employee involvement. In 2003, these 
institutions were re-organized under the umbrella body of the National Economic and Social 
Development Organisation (NESDO). 
60 The basic structure of the partnership, that exchanged wage restraints for tax cuts, targeted 
social inequalities and exclusion by keeping the real value of transfers constant, remained stable. 
It was also expanded to include more than macroeconomic issues to a wide range of non-pay 
issues such as taxation, minimum wages, labor market training and activation measures. 
61 Personal Interview with Jack O’Connor, General President, Services, Industrial Professional & 
Technical Union (SIPTU). Dublin, April 2014. 
62 For instance, the negotiations in 2008 proved to be quite difficult due to divergence in earnings 
growth across different sectors of the economy. The IBEC also warned regarding the loss of 
competiveness due to high wages and cost levels in the country. At the same time, the unions 
continued to push for employment and collective rights. For instance, following the new wave of 
enlargement in 2004 that led to opening of the EU market, the unions increasingly became 
concerned about the erosion of employment rights and standards via the use of immigrant 
workers. Only through the efforts by the government and Labor Relations Commission, ICTU 
was convinced to continue the negotiations. 
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led by Fianna Fail had an interest in keeping labor intact and stability as well. Albeit the lack of 
severe economic crisis that would test the economic governance capabilities of the partnership, 
the social partnership had remained in place in governing industrial relations and in economic 
policy making. But it became increasingly vulnerable to intensifying conditions and economic 
pressures.  
5.4 NEGOTIATIONS AND THE IMF PROGRAM DESIGN 
Within this policymaking environment, the decision to sign an IMF program was by the 
government without any consultation with the domestic stakeholders and social partners.63 The 
domestic interest groups such as the unions were not represented during the design of the 
program and were excluded from the process. Before the signing of the agreement, the ECB had 
already been pressuring the Irish authorities to accept a program. They even warned the Minister 
of Finance Lenihan on several occasions and told that the ECB had been monitoring ‘the 
government’s commitment to its four year plan, still in preparation and said that continuing the 
ECB support was contingent upon its implementation’ (Times 2012). Deteriorating economic 
conditions, increasing fiscal debt and pressures from the ECB had finally forced the Irish 
authorities to start the negotiations on a program within the last two weeks of the signing of the 
agreement. The negotiations had taken place secretly and it had not been known before the 
official announcement on 28 November 2010. However, there was a strong government 
ownership of the program and the policy conditions mainly responded to local circumstances and 
the needs. For more than two months before the bailout, the possibility had been discreetly 
acknowledged at the highest levels within the government apparatus (Times 2011). The National 
Recovery Plan of 2011-2014 that was announced on November 2010 was in fact entirely 
consistent with the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. This plan represented a national 
agenda and had been mainly drawn by the Department of Finance in consultation with the 
                                                 
63 During the negotiations, the Green Party declared that they were leaving the government. The 
main source of tensions had been the possibility of imposing losses on senior bank bondholders, 
which the ECB opposed. Eamon Ryan, former Green party minister later told that: ‘we met that 
weekend (after the bailout was confirmed) and we just had a very strong sense that the 
introduction of the IMF required us to have an election. ‘this is a game changer’..’.  
 95 
TROIKA partners (O’Brolchain, Dublin 201464, Breuer, Dublin 2014)65. The Irish government 
had discretion over the composition of adjustment within the negotiated macroeconomic targets 
(Bhatia, Washington D.C. 201466; Breuer, Dublin 2014).  
5.4.1 The Preferences within the TROIKA 
The negotiations on the program were shaped by a variety of competing objectives such as “the 
need to protect European Central Bank liquidity, prevent broader European financial sector 
losses, and limit German taxpayer exposure to the need to ‘bail out’ weaker economies” 
(Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012). The disagreements among the TROIKA partners were clearly 
visible in the nature of the consolidation of bank debts, and the nature and pace of the fiscal 
consolidation.  
The Irish government came under intense pressure to extend its earlier blanket guarantee 
to the banks.67 This prevented the Irish government to impose some of the burden of adjustment 
on private sector bondholders, or demand assistance from the Eurozone at large to rescue the 
banks. This was the main source of disagreement between the IMF and its European partners, 
mainly the ECB. With respect to bank debt, the IMF had a strong view regarding the different 
levels of liabilities such as equity holders, junior bondholders, senior bondholders as well as 
differentiating between secure and unsecure debt (Donovan 2016)(Breuer, Dublin 2014). The 
Fund also demanded breaking down the negotiations on the sovereign and banking debt and held 
them separately (Donovan 2016, Veron 2016). Given the problem in the financial sector- 
inability of the banks to lend and people to re-pay their debts- there were serious doubts within 
the IMF that the current program would produce enough growth (Breuer, Dublin 2014). 
However, it was the ECB that wanted sovereign and banking debt negotiations together and 
                                                 
64 Personal Interview with Feargal Ó’Brolcháin, Principal Officer, External Programme 
Compliance Unit, Department of Finance. Dublin, April 2014. 
65 Personal Interview with Peter Breuer, The IMF Resident Representative to Ireland, Dublin, 
April 2014 
66 Personal Interview with Ashok Vir Bhatia, Senior Economist at the International Monetary 
Fund (Chair of Irish Mission Team). Washington D.C., May 2014. 
Personal Interview with Jochen Andritzky, Economist at the International Monetary Fund 
(Member of the Mission Team to Ireland). Washington D.C., May 2014. 
67 This meant that all the liabilities of the ruined banks had to be met by taxpayers 
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pushed the adjustments costs on to the taxpayers in Ireland (O’Reardon68 and Breuer, Dublin 
2014).69 
The second source of disagreement was over the pace of fiscal consolidation and fiscal 
targets. The ECB had been less flexible due to contagion fears (Bhatia, Washington D.C. 2014).  
A total collapse of the Irish economy would have had negative consequences for the rest of the 
Eurozone, especially since, in the midst of the crisis, there were ongoing problems in countries 
such as Greece, Spain and Portugal. Accordingly, the European partners presented Ireland as an 
example to the rest of the Europe of what a structural adjustment program would look like if 
steps were not taken by individual governments to prevent similar situations. However, the Fund 
pointed out the uncertainties of fiscal consolidation that could not be understood ex-ante and 
pushed for lower pace of consolidation (IMF, Dublin and Washington D.C. 2014). The Fund 
eventually prevailed in this discussion and the 3% deficit target had been pushed one year ahead 
to 2015 rather than 2014. Lastly, it was the IMF officials who were critical of the extent of long-
term effects of the austerity measures. Although unsuccessful, the IMF Mission Chief to Ireland, 
Ashoka Mody, pushed for the inclusion of pro-growth related measures (Kelpie 2013). The 
discussions on the Irish economies’ path to growth had not been resolved.  
5.4.2 The Preferences of the Irish authorities and the Irish Public Administration 
Apart from the preferences of the donors, the second critical issue for the program design had 
been the willingness and the effort of the Irish authorities. Before the agreement, the government 
had already taken several steps towards fiscal consolidation and resolving problems in the 
banking sector. This was critical in showing the willingness of the government during the design 
of the program. More importantly, there was a general consensus on the necessity of the reforms 
                                                 
68 Personal Interview with Colm O’Reardon. Economic Advisor at Office of the Tanaiste, 
Advisor and Director of Policy at Office of the Leader of the Labor Party. Dublin, April 2014. 
69 The ECB’s position was also confirmed by the Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, who 
was also part of the discussions. Weidmann told that, ‘I did not share the concerns of Trichet that 
debt write downs of investors posed too great a stability risk for the union.  “in that debate the 
Bundesbank has always considered it important to make investors bear the risks of their 
investment decisions’.. In negotiations with former minister of finance Brian Lenihan, Trichet 
closed to door to burden sharing with investors and urged that they must be covered with cash 
injections by the government.’  See, Irish times. ‘Bundesbank opposed Trichet over Irish debt’ 
Weidmann says German central bank in favour of burden sharing in 2010. January 24, 2014. 
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and the fiscal adjustment among the Irish political elite. There was no significant opposition 
within the political parties and the program had not challenged the long-established economic 
policy making principles in Ireland. The Irish political system is dominated center-right parties 
and thus accordingly has strong biases towards the right and center right. There is also 
widespread consensus among major political parties on many issues (Budge 2010). Thus, there 
was no significant opposition to the neo-liberal policies that IMF advocates in the borrowing 
countries. 
This was also visible among the economic elite who occupied the two key seats in 
economic policy making, the Minister of Finance and the head of Central Bank. Brian Lenihan, a 
barrister by training, had been the Minister of Finance since 2008. Lenihan was known for his 
neo-liberal approach to the economic issues. Patrick Honohan, who worked in the Fund and 
World Bank in his earlier career, was appointed as the governor of the Central Bank on 
September 2009. He was the first person to be appointed from outside the institution. Having 
people with better knowledge about the institutions and mind-set regarding the economic policies 
of the international financial institutions (IFIs) enabled better communication and understating 
between the Fund and Irish authorities (Breen70, Dublin 2014).  
Moreover, a well-functioning bureaucracy with a clear mandate to identify and 
implement the right steps towards recovery had supported these key figures. The Fund officials, 
even at the initial steps of the negotiations, acknowledged the professionalism, expertise and 
capacity of the Irish bureaucracy. Both the willingness and capacity had been critical in the eyes 
of the IMF and enabled bargaining power to the Irish authorities during negotiations (Breuer, 
Dublin 2014). Thus, the Irish government had considerable autonomy over the design of the 
policies due to its credibility and bureaucratic capacity. The government decided on where to cut 
the spending, when to raise taxes or whom to target within the macroeconomic targets. The IMF 
had overseen the progress and even asked for some pro-growth measures rather than broadening 
the tax base (Breuer, Dublin 2014).  
5.4.3 The Interaction between the Irish Government and Domestic Stakeholders 
When the economic conditions deteriorated in 2008, the initial reaction by government was to 
                                                 
70 Personal Interview with Michael Breen. Lecturer, Dublin City University, Dublin, April 2014.  
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keep the social partnership in place. There were negotiations on the strategy towards possible 
recovery. Despite some disagreements, there was even an agreement on the table in early 2009. 
The unions were not satisfied with the agreement but kept negotiating and stayed on the table 
(O’Connor, Dublin 2014). However, that agreement had never materialized with the sudden 
unilateral policy actions initiated by the government. This move has been mainly attributed to the 
newly appointed Minister of Finance, Brian Lenihan, and the resulting shift in the balance of 
power within the governing party with the emergence of a strong group of party backbenchers 
(O’Donnell71, O’Connor, Cody and Begg72, Dublin, 2014). However, these actions were only 
possible due to certain structural changes regarding the trade unions and their role in the social 
partnership.  
The ability of unions to initiate industrial action and mobilize support for broad set of 
reforms among their members has greatly declined within the last decade. By the time of the 
crisis, the total number of days lost to strikes declined to 26,000 annually (Culpepper and Regan 
2014). Despite the mass protests and strikes in Greece, there were only eight strikes in Ireland in 
2011 during the height of the structural adjustment. The country even hit to historic lows with 
only 3,700 days lost to industrial action. The overall trade density was around 31% percent prior 
to the crisis. While the density remained around 80% in the public sector, it was around 22% for 
the private sector. Especially the unions in the private sector seemed to be limited due to their 
narrow membership and weak organizational capacities. This decline of membership levels also 
coincided with a decline in collective bargaining coverage, which was around 44% in 2010 
compared to 70% in early 1980’s (Culpepper and Regan 2014).  
The declining power of the trade unions had also been evident in the inability of ICTU to 
act as representatives of both unionized and non-unionized workers. In response to the austerity 
measures, ICTU attempted to mobilize public opinion against the government’s policies. But the 
reaction by the unions had not created enough political support. Initiating strikes require a 
majority of the unions in Ireland to win ballot votes within their organizations. The attempts to 
secure a strike failed in February 2010 when even the IMPACT ended up not winning its ballot. 
Moreover, the unions neither shared a common analysis of the crisis nor were able to design a 
                                                 
71 Personal Interview with Rory O’Donnell, Director, National Economic and Social Council of 
Ireland (NESC). Dublin, April 2014. 
72 Personal Interview with David Begg, General President, Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
(ICTU). Dublin, April 2014.  
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shared response strategy (O’Connor and Begg, Dublin 2014)73. ICTU had been inefficient in 
providing a coherent view to unite its members as well (Begg, Dublin 2014). It had been 
regarded as an institution like the UN with actors with different backgrounds and preferences 
(Begg, Dublin 2014). It not only failed to develop a viable alternative strategy but also had a 
weak center that was dominated by the bigger unions within it (O’Donnell, Dublin 2014).  
The ICTU’s failures were also associated with a mass media campaign portraying the 
trade unions as sabotaging the country’s path towards recovery (Roche 2011, Mercille 2014). 
The trade unions were defined as a public sector cartel holding the government ransom 
(Culpepper and Regan 2014). The news regarding the CEO-type salaries of the trade union 
leaders and corruption accusations regarding SIPTU made the headlines. An ICTU report later 
even showed that nearly 90% of press coverage was anti-union at the time.74 This also added to 
the already high levels of distrust to unions. During the height of the social partnership, the 
distrust in unions was quite low. However, it increased rapidly from 30% to 53 % after 2007 (57 
% in 2010). Moreover, the close alignment of the trade union leaders with the Fianna Fail 
government and the failures in public policies had been critical in the shaping the negative public 
perception. This made it harder for the already weak trade unions to shape the public discourse 
and change the strong public preference that also favored the government policy of spending cuts 
over tax increases. The government increased its credibility in the bargaining table since it could 
easily claim to have the authority to implement the reforms. Thus, ICTU eventually lost its 
legitimizing effect within the social partnership and as a strong force of mobilizing labor.  
In this context, the employers and government have little incentive or gain by engaging 
with the unions and forming a tripartite process of adjustment. Already having problems in early 
2000s due to increasing macroeconomic challenges, the economic conditions in 2009 made it 
more difficult to negotiate a deflationary pay deal given also the amount of public deficit 
(Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012). The Transitional Agreement that was negotiated in 2008 
provided 6% pay increase for both public and private sectors. But it became clear that the 
employers would not be able to meet the necessary adjustment in wages. During the negotiations 
in 2009, the IBEC made a statement criticizing the loss of competitiveness and the need to 
                                                 
73 A report produced by the ICTU titled “there is a fairer, better way” was seen quite inadequate 
to provide an alternative solution to the problems (O’Reardon and Hardiman, Dublin 2014).  
74 ICTU (2010) ‘Analysis of Op/Ed Coverage in the Irish Newspapers’, Dublin, ICTU 
(manuscript). 
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decrease wages and costs.75 There was an also strong division within the government regarding 
which policy path to take. Especially the disagreements between the Department of Taoiseach 
and the Department of Finance had become evident during the 2009 Budget talks. The cabinet 
was reported to be split on whether to continue negotiations with the social partners in December 
2009.76  
An internal report by the Department of Finance indicated that it was the asymmetric 
influence of social partnership to blame for the problems of wage competitiveness, pro-cyclical 
taxes and increased public expenditure (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012)77. The Minister of 
Finance Brian Lenihan, who was known for his skepticism of the social partnership as a 
mechanism to solve policy problems, later publicly mentioned “the department of finance has 
concluded that the dominance of the social partnership process did enormous damage to our 
financial system” in December 2010 (Regan 2012). The social partnership enabled a greater role 
for unions and employers in decision making through their seats on the boards of institutions 
such as the Central Bank, the state training agency and the health sector (Barrett 2011). The 
partnership, that was operated through and supported by the Department of Taoiseach, 
                                                 
75 The IBEC made the following statement: ‘‘More fundamentally, we believe that Ireland’s lost 
competitiveness during this decade amounts to close to 15% relative to our main trading 
partners. Ireland’s wage and cost levels are seriously out of line with trading partners. This must 
be corrected rapidly if Ireland is to restore its competitive position. Failure to do so will result in 
sub-optimal growth and will undo much of the progress of the last 15 years, with a return to 
permanently high levels of unemployment. Government is already seeking to reduce the cost of 
service providers to the public sector; it should also ensure that it reduces its own service costs 
and prices by a similar quantum”. 
76 A camp of Taoiseach Cowen and four ministers were in favor of continuing the negotiations as 
opposed to a camp led by Lenihan and 7 other ministers within the cabinet who opposed it. A 
former advisor of Lenihan even told that’ “Lenihan's attempts to grasp the nettle back in 2009 
were continually interfered with by former Taoiseach Brian Cowen”. The Lenihan camp 
eventually prevailed in these discussions. As a result of this and already increasing 
electoral/political costs, Cowen was unwilling to continue his support to social partnership. 
http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/we-were-a-war-cabinet-and-lenihan-was-leader-
26779992.html 
77 A report by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) was critical in shaping the 
public discourse against the politics of labor relations and unit labor costs in the public sector. 
This report indicated that the wage in the public sector, on average, was 22% more than the wage 
in the private sector. This finding became one of the central facts supporting a coordinating 
policy discourse against the trade unions in Ireland. Although many economists supported the 
findings in this report, there were also critiques among the scholars of industrial relations (Regan 
2012).  
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undermined the authority of and weakened the ability of the Department of Finance and other 
key public agencies to control public spending (Barrett 2011).  
This effect of social partnership and his preferences regarding economic policy making 
had been why, just one day after the initial agreement, Lenihan suddenly made a public 
statement criticizing the unions and the proposal on the table. This was a shock to unions who 
had thought that they had a deal on the table. With the initiatives of Lenihan and the 
backbenchers within Fianna Fail78, the government announced the new budget with a public 
sector pay and minimum wage cut the next day (O’Connor; Begg; and Cody, Dublin, 2014). The 
proposed extent of retrenchment was too severe too negotiate an agreement. Thus, both IBEC 
and the private sector unions pulled out of the negotiations claiming that the economic conditions 
deteriorated and their priorities had changed. Government then sought deals with the public 
sector unions but it collapsed around the pension levy and wages in the public sector (O’Connor; 
Begg; and Cody, Dublin, 2014). This eventually meant the collapse of negotiations and the social 
partnership, which was not deeply embedded as an institutional process and was mainly a 
pragmatic relationship (Begg, Dublin, 2014). While the NESC was sidelined, the social 
partnership committees were shut down and replaced with the parliamentary subcommittees as 
the main arena of decision-making within the government.79 Eventually, based also on the 
recommendations of the Department of Finance’s report, the government unilaterally initiated 
several rounds of unilateral public sector pay cuts to reduce the mounting deficit.  
It was the combination of various factors that led to the end of the social partnership 
process which was a voluntary process and was dependent on the political preferences of the 
government and the PM (Regan 2012). The already declining ability of the trade unions to 
initiate industrial action and mobilize support was evident both due to declining membership 
levels and high level of distrust among the general public. Already experiencing problems within 
the last couple of years, the incentives to keep partnership in place further declined when the 
crisis hit. The underlying coalition between the unions and the PM has eroded with the change in 
the balance of power within the major party, Fianna Fail. The decline of the power of the office 
of Prime Minister that was critical for maintaining the social partnership and the rise of the 
                                                 
78 The details can be found here: http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/revealed-how-the-
cabinet-was-split-26588766.html  
79 The scope of social partnership had been reduced back to its 1980’s level in which the 
government just acted as a referee between the employers and unions. 
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Ministry of Finance had created an opportunity for a shift towards neoliberal orthodoxy. Thus 
the Minister of Finance Lenihan dictated the policy response with consultations with TROIKA. 
The Fine Gael-Labor government has also kept this structure, negotiated with individual public 
sector unions on a bilateral basis through the Department of Finance. 
The fiscal consolidation heavily concentrated on cuts in public sector pay, social security 
payment and downsizing of the public sector (Monastiriotis, Hardiman et al. 2013). Thus, despite 
the vulnerability of ICTU and the private sector unions, the public sector unions were still critical 
for the policy implementation process. The trade density levels in the public sector have 
remained constant throughout the social partnership. While there were no severe industrial 
actions, the majority of strikes were still in the public sector. As a result, the possibility of 
stalling the negotiation process through industrial action and refusing to implement the 
agreement initiated a residual desire to have a national framework rather than unilateral action 
(Cody, Dublin 2014). The political actors still had a preference in maintaining consensus rather 
than conflict in the policymaking processes. Thus, following the collapse of social partnership, 
the government approached the public sector unions in mid-2010. This move by the government 
aimed to ease the dissatisfaction and ensure stability in the public level (O’Connor and Cody, 
Dublin 2014). The public sector unions, although thought that the agreement was very 
controversial, believed being on the negotiation table would serve them better than being on 
street (O’Connor and Cody, Dublin 2014). Under the threat of unilateral government action, the 
unions took a defensive position and tried to hold as much as ground possible on the table 
(O’Connor, Dublin 2014). These negotiations led to the signing of a sectoral agreement between 
the government and public sector unions in June 2010, namely the Croke Park Agreement. The 
social partnership was replaced by a centralized public sector agreement between the state and 
the public sector unions. Rather than the PM leading the way, the Department of Finance and the 
newly established Department of Expenditure and Reform represented the state. Through this 
deal, the government was able to secure stable political environment without major social and 
political unrest and industrial action. As a result, when the Fund came in for the negotiations, 
there was a broader consensus and ownership of the fiscal consolidation program produced by 
the government without any significant opposition and resistance by the domestic interest groups 
such as the unions and financial sector interests.  
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5.5 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMF PROGRAM  
This consensus and ownership of the program during the design stage was also transferred to the 
implementation stage. Ireland successfully completed its IMF program in 2013 within the 
proposed schedule. It is considered to be a case of high level of domestic ownership, which led 
to a relatively smooth process of policy making and implementing reforms. The strong 
willingness of successive governments who negotiated and implemented the agreement, the 
participation of the relevant domestic stakeholders to the process and efficient political and 
bureaucratic organization have been critical in this process and successful conclusion of the Irish 
IMF program. This chapter now discusses each of these in return to have a detailed 
understanding of the process and the nature of the interaction between the Irish government and 
domestic stakeholders. I will separately discuss the politics of labor market and financial sector 
reforms.  
The program has been designed and signed under the coalition government of Fianna Fail 
and the Green Party. The other coalition partner, the Green Party, withdrew from the government 
and called for an early election. The general election of February 2011 resulted in the 
unprecedented electoral collapse of Fianna Fail and produced the largest parliamentary majority 
of the Ireland’s history (68% of seats) with a coalition between Fine Gael Party and Labor Party 
(Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2013). The Fianna Fail’s economic policies and especially their 
ties to the trade unions, which were seen at the root of the deficit problems, were among the 
major factors contributing to their electoral collapse. Especially the legitimacy of ICTU in 
representing the interests of the workers had been questioned severely prior to the elections. The 
strong association between the union and party leaders was also important, shifting the votes of 
workers away from Fianna Fail towards the Labor Party and Sinn Fein.  
Accordingly, the program was implemented under a different coalition government. This 
coalition involved the center-right Fine Gael and the center-left Labor Party. Thus the ideological 
spectrum had been wider than the previous coalition. The elections also introduced several anti-
bail-out and independent representatives from small socialist or other left-wing groupings. 
Especially, a relatively small left-wing party, Sinn Fein was able to secure the votes in working-
class urban areas by identifying itself vigorously against the austerity measures (Hardiman and 
MacCarthaigh 2013). Since the IMF agreement has been successfully implemented under this 
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coalition and political environment, the focus is on this period. There are three significant factors 
to consider regarding the successful implementation of the program. The first are the preferences 
of the new coalition partners, Fine Gael and the Labor Party and their strategies. Especially 
analysis of their interaction with the domestic stakeholders who are key to implementation is 
critical. The second is the bureaucratic structure that was responsible from implementing the 
reforms. Lastly, IMF, its strategies throughout the implementation process and its interaction 
with the government and the domestic actors in Ireland are discussed. 
5.5.1 The Fine Gael-Labor coalition and their preferences 
The coalition government, with 68% of the total seats in the parliament, had the necessary 
coalition to enact any commitments given to the Fund. Thus, the willingness and cooperation of 
the coalition partners was critical in ensuring successful implementation. The coalition 
represented a wide range of interests from center right to center left (O’Reardon, Dublin 2014). 
Given the support and democratic mandate that they achieved as a result of the elections, the 
coalition government was already in a strong position. There was a strong consensus regarding 
the severity of the crisis and the need to intervene not only within the government but also 
among the broader public. The program objectives had not provided a significant challenge to 
the ideational basis of economic policies in Ireland. There was real congruence between what the 
IMF demanded and the neo-liberal interpretation of what thought to be best for the Irish 
economy (Hardiman, Dublin 2014)80. For instance, Dellepiane and Hardiman (2012) emphasize 
the successive budget speeches prior to the crisis that prioritized the need to restore fiscal 
position to boost business confidence. Similarly, many economists argued the need to initiate a  
‘shock therapy’: a quickly undertaken, massive fiscal consolidation, primarily based on spending 
cuts, front-loading the pain (Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012). These recipes were similar to the 
policies undertaken throughout the IMF program. Thus, despite disagreements on certain issues, 
the coalition partners were able to create necessary consensus on the implementation of the 
program goals (O’Reardon. Dublin 2014). There were no significant differences in terms of 
willingness and commitment to the IMF program before and after the elections (Hardiman and 
                                                 
80 Personal Interview with Niamh Hardiman, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public 
Policy, University College Dublin. Dublin, April 2014.  
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MacCarthaigh 2013). The coalition partners did not attempt to significantly alter the already 
established plan and tried to maneuver around the commitments under the IMF program. It was 
naturally expected from the center-right Fine Gael to implement the policy goals and pursue a 
neo-liberal agenda. This would give them a chance to weaken the effect of unions in economic-
policy making and alter the labor markets towards a more neo-liberal structure while providing 
solutions to the deeper structural problems.  
Although its pre-elections discourse strongly relied on anti-austerity policies81, the Labor 
Party also showed a strong commitment/ownership. The party tried to benefit from this process 
by defining themselves ‘as fiscally responsible, and to attract and retain a middle-class (and often 
public-sector) support base’ (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2013).  The leaders also portrayed the 
party as having the capacity to police’ the terms of the loan agreement. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the reforms were already necessary due to already high costs of entitlements for the 
state. There was a consensus among the party officials that the crisis was too severe and the 
adjustment was necessary (O’Reardon, Dublin 2014). It was the ministers from the Labor Party 
who implemented the cuts in both cash transfers and in many welfare service provisions and 
reforms in reducing the public sector pay bill. 
Given the consensus within the government, their strategies have been critical in the 
implementation process. In order to manage their relations with the Fund, the government 
created an economic management council that included two members from each party. The 
negotiations on the strategy to be followed on budgetary issues have been discussed within this 
council and all the decisions were taken with internal discussions. When it came to the 
negotiations with the TROIKA partners, the government spoke as a single voice and did not 
reflect any disagreements. This enabled the government with additional bargaining power in the 
international table since it left no room for exploitation by the TROIKA partners.  
5.5.2 The Politics of Labor Market Reform 
The Irish program did not rely heavily on structural reforms. This supports the findings in the 
                                                 
81 For instance, the leader of the party Eamon Gilmore famously argued for either Labor’s way 
or Frankfurt's way - or back to the old ways’.  
Available online at: http://www.independent.ie/opinion/letters/labours-way-frankfurts-way-or-
back-to-the-old-ways-30709165.html (accessed on December 2, 2014). 
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empirical chapter on labor market implementation. When labor is weak or not militant, IMF does 
not maximize conditionality. The labor market conditionality was exercised mainly through 
fiscal consolidation measures and some structural conditionality. Since the public sector 
employment and pay accounted for a significant portion of public spending, the program mainly 
targeted the public sector bill. From 2009 to 2011, the public wages were cut by 13% on average. 
The cuts were mainly progressive, those earning over €100,000 facing net pay reductions of up 
to 30 % (IMF 2012). With also cuts achieved through the Croke Park, the measures had 
delivered net annual savings of €1.7 billion by the end of 2011.82 Similarly, a strategic targeted 
rather than across the board approach was employed in the employment cuts, focusing on the 
health sector and protecting the ones in the education (IMF 2012). By the time of the 9th review, 
the government also implemented several structural reforms to strengthen activation and training 
of job seekers and to facilitate job creation by SMEs as well as enacted the new residential 
property tax and the social welfare bill (IMF 2013). Moreover the Irish Fiscal Advisory Board 
was set up with a mandate to achieve the soundness of official macro-fiscal forecasts, the 
appropriateness of the fiscal stance and the consistency between the budgetary plans and fiscal 
rules in July 2011.83 
These reforms had especially been damaging to welfare of several groups such as 
beneficiaries of social spending and public sector employees. However, the coalition government 
did not face significant resistance from the trade unions due to their inability to initiate industrial 
action and mobilize support within the general public. The theory presented in the second 
chapter predicts that when the labor is weak and not militant, the government should find it 
easier to implement labor market reforms. This was clearly the case for Ireland. However, the 
Irish case presents a unique opportunity due to its consensus based politics and the unique role 
played by the Labor party in the coalition government. Although the social partnership process 
was reduced to specific public sector deals, the role of the Labor party was critical in maintaining 
a stable policy environment and peaceful interactions between the government and relevant 
domestic stakeholders, especially the public sector unions.  
Although it was not possible to alter the program objectives in radical ways, the Labor 
                                                 
82 These cuts in wages had been strategic in targeting the reining hospital and police overtime 
costs and sick pay. 
83 http://www.fiscalcouncil.ie 
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party had been critical in integrating the relevant stakeholders to the policymaking process and 
keeping them peaceful throughout the process. The Labor Party officials acknowledged that it 
would have been very difficult for the government to act unilaterally and implement program 
successfully with a widespread unrest among the unions and possibility of industrial action 
(O’Reardon, Dublin 2014). There was a strong belief among the unions that, if left alone, Fine 
Gael would have imposed the costs of the adjustments to the workers and the unions (Begg, 
O’Connor, Cody, Dublin 2014). Even before the elections, SIPTU had even discussed the 
possibility of calling their members to vote for the Labor Party (O’Connor, Dublin 2014). They 
feared that Fine Gael would have secured enough votes to govern without the support of the 
Labor Party, which could have had disastrous consequences for the unions (O’Connor and Begg, 
Dublin 2014).  
The Labor Party has been critical in moderating the government agenda and program 
goals in several ways. Due to the collapse of the social partnership, the trade unions lost their 
direct channel of access to the policy-making apparatus and especially to the government. Since 
there is no formal institutional structure, their relationship is mediated through individual 
ministers in key positions. With the Labor Party becoming the junior coalition partner, the public 
sector unions were able to establish a detailed engagement with the new coalition government, 
even more extensively than the previous Fianna Fail-Green Party coalition (O’Connor and Cody, 
Dublin 2014). This was mainly possible due to the communication channels through the Labor 
party and its ministers in key positions. The Labor Party Minister occupied two key ministries 
that were directly related to the public sector reforms, the newly established Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform, and the Department of Social Protection. Especially the 
Minister of Social Protection, Joan Burton, was critical for the unions, providing direct access 
and a channel for communication for their concerns (Hardiman, Dublin 2014). This provides 
support to the idea that the unions might exercise influence through their access to certain 
ministers (Alexiadou 2016). The union officials strongly believed that if it was left to Fine Gael, 
the burden on the public sector could be more severe (Begg and Cody, Dublin 2014).  
Secondly, the Labor party also was able to gain certain concessions along the way. For 
instance, with the support of the IMF, the Labor party was also able to resist to certain 
privatization reforms suggested by the ECB (Cody and Breuer, Dublin 2014). Moreover, the 
Labor Party was able to introduce a modest job-stimulus package and labor activation policies 
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into their government program despite the reservations by the TROIKA partners. The Fund 
openly warned the Irish authorities regarding the possible negative effects of the Job Stimulus 
package on the country’s fiscal position and urged Ireland to focus on controls on hiring and 
savings through non-core pay entitlements rather than wage reductions.  
One of the critical moments during the implementation process has been in 2013 when 
the government had negotiated the Haddington Road Agreement (HRA) with the public sector 
unions to address the additional fiscal deficit. Despite the governments’ efforts, the weaker 
macroeconomic outlook in the Eurozone and the impact of the Jobs Initiative necessitated 
additional fiscal consolidation. In early 2013, it was realized that the budgetary measures fell 
short in its target of addressing the fiscal deficit by nearly €1.3 billion. Since the Public Service 
Pay and Pensions Bill accounted for 35% of government spending, it was the main target for the 
government to achieve the required expenditure reduction. Thus, the government approach to the 
unions representing the public sector employees to negotiate a new deal. The union officials 
believed that, it was the Labor party who had taken precautions early and started negotiations 
with the unions (Cody and Begg, Dublin 2014). Fine Gael would have just imposed the burden 
on the unions with unilateral policies. The resulting agreement is known as the Haddington Road 
Agreement (HRA). 84 This agreement was accepted by the unions under the assurance by the 
government that this would be the ‘final ask’ of public servants in the lifetime of this 
government. In other words, public servants whose unions accepted the HRA would not face 
further changes to public service pay. The government also agreed to re-instate the loss of 
income when the economy returns to its normal state. The parties agreed to achieve the necessary 
€1 billion savings in the cost of the pay and pensions bill over the 3 years from 2013 to 2015 
through a variety of measures. These include: 
x A reduction in pay rates for public servants who earn over €65,000 
x A reduction in the pensions of public service pensioners above a threshold of €32,500 
x Suspension of incremental progression for three years for all public servants, unless they 
are covered by a collective agreement registered with the Labour Relations Commission 
(in practice, the Haddington Road Agreement) 
                                                 
84 For more details, see http://www.per.gov.ie/haddington-road-agreement/ ; 
http://www.impact.ie/Haddington-Road-Agreement/Haddington-Road-frequently-asked-
questions.htm 
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x Certain changes in the terms and conditions of employment including pay reductions or 
increases in working time.  
The Haddington Road and the Croke Park Agreements have been critical in maintaining a 
stable political environment and high domestic ownership of the program in Ireland. Through 
these deals, since 2008, the government was able to save approximately €25 billion (around 16% 
of 2011 GDP) by expenditure reducing and revenue raising measures. The public servants faced 
averaging 14% pay reductions arising from the introduction of the Pension Related Deduction in 
2009 and the pay reductions introduced in January 2010. The measures also included an ongoing 
pay freeze, deductions from public service pensioners, reduction of more than 30,000 staff and 
€1.5 billion in pay and non-pay savings.85 More importantly, the Croke Park and the Haddington 
Road agreements only delivered the budgeted savings but also helped maintained the industrial 
peace, which has been critical to the implementation of the other fiscal and structural reforms. As 
the Fund puts it, “the social dialogue has established a stable framework for change in a very 
challenging context and has dampened down levels of conflict within the public sector’ (IMF, 
2013).  
5.5.3 The Politics of Financial Sector Reform 
Unlike Greek sovereign debt crisis, the crisis in Ireland was a major banking crisis leading to the 
loss of market access. Although the government took several steps to respond to the problems in 
the banking sector, the program extensively relied on the financial sector conditionality to 
address contagion fears and structural problems. Out of the €85bn provided in the program, 
€35bn was reserved for banking sector support including recapitalization and buffer for the later 
interventions (Veron 2016). The IMF contributed significantly to the effective resolution of a 
major banking crisis in Ireland. Given the fact that the crisis originated in the financial sector, 
IMF maximized financial sector conditionality to address structural problems.   
Due to its expertise, the IMF had a much bigger role in the design and implementation of 
the financial sector reforms. The reforms in Ireland focused on the recapitalization and 
deleveraging of banks through restructuring and downsizing; addressing non- performing loans; 
increasing transparency and oversight of the financial sector through bankruptcy/competition 
                                                 
85 The numbers are taken from the Labor Relations Commission’s website: www.lrc.ie 
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laws and increasing role of the central bank (Veron 2016). Initially, the banking sector was 
further restructured.86 The Fund also provided technical assistance to Ireland to enforce better 
implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards and to conduct stress tests and 
debt sustainability analysis. Moreover, in order to increase transparency and prevent future risk 
behavior, new regulations were adopted in bankruptcy, credit union and competition reforms 
(Veron 2016).  
Accordingly, these reforms had negative consequences on the financial sector interests 
such as raising capital requirements, increasing oversight and transparency and enforcing 
downsizing and restructuring. However, the government was able to implement these reforms 
without major opposition. There were several reasons for this. First, the Irish financial sector was 
already collectively weak to influence government policies. The sector was among the main 
reasons for the collapse of the economy and were blamed for their failure. Their strong links to 
Fianna Fail politicians enabled privilege access for the domestic banking industry (Honohan 
2016). However, they did not have similar connections to the current government, which was 
willing to undertake necessary measures. Unlike the public sector unions who had privileged 
access to the Labor party, the financial sector interests did not carry any electoral costs for 
neither of the political parties (Beaumont 2016)87. Although the financial interests were 
consulted throughout the process, their role was limited to providing information to correctly 
diagnose problems and they did not have any real influence on the process (Beaumont 2016). 
Some domestic financial actors that had privilege access to policymakers tried to exercise 
influence; however, they were not successful (Honohan 2016). Moreover, the key engines of the 
Irish economy, the large foreign multinational corporations, was not primarily dependent on the 
domestic banking system. Thus, this weakened the effect of domestic financial interests due to 
their decreasing control on the credit flow and growth of the Irish economy.   
Absent any effect of domestic financial interests, the analysis of the implementation 
process reveals important features that are unique to the financial sector conditionality. Initially, 
                                                 
86 For instance, the EBS Building Society (formerly the EducationBuilding Society) was merged 
into AIB in July 2011; Anglo Irish and INBS were merged to form the Irish Bank Resolution 
Corporation (IBRC). IBRC was later liquidated in February 2013; the government bought the 
Irish Life & Permanent and split its insurance (Irish Life) and its banking operations. The credit 
unions sector was also overhauled. A number of local credit unions closed or recapitalized. 
87 Personal Interview with Craig Beaumont, Assistant Director of the European Department at 
the IMF and the Mission Chief to Ireland, Washington D.C., August 2016.  
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as expected the financial sector were unwilling to settle restructuring of mortgage arrears and 
delayed the process as much as possible to decrease their losses. Addressing the mortgage arrears 
took longer than expected and was frustrating due to delays resulting from the actions of the 
banks in Ireland (Beaumont 2016). The Irish crisis mainly originated in the real estate sector. 
Accordingly, when the crisis hit, there were over 100,000 mortgage borrowers with prolonged 
arrears that needed to be resolved (IMF 2012). With the collapse of the housing market and 
decline in property prices, these contracts had to be renegotiated, which requires cooperation 
from both sides. However, the mortgage borrowers and the banks naturally have different views 
on the appropriate value of a restructured loan. The borrower would like a large write down of 
the value. The banks do not want to forgive loans but to recover as much as possible. These 
differences are widest in the early phases when house prices are lowest and there are large doubts 
about recovery. Thus both sides have incentives to delay for a better deal and can use some legal 
means such as repossession and declaring bankruptcy (Beaumont 2016). Thus, the banks in 
Ireland used their leverage on this process by appearing unwilling to restructure. Similarly, the 
borrowers refused to communicate with the banks, preventing any progress (Veron 2016).   
The existing Irish regulations made it difficult for the banks to use foreclosure due to 
strong protections of private property rights and declare bankruptcy. Especially the public and 
courts were averse to the idea of foreclosures (O’Reardon 2014, Beaumont 2016). Thus, new 
regulations were needed to address these issues and settle mortgage arrears. The financial crisis 
hit especially the young first time home buyers. Many politicians in the parliament were 
sympathetic to these people’s demands and needs. However, there was also a concern that more 
debt relief would ultimately be at the expense of tax payers. Accordingly, the government, 
justice department and the IMF worked intensively on the reforms seeking to strike the right 
balance. The financial sector conditionality specifically set targets for the banks to engage with 
borrowers and offer restructuring deals. The resulting bankruptcy reforms were complex, 
including a novel option for out of court restructures of secured mortgages. Accordingly, it took 
longer than normal by taking into account political complexity and legislative delays.  
The IMF financial sector conditionality was successful in creating financial stability 
through financial sector restructuring and reform. While the Irish authorities effectively 
implemented reforms, the analysis also the IMF’s technical support and designing the reforms 
and complex legislative processes that involved members of the parliament, mortgage borrowers 
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and the lenders.  
5.5.4 The Irish bureaucratic apparatus 
In addition to the policy-making process that ensured the integration of the relevant stakeholders 
to the process, the capacity of the Irish bureaucracy to deliver the results was critical in 
successful implementation of the program. The borrowing country governments need technical 
expertise and able bureaucratic apparatus to deliver the results. This was especially critical in the 
implementation of the complex financial sector conditions such as the bankruptcy laws. This 
actually is in contrast to the empirical findings regarding the role of the bureaucracy, which 
shows that the implementation goes down with the increasing expertise/strength of bureaucracy. 
Further tests might be needed to analyze some interactive effects such as between government 
ideology and bureaucracy, that might help explain the puzzling finding in the empirical chapter. 
The IMF programs involve complex policy measures that span across different issues. 
They require not only people to understand policy objectives, turn them into measures but also 
experts to draft legislations. Thus, timely implementation would normally require experts and 
able bureaucrats. Ireland already had a functioning bureaucracy to aid the needs of the 
government. They were critical in the negotiation stage to bargain harder. Moreover, the new 
government invested additional resources to ensure successful implementation. One of the initial 
actions by the new Irish government was to create a new ministry, the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, to deal with public sector reform, management and industrial issues. 
This ministry was basically a department within the Ministry of Finance and now being turned 
into an independent organization. The Department of Finance became solely responsible from 
budgetary and macroeconomic issues. This move was critical to break ‘the duopoly at the heart 
of the Irish government in which decision making power was shared and contested between the 
Finance and Prime Minister’s Departments’ (Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2013). 
Moreover, the government also created several new units dedicated to internal monitoring 
of the program. These units included dedicated Central Unit within the NTMA and within the 
Central Bank. The most crucial one has been the External Program Compliance Unit (EPCU) 
within the Department of Finance. This unit has been specifically mandated to deliver and 
monitor the implementation of the program conditions. Once the conditions were negotiated, the 
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unit would be responsible for deciphering the IMF texts, creating timelines and updates 
regarding the progress, creating regular reports, identifying risks and potential bottlenecks, 
notifying both the government and TROIKA partners in a timely manner so that the program 
remains on track.88 This unit became the contact point for the Fund officials during their visits 
for review and had been described as highly functional and helpful with clear mandate and 
delivering everything on deadline (Bhatia, Washington D.C. 2014; Breuer, Dublin 2014). These 
follow-up tasks that would be normally performed by the IMF staff in countries without 
necessary capacities was given to this compliance unit during the process of implementation 
(Breuer, Dublin 2014). This was critical in maintaining a credible relationship and establishing 
trust to deliver results with the IMF along the way (O’Brolchain, Dublin 2014; Bhatia, 
Washington D.C. 2014). High level of government ownership/willingness and the ability to 
deliver results had been why the IMF had not dictated the terms of the program and gave room to 
the Irish authorities (Bhatia, Washington D.C. 2014).  
5.5.5 The IMF and its interaction with the Irish authorities 
Given their interactions throughout the negotiations and implementation process with the Irish 
authorities and their reviews of the program, the Fund officials considered Ireland as a case of 
high ownership (Bhatia, Washington D.C. 2014; Breuer, Dublin 2014). The two governments 
that the IMF officials interacted with had high willingness and ownership of the program. 
Moreover, the Fund officials have praised the professionalism, expertise and ability to deliver of 
the Irish bureaucrats. They were able to adopt the changing circumstances and requirements of 
the program and respond quickly. This was why, throughout the process of implementation, the 
IMF mission team was able to build up a trust with Irish authorities and their ability to deliver 
results. This was critical because this provided the flexibility to the Irish authorities to design 
their reform agenda in fiscal consolidation. One IMF official even said that ‘We could have 
                                                 
88 The head of EPCU has noted that the IMF documents were not clearly written and EC 
documents were actually worse. They included lots of text, were not clear on what the target was 
and were structured thematically. Thus the EPCU office had spent quite a time to come up with 
an easier structure to clarify the targets and make it easier to implement. For instance, they 
created tables for each condition which made it easier to follow implementation and also 
structured the conditions temporally rather than thematically in order to have a clearer sense of 
creating timelines and identify difficulties (O’Brolchain, Dublin 2014).  
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pushed it harder but political stability has its values (…) Given the trust that we had in Irish 
authorities and their track record, we were mostly in monitoring mode in Ireland’ (Bhatia, 
Washington D.C. 2014). This is critical since the IMF programs are dynamic in nature. As a 
result of the quarterly reviews and track record of the implementation, the Fund might demand 
alterations to programs such as waivers, discontinuations or modifications of certain policies or 
accept the delay of implementation due to technical and political reasons. This enables flexibility 
to the government to accommodate for the difficulties along the way. The willingness and ability 
of the Irish authorities were critical in this respect.  
The interaction between the Fund and Irish authorities is a two-way process. Contrary to 
the widespread belief about the Fund, the Irish authorities and domestic stakeholders considered 
the IMF ‘the good guys’ within the TROIKA. They considered the Fund as professional, having 
the necessary expertise and open to dialogue more than the other partners. In certain issues such 
as the fiscal debt and structural reforms, unlike its European counterparts, the Fund seemed to be 
open to negotiations and was willing to give certain concessions. The members of the Fund 
mission team such as Ajai Chopra and Ashoka Mody were well respected and were defined as 
intelligent and communicable people with great experience and knowledge regarding the 
economic crisis. Especially Ashoka Mody had been very critical of the European partners and 
the heavy reliance on austerity measures in the program. He was the one pushing for the 
inclusion of pro-growth related measures.89 Thus, this might help the Irish authorities to develop 
a certain common ground with the IMF officials or simply help them align their interests.  
The IMF also considers that the ownership goes beyond the government level and 
requires accommodation of the needs of domestic stakeholders and civil society groups. This has 
come out of the discussions of streamlining conditionality as a response to the growing critiques 
against the Fund and its policies especially after the Asian Financial Crisis (IMF 2011). One 
strategy developed has been the reaching out meetings in which the Fund gets together with 
various audiences from the domestic and international level to listen their concerns and have a 
chance to explain its own strategy to broaden the ownership. With this aim, the Fund officials 
constantly met with the civil society groups as well as the social partners in Ireland. However, 
                                                 
89 The IMF Country Representative Peter Breuer also confirmed that, given the problem in the 
financial sector, inability of the banks to lend and people to re-pay their debts, there was a 
serious doubt within the IMF that the current program would produce enough growth (Breuer, 
Dublin 2014).  
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despite the positive reactions to the professionalism and expertise of the Fund by the domestic 
groups in Ireland, these meetings failed to broaden ownership and create a positive outcome. The 
meetings had been viewed as ‘window dressing and the actors participated ended up being 
frustrated’ (Begg and Murphy90, Dublin 2014). Even though their voices had been heard, the 
participants believed that they were not being taken into serious consideration and had not 
created a real effect on the program and its objectives.  
Despite the Fund’s intentions, it was the government’s efforts that secured a stable policy 
environment and the integration of the needs/concerns of the relevant domestic actors. Especially 
the public sector unions, whose consent was critical, was able to secure two critical deals with 
the government which secured that there would not be any industrial action. Thus, broadening 
the ownership to the societal level, these agreements ensured successful implementation. 
5.5.6 Conclusion 
Following these reforms, before the 12th and last review of the program on November 2013, the 
Irish economy was in path toward recovery with significant reforms in the banking sectors and 
significantly improved fiscal position. Every fiscal target under the program had been met and 
the country was able to reduce its structural primary deficit to .5 percent of GDP in 2013, a 
cumulative decline of around 4.25 percent since 2010 and of 10 percent since the onset of the 
crisis. Fiscal measures implemented under the program was in total over €13 billion or 8 percent 
of GDP, two-thirds on the expenditure side. Although the problems deepened in the Eurozone, 
the authorities remained committed to the program goals and objectives. This has also 
contributed to the increasing investor confidence to the Irish economy due to the policy 
implementation track record and the growth prospects. The country regained normal lending 
access to financial markets on March 2013 when it successfully issued 5 billion of 10-year 
maturity bonds. 
This fiscal consolidation effort was also strengthened with an institutional framework 
through the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 that introduced aggregate and ministerial level 
expenditure ceilings, provided the independence and adequate funding of the Irish Fiscal 
Advisory Council (IFAC) and to enhance transparency include the authorities’ action plan on 
                                                 
90 Personal Interview with Michelle Murphy, Social Justice Ireland. Dublin, April 2014.  
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fiscal reporting, forecasting and risk analysis. Due to lack of strong unions and militancy, Irish 
IMF program did not rely heavily on structural reforms to correct problems in the labor market. 
Structural reforms improved the competition within the legal and medical services sectors. The 
labor market reforms focused on enhancing activation and training of the unemployed, and 
facilitate labor market adjustment in sectors hit hard by the crisis. Despite the fact that the 
implementation of some reforms in the labor market as well as in health and social policy was 
yet to be completed, on the basis of successful ongoing bond issuance, the government was able 
to end its program with the Fund in December 2013.  
The Irish government implemented the labor market and financial sector conditionality 
without facing significant resistance by the domestic actors. However, the reforms in these 
sectors are still driven by unique characteristics. Analysis of the implementation of labor market 
reforms highlighted the role of Labor Party in responding to the public sector unions’ demands 
despite their collective weaknesses. The financial sector conditionality required complex laws 
and relied on resolution of unique interactions between the mortgage borrowers and their lenders. 
Despite these unique characteristics, the implementation of the IMF programs in general share 
certain commonalities that rest on the strategic interaction between the Fund, the borrowing 
country government and domestic stakeholders. It is the government’s willingness and capacity 
that align the interests with the domestic interest groups and enable domestic ownership of the 
programs. Now I turn to the analysis of the Greek IMF programs, which presents an adversarial 
political system in the presence of strong organized interests, especially in the labor market 
conditionality.  
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6.0  GREECE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In stark contrast to Ireland, which has successfully and quickly completed its program, 
successive Greek governments had difficulties in implementing the IMF conditionality. Greece 
signed its first program in 2010, which was then replaced with a 4-year Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) arrangement in 2012. However, the EFF program expired in mid-2015 and has not been 
replaced with a new program. The IMF refrains from the participating in the latest Eurozone 
bailout and argues that another financial package for Greece without further debt relief as 
unsound (Eichengreen 2016).  
The Greek governments particularly were unsuccessful at reforming their labor market 
and downsizing the public sector due to strong opposition by the unions and clientelist linkages 
(Featherstone and Tinios 2006, Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2013). Thus, analyzing the 
implementation of IMF labor market conditionality in Greece provides a nuanced understanding 
of the causal mechanism presented in the empirical chapter. Greece exemplifies the left’s ability 
to overcome resistance and the right’s inability to form a pro-reform coalition due to strong 
opposition by the left and the unions, especially when the unions are strong and militant. Greek 
unions had traditionally strong ties with left-wing PASOK and had been receiving favors from 
party officials. When the crisis started and PASOK attempted to implement reforms, the unions 
resisted and had been militant. Despite their strong historical ties, PASOK could not create 
consensus with the unions, but managed to pass many structural reforms. This was because the 
main opposition party, right-wing New Democracy, although formally against austerity, was not 
a pro-labor party and was not against the labor market conditions. PASOK government was 
much more effective in isolating the unions and implementing labor market conditionality. 
However, when ND came to power, it faced severe opposition from the main opposition, 
SYRIZA, a radical-left party. Aligning with the unions, SYRIZA was able to limit ND’s ability 
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to pass very ambitious reforms. Despite these problems and different party responses in the labor 
market, successive Greek governments have not faced resistance from the financial interests and 
have been relatively successfully in implementing reforms pertaining to financial sector 
conditionality.  
I will first focus on the origins of the economic crisis in Greece and then the initial policy 
responses. After outlining the major political actors and policy-making traditions in Greece, I 
will detail the IMF programs and the determinants of the design of conditionality. I will 
particularly focus on the implementation of labor market conditionality. After a brief discussion 
of financial sector conditionality, I will conclude.  
6.2 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN GREECE 
6.2.1 Crisis and the initial policy responses  
After Prime Minister Papandreou’s announcement of the discrepancies in Greek official debt 
figures in the late 2009, Greece has entered into a severe economic crisis. Starting as a public 
debt crisis, the problems quickly spread to the banking sector and the real economy. Although 
the banks had sound liquidity and solvency in the beginning of the crisis, sovereign 
downgrading, uncertainty and recession had caused serious distress. As a result, Greece has lost 
cumulatively over 20 percent of its 2008 GDP with declines of nearly 7 percent in 2011 and 
2012. The unemployment rate reached 28 percent with nearly 630,000 long term unemployed in 
2012 (Pagoulatos 2012). Since the start of the crisis, the country has experienced high interest 
rates, severe recessions, harsh austerity and structural reform measures that led to spending, 
pension and wages cuts as well as monetary injections to keep the country solvent (Pagoulatos 
2012).  
Greece had actually been performing well compared to its European partners prior to the 
crisis. The Eurozone membership and the subsequent elimination of exchange rate risks created  
opportunities for Greece (Xafa 2014). Greece’s borrowing costs dropped dramatically with 
significant decrease in the interest rates on 10-year Greeks bonds from 24.5 percent to 6.5 
percent between 1993 and 1997. The eligibility criteria for the Eurozone membership initiated 
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significant policy reforms that resulted in convergence across European countries (Nelson, 
Belkin et al. 2010). The EU member states have also been obliged to limit their government 
deficits to 3 percent of GDP and their public debt levels to 60 percent of GDP under the Stability 
and Growth Pact. Given the fact that Greece had to give up its monetary autonomy, which was 
governed by the ECB, investor confidence in Greece had increased. These expectations resulted 
in significant influx of capital to Greece, which had traditionally weaker economic fundamentals 
than the stronger European counterparts (IMF 2010). Thus, Greece had enjoyed above average 
growth rates (around 4 percent annually) between 2000-2008. This was also fueled by a debt 
financed consumer boom and pro-cyclical fiscal policy with tax cuts and increased spending on 
wages and entitlements (IMF 2010).  
However, this process of growth was not accompanied by the necessary reforms that 
would tackle Greece’s structural problems such as competitiveness, lack of fiscal control and 
increasing public debt, corrupt public sector, a narrow tax revenue base and an unsustainable 
current account deficit (Pagoulatos 2012). The successive government took advantage of the 
access to cheaper credit for short-term stimulus, financing the government spending, offsetting 
the narrow tax base, paying for the imports from abroad that were not offset by exports (Nelson, 
Belkin et al. 2010, Xafa 2014). This resulted in significant government budget and trade deficits 
in 2000s. During this period, inflation also remained persistently above the EU average. 
Resources had moved increasingly from tradable sectors such as manufacturing to highly 
protected sectors such as construction and retail (Xafa 2014). Thus, this access to cheap credit 
had not translated into productive investments that would generate future growth or increase the 
country’s competitiveness. When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, Greece’s general 
government deficit was around 10 percent of GDP and the external current account deficit was 
around 15 percent of GDP (Wyplosz and Sgherri 2016). The Greek economy’s reliance on 
borrowing from international capital markets to finance its budget and capital deficits left the 
country vulnerable to change in investor’s confidence and a sudden stop in capital flows.  
Already highly exposed to international capital markets, the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009 and the subsequent economic downturn increased the pressures on the Greek 
economy. While government spending on programs such as unemployment benefit, wages and 
entitlements increased substantially, the tax revenues decreased (IEO 2016). The Greek 
government debt already increased from below 100 percent of GDP to 126 percent of GDP by 
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the end of 2009. The situation worsened when the newly elected PM Papandreou revealed that 
Greek public debt was much higher than previously reported on February 2010. It was first 
upgraded from 6-7 percent to 12.8 percent of GDP, then increased further to 13.6 per cent in 
2012 (Featherstone 2011, Pagoulatos 2012). This large discrepancy undermined the credibility of 
the Greek economy as well as the EU budgetary surveillance, which led to a sharp increase in the 
Greek borrowing costs. From September 2009 to April 2010, all three major credit rating 
agencies downgraded Greece’s status gradually and highlighted Greece as being in danger of 
default on its foreign borrowing. Eventually, Greece lost its access to the international capital 
markets on April 2010.  
The Greek sovereign debt crisis also exposed the structural vulnerabilities of Greek 
economy and the weaknesses of governance in Greece. Successive Greek governments had 
failed to address structural problems of competitiveness, public and trade deficits, investment 
imbalances and fiscal mismanagement (Featherstone 2011). Raising tax revenues was one of the 
critical problems. For instance, the European Commission estimated that uncollected tax revenue 
in 2006 amounted to 3.4 percent of GDP (Monastiriotis, Hardiman et al. 2013). Weak control of 
public expenditure had enabled significant amount of tax evasion. Greece also ranked among the 
highest in the EU in terms of aging related and entitlement costs. This was a problem especially 
for the long-term fiscal sustainability since spending on pensions was projected to increase by 
126 percent points of GDP over 2010-2050 (Monastiriotis, Hardiman et al. 2013). Domestic 
demand inflation and external competitiveness problems were evident given the current account 
deficit of 11 percent. Competitiveness was also affected by the problems in the labor markets 
such as poor enforcement of already problematic and very rigid employment laws. Greece scored 
poorly on OECD and EU indicators for economic efficiency and flexibility. Competition in the 
domestic markets was impaired particularly in network industries (with large public sector 
participation) and certain professions that remained closed (IMF 2010). This lack of competition 
leads to higher costs and lower productivity in the domestic markets. Greece also had a very 
large informal economy that was estimated to be around 29.5 per cent of GDP (IMF 2010). As 
discussed in the previous section, the lack of reform by successive governments that also failed 
to address public debt problems signified the governance problems. All of these factors led to 
eventual loss of access to capital markets and the bail-out program. 
The European authorities had been late to respond to relieve the severe market pressure 
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on the Papandreou government. As the crisis unfold, the European Union as well as the leading 
countries such as Germany and France had been reluctant to provide a clear signal of their 
willingness to support Greece (Xafa 2014). They initially invoked the “no bailout” clause 
enshrined in Article 125 of the EU Treaty. The lack of support exacerbated the market 
confidence to the Greek economy and was critical in the total loss of market access. The 
government had initiated a 3-year government program in January 2010 to address those 
vulnerabilities and re-gain market confidence. Greece was already in the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure of the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact to reduce the fiscal deficit to 
below 3 percent of GDP by 2012. However, the macroeconomic framework and policy measures 
to address the underlying the deficit problem were not sufficient and convincing (IMF 2010). As 
a result, the government, with extensive consultations with the European Commission, put 
forward additional fiscal measures in February and March 2010 following the Ecofin91 
meetings.92 However, given the lack of clear and sufficient financing assurances by the European 
partners, these measures failed to create momentum in the international capital markets. The 
market sentiment decreased even further, concerns about fiscal sustainability deepened, thereby 
worsening the Greece’s status in the capital markets. Due to eventual loss of its access to foreign 
funds and widening of the spreads on government papers, after a very risky delay, the Eurozone 
Finance Ministers finally agreed on a three-year economic adjustment program to provide €110 
billion loan to Greece in early May 2010.  
6.2.2 IMF Program in Greece 
As a result of the negotiations between the IMF and European counterparts (ECB and EC), an 
                                                 
91 Ecofin is the Economic and Financial Affairs Council of the Council of the European Union, 
made up of the economics and finance ministers from all member states. Ecofin is responsible 
for EU policy in 3 main areas: economic policy, taxation issues and the regulation of financial 
services. Ecofin also deals with issues pertaining to the Euro, the coordination of EU positions 
for international level meetings, such as the G20, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank; and the financial aspects of international negotiations on measures to tackle climate 
change. For more details, see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council/council-configurations 
92 The measures included a 10% cut in salaried bonuses and a recruitment freeze in the narrow 
public sector; increases in VAT rates (from 19% to 21%) and in taxes on petrol, cigarettes and 
alcohol as well as some parametric changes in income taxes and some moderate cuts in 
expenditures and central government operating costs. 
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ambitious program that included a €110 billion financing plan for Greece was announced on 
May 2, 2010. While the European members had pledged to provide €80 billion through bilateral 
loans, the IMF agreed to provide €30 billion through a 3 year Stand-By Agreement (SBA). This 
was an exceptional level of access to the Fund’s resources –equivalent to 3200 percent of 
Greece’s quota in the Fund. This was in fact the largest access granted to a member country. 
Combined €20 billion (€5.5 billion coming from the Fund) was immediately made available to 
Greece. The IMF, through quarterly reviews, would be responsible from monitoring the 
implementation of the program and subsequent disbursement of loans.  
The SBA program identified a dual challenge for Greece that should be addressed to put the 
country on the path of recovery and restore market confidence. First, Greece had a severe fiscal 
problem with government and trade deficits. Secondly, the country faced a severe 
competitiveness problem. The focused conditionality in the SBA program aimed to tackle these 
twin issues of debt and competitiveness. Additionally, given the challenges it faces, the program 
identified safeguarding financial sector stability as a crucial goal. The adjustment required of 
Greece in its primary government balance had been quite extreme and unprecedented in history 
amounting to 14.5 percent of GDP over a five-year period. In order to reach these aims, the 
program has identified these necessary aims/steps: 
x To make the government’s finances sustainable, reducing the fiscal deficit and 
placing the debt-to-GDP ratio on a downward trajectory: through reduction in wages, 
social benefits and pensions that constituted 75 percent of total (non-interest) public 
spending.  
x To make the economy more competitive, initiating pro-growth policies and reforms to 
modernize the economy and open up opportunities for all: through cost controls; 
nominal wage and benefit cuts; reducing inflation; and improving transparency and 
reducing the role of state in the economy. 
x Rigorous fiscal adjustment through structural policies and financial sector reforms: 
Key elements of the reform package included: 
- Government spending: Spending measures would yield savings of 5 ¼ percent of 
GDP through 2013. Pensions and wages would be reduced and frozen for three 
years, with payment of Christmas, Easter, and summer bonuses workers 
abolished, but with protection for the lowest-paid. 
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- Fiscal policies: Fiscal consolidation—on top of adjustment already under way—
would total 11 percent of GDP over three years, with the adjustment designed to 
get the general government deficit under the 3 percent level by 2014 (compared 
with 13.6 percent in 2009). 
- Government revenues: Revenues measures would yield 4 percent of GDP through 
2013 by raising value-added tax, and taxes on luxury items, and tobacco and 
alcohol, among other items. 
- Revenue administration and expenditure control: Strengthening tax collection 
and raise taxes with safeguard revenues from the largest tax payers; strengthening 
budget controls. The total revenue gains and expenditure savings from these 
structural reforms were expected to gradually total 1.8 percent of GDP during the 
program period. 
- Financial stability. A Financial Stability Fund, funded from the external 
financing package, was being set up to ensure a sound level of bank equity. 
- Entitlement programs. Government entitlement programs would be curtailed; 
selected social security benefits would be cut while maintaining benefits for the 
most vulnerable. 
- Pension reform. Comprehensive pension reform was proposed, including by 
curtailing provisions for early retirement. 
- Structural policies. Government to modernize public administration, strengthen 
labor markets and income policies, improve the business environment, and divest 
state enterprises. 
- Military spending. The plan envisaged a significant reduction in military 
expenditure during the period. 
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6.3 GREEK POLITICAL SYSTEM 
6.3.1 The Greek politics and policy-making processes  
Until the collapse of the political and economic system in 2010, Greece has been a strong 
majoritarian system that produced stable single party majority governments. New Democracy 
(ND) and Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) dominated this political spectrum. Despite 
the gradual decline of ideological differences since 1980s, these parties could be placed on the 
right-left cleavage (Alexiadou 2016). New Democracy, which is the center-right party that 
oversaw the Greek transition from military dictatorship to democracy, has received support 
mainly from conservative urban middle class. Traditionally, the ND has pursued greater 
economic liberalization with policies such as privatization and lower taxes and has been a strong 
supporter of the European integration (Alexiadou 2016). The ND opposed the first bailout 
package in 2010 when PASOK was the single governing party but later oversaw the negotiations 
and the implementation process in the government. 
PASOK has been a non-traditional social democratic party. Although it has its 
ideological roots in the radical left, PASOK has gradually transformed into a ‘catch all, petit 
bourgeois party’ since early 1980’s (Alexiadou 2016). PASOK’s main voter base is composed of 
lower class, protectionist classes with professionals and progressive modernizers. It also has 
strong ties with the labor unions and farmers. PASOK was able to maintain the support of this 
unusual coalition of heterogeneous groups through populism, patronage and clientelist structures 
since 1990’s. Thus, party’s policies and discourse shifted numerously accordingly and lacked 
clarity in terms of program goals.   
As a result of the ongoing economic crisis and resulting austerity measures that 
accompanied the subsequent structural adjustment programs, New Democracy and PASOK, 
which has dominated the Greek politics since the democratization, fell from a total vote of 77% 
in 2009 to 32% and 42% in the twin elections of 2012 (Kompsopoulos and Chasoglou 2014). 
PASOK, which led the government that requested the bailout package, lost much of its political 
support and hit near historic lows. New political movements from both ends of the ideological 
spectrum, the most important one being SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left), have 
capitalized on the discontent created during this period of turmoil. SYRIZA, first founded as an 
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alliance between the socialists, the Trotskyist, the Maoist and the ecologists, has recently turned 
into a political party. SYRIZA has been one of the forerunners of the anti-austerity/anti-
memorandum movements and claims that Greece has been subjected to external anti-social/anti-
national forces (Kompsopoulos and Chasoglou 2014). Other relevant parties have been the 
Democratic Left (DIMAR), which was formed in 2010 by the moderate SYRIZA defectors; the 
extreme right party Golden Dawn, which was founded by the supporters of the military junta that 
ruled the country between 1967-74; and the right wing party, the Independent Greeks. The 
Democratic Left has a more moderate position than SYRIZA, rejecting only certain elements of 
the memorandum such as the decrease in the minimum wage. Golden Dawn, which is considered 
as a neo-Nazi party, is also known for anti-austerity/memorandum and anti-immigrant policies. 
Lastly, the Independent Greeks, a split from the ND, is an alternative anti-austerity party with 
some populist elements (Kompsopoulos and Chasoglou 2014).  
Outside the party politics, the unions and employer organizations are crucial actors in 
Greek politics. The major trade union organizations are93: GSEE94 (the General Confederation of 
Greek Workers), ADEDY95 (the Higher Command of Unions for Public Sector Employees) and 
PAME96 (the All-Workers Militant Front). The GSEE is made up of 83 workers unions and 74 
departmental secondary confederations with nearly half a million members. The ADEDY, which 
has nearly 300,000 members, represents permanent and non-permanent civil servants. The 
PAME, which has ties to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), is an anti-capitalist trade union 
organization with nearly 850,000 members according to its own numbers. The PAME has a more 
radical stance than GSEE/ADEDY with anti-government and anti-EU elements (Kompsopoulos 
and Chasoglou 2014). There are very few large firms and numerous small and micro-enterprises 
in the Greek economy, which are represented by two main employer organizations97. While the 
                                                 
93 The union movement in Greece has three different components. The first one is the primary-
level unions that organize on the level of professions or industry-based companies. The second 
level includes both associations (of different professions or companies) and the Labor Centre 
(EE). The third and final component is the two confederations, the GSEE and the ADEDY.  
94 www.gsee.gr 
95 www.adedy.gr 
96 http://pamehellas.gr/index.php/en/ 
97 The National Confederation of Hellenic Commerce (ESEE) is a confederate organization 
representing Greek commerce on both domestic and international levels. For details, see: 
http://www.esee.gr/Profile.aspx 
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SEV98 (the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises), represents mainly the interests of those very few 
large firms, GSEVEE99 (The Hellenic Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen & Merchants) 
represents the smaller enterprises. Lastly, as a result of the historical policy-making processes 
that enabled interest-group access to the political parties and the bureaucracy, vested interests 
such as various professional groups are strong veto-points in the Greek politics.  
6.3.2 The Greek policy-making processes 
Despite the electoral stability prior to the crisis, the Greek politics, economy and society have 
had persistent structural problems: problems of policymaking and governance; clientelist party 
competition structure; high levels of corruption; a large, politicized and inefficient bureaucracy; 
and problems of competitiveness (the inflexible labor markets, a weak industrial base and current 
account deficit (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008, Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2013).  
The nature of these problems is rooted in the structure of the Greek economy and 
historical traditions of policy-making. The Greek economy has been characterized by late 
industrialization and its dependence on the foreign capital (from Diaspora, bilateral relations and 
the EU) (Featherstone 2008). In order to fill the domestic vacuum, the Greek state had a strong 
control over the economy through extensive regulation, protectionist measures, transfers and 
subsidies (Featherstone 2008). However, these instruments were used particularly to satisfy 
political interests, which led to rent seeking behavior and favoring certain sectors (Sotiropoulos 
2004). At the same time, the foreign capital was channeled to sectors such as banking, commerce 
and shipping in the hands of a comprador bourgeoisie. With a large agrarian and service sector, 
the economy was shaped by a limited manufacturing base and large number of family-owned 
SMEs. Thus, before the crisis a few large enterprises and many micro small firms mark the 
structure of the Greek economy (Featherstone 2008).  
This economic structure also coincides with a liberal democratic formal structures with 
multiple veto points (both within and outside the parliament100) and a political culture marked by 
clientelism, rent-seeking and corruption (Pagoulatos 2003). The political parties, when in control 
                                                 
98 http://www.sev.org.gr/online/index.aspx?lang=en 
99 http://www.gsevee.gr/en/organisation 
100 Outside the parliament, the trade unions are one of the strongest vested interest groups. Their 
role will be discussed in the following sections.  
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of the government and state resources, are known to distribute favors through their clientelist 
networks and practices that lead to subordination of the state to political interests. This form of 
politics has been described as ‘parentela pluralism’ in which various interest groups are 
particularly attached to the governing party (Lavdas 1997). The governing party, acting as a 
patron, assumes strong role in policymaking process. The voters and interest groups, through 
their attachments to this strong actor, have been able to secure strong access to the state 
resources and obtain rents for their support. For instance, the heads of the small number of 
enterprise networks have had privileged access to and influence over the party state. This in turn 
affected the policy choices of the respective governments and the allocation of state’s resources 
according to their particular interests. The rest of the Greek enterprises, mainly the SMEs, had 
limited access to or influence on the state and its policies (Pagoulatos 2003).  
Similarly, any mobilized interest group such as different professional organizations of 
lawyers/medical professions had significant influence on specific policies. Prior to the crisis, 
Greece has remained as one of the strictest countries in terms of regulating professional services 
among the European and OECD countries (Pagoulatos 2003). Closed professions have been a 
major source of large rents and economic inefficiencies such as lack of competition and 
innovation and higher mark-ups and prices.101 Through their ties to the party, its 
ministers/officials as well as the bureaucratic apparatus, various professional associations were 
able to maintain these benefits and emerged as a strong ‘vested interests’ that oppose the 
reforms. Given the nature of the policy-making and various veto points, the Greek politics and 
interest group mobilization is characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and often rent-
seeking (Pagoulatos 2003).   
These deep-rooted problems in the domestic politics have been most visible in repeated 
institutional and policy reform failures. This inability to reform has been associated with the 
inner workings of the government, specifically with the limited power of the Prime Minister and 
greater operational independence of the individual ministers (Featherstone 2011). Despite the 
unusual constitutional strength of the executive branch of the government, the office of the PM 
suffers from poor intra-governmental coordination such as inter-departmental committees, 
monitoring and planning tools, efficiency and lack of relevant centralization resources 
                                                 
101 These regulations included fixed prices or compulsory fees and requirement of an 
administrative license to practice a profession.  
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(Featherstone 2011). Thus individual ministers have enjoyed extensive decision-making 
responsibilities in their respective domains with the cabinet simply being a residual organization 
(Featherstone and Tinios 2006).  
However, this ministerial autonomy has also been constrained the limitations of the 
public administration/bureaucratic apparatus in Greece. Besides this strong state tradition and 
political organization, the politically subservient bureaucracy remained fundamentally as a weak, 
inefficient and inflexible organization (Katsimi and Moutos 2010). Also limited by legalistic 
norms and strong interest group opposition, the bureaucracy has been a passive agent, merely 
attempting to implement the decisions (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). The problems of 
states’ inefficiency were evident in several ways. The size of the public administration as a 
proportion of the GDP was amongst the highest in the European Union (Fouskas and Dimoulas 
2012). The state administration was unable to provide reliable account of the number of public 
employees until 2010 and the problems regarding budget management and tax administration102 
(Katsimi and Moutos 2010). The poor record of implementation of the EU’s single market rules 
and high rate of infringement was another example. The successive Greek governments had also 
problems tackling wide spread corruption practices across the state institutions (Featherstone 
2011).103 Both the ND and PASOK were recently associated with important corruption scandals 
(Siemens104 and Vatopedi105). In fact, Greece has ranked worse than its European counterparts in 
the Corruption Perception Index.106 Lastly, the government’s inability to address wide spread tax 
evasion or irregular tax payments by businesses has been cited numerously (Katsimi and Moutos 
2010).  
                                                 
102 For instance, more than 6000 individuals were known to owe more than 150,000 Euros to the 
state, amounting to a total of 30 billion Euros, while Greece’s total budget was about 23 billion 
(Foukas and Dimoulas, 2012).  
103 For instance, it was quite common for citizens to provide ‘fakelaki’, bribes to public 
employees to secure public service or to have political connections even to be appointed at the 
lowest level of the public sector. 
104http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/siemens-bribery-scandal-in-greece-ex-boss-
could-help-shed-light-on-corruption-a-633198.html 
105 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/32a685c0-2f6d-11e3-8cb2-00144feab7de.html 
106 For details see: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
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6.3.3 The interest mediation in Greece 
This structure of economic and political background also had implications on the interest 
mediation in Greece, in which coordination and consensus had been extremely difficult to 
manage in a climate of antagonism and mistrust. This has its roots in the mode of representation 
of the social partners. Both the trade unions and employer organizations are skewed through 
certain groups and their interests (Ioannou 2013). The two major union federations, the GSEE 
and the ADEDY, over-represent the state and the wider public sector. Due to weak 
implementation of the laws, the unionization rates in the private sector remains quite low. For 
instance, only 7% of the working population, which were predominantly from the public sector, 
was represented in the trade unions in 2002 (EC, 2006: 24).107 The interests of the women, part-
time and temporary workers as well as the unemployed do not create a strong voice within the 
union movement. Accordingly, this structure leads to favoring the interests of a relatively 
protected sector of the economy, particularly the public sector (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 
2008)108.  
The implications of this have been visible on the social security structure and wage 
formation processes. While state’s social spending in relatively high, it is highly skewed and 
reflects the political interests of the workers that unions represent. The social spending on 
families and unemployment benefits is low, limited in scope and duration (Featherstone 2008). 
However, the cost of pensions occupies a significant portion of the government spending. 
Similarly, while the workers in the private sector (also in the large informal sector and people 
with temporary jobs) face low protection and limited employment rights, the employees in the 
public enterprises and the wider public sector traditionally enjoyed higher wages and 
employment rights such as job protection (Katrougalos and Lazaridis 2003). For instance, 
education and training provisions for Greek employees are among the lowest in the European 
Union (2.9% of GDP), only more than Bulgaria (1.4%) and Romania (1.5%) (Featherstone 
2008). Thus, the unions traditionally do not favor issues such as de-regulation, re-regulation of 
                                                 
107 Greece economy has a structural problem of higher unemployment. Despite the recent 
progress, the overall employment level is below 70%. Salaried employment is only around 64% 
compared to 84% of the EU-15 average. Industrial employment has been in a gradual decline 
within the last decades, standing only at 10% of the overall employment.  
108 For instance, the Greek unions do not even collect statistics regarding the presence/activities 
of women in unions.  
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state monopolies, and wage constraining mechanisms that threatens their wage setting 
mechanisms and interests of the wider public sector.  
Similarly, the very large firms of the Greek economy and their interests have traditionally 
dominated the SEV, in which membership levels are actually quite low in European standards. 
Thus, the policies of the SEV are also affected by the interests of these firms, which benefit from 
the prevailing market regulations, barriers to entry and stable product demand (Featherstone 
2008). This creates a political and economic environment in which risk-averse, statist and anti-
competition traditions prevail over the more open and competitive private interests. For instance, 
the SMEs, which would prefer liberalization and flexibility in the market, do not have significant 
influence (Ioannou 2010). As a result, the Greek economy lacked liberal market reforms and 
remained mainly as a domestic market with anti-competitive regulations, relatively cheap labor 
and stable domestic demand (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008).  
These contrasting interests of the social partners and the strength of the main groups that 
they represent in turn shaped the interest mediation/social partnership processes. The nature of 
the relationship between the government and unions/employer organizations was based on a few 
organizations possessing a representational monopoly within their own area of interest 
(Schmitter 1977). At the same time, the political system and culture in which this relationship is 
embedded, created an environment that prevented the formation of social pacts (Ioannou 2010). 
As a result, unlike Ireland that relied on social partnership within the recent decades to govern 
industrial relations, Greece failed to produce similar corporatist structures.  
6.3.4 Social Pacts in Greece 
Following the democratization of Greece in 1974, the state’s domination and control over the 
Greek economy had also implications over the industrial relations. The nature of the relationship 
between the government and social partners was defined as a ‘disjointed corporatism, the 
combination of a set of corporatist organizational features and a prevailing political modality that 
lacks diffuse reciprocity and remains incapable of brokering social pacts’ (Lavdas 1997). The 
interaction had been mainly adversarial and characterized with mistrust with significant control 
of the successive governments on the trade unions. There was especially a strong 
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interdependency between the unions and PASOK that effectively controlled the unions.109 The 
unions also had lot of power over PASOK and were able sustain rent seeking from the state 
through their connections to its governments/ministers. Both the unions and employer 
organizations following their narrow interests based on their constituencies, these domestic 
conditions were not suitable for neo-corporatist institutions to evolve110 until the early 1990’s 
(Pagoulatos 2003).  
The government’s control and intervention in trade unions declined during this period 
that created a room for more political and financial autonomy (Pagoulatos, 2003: 161). This led 
to emergence of more autonomous social partners, norm of wage moderation and certain neo-
corporatist processes and institutions. There were developments towards institutionalization of 
bipartite bodies and processes as well as tripartite Economic and Social Committee to promote 
social dialogue and tripartite collaboration (Ioannou 2000). Especially since the mid-1990s, two-
year long-term collective agreements were signed under the government oversight rather than 
control and patronage. The GSEE has become more autonomous and began to play a significant 
role in industrial relations. Although a national level corporatist structure has been lacking, some 
sectoral-based neo-corporatist processes have been seen especially in the banking, telecom or 
energy sectors (Pagoulatos 2003: 187).  
However, the extent of this change in social partnership type processes is disputable and 
seems to exaggerate the degree of consensus and the significance of the pursuit of social pacts 
(Featherstone 2008). The attempts to create social pacts have not been fruitful to create long-
lasting arrangements and a shared understanding/agenda among the actors. It only offered 
limited resources and was not sufficient enough to restructure the contrasting underlying 
preferences of the social partners. For instance, despite its creation of several bipartite and 
tripartite bodies of social dialogue, PASOK neglected/bypassed them in 1997 by creating a new 
‘National Social Dialogue’ (Featherstone and Tinios 2006). Similarly, the uneven 
institutionalization of the labor side in social dialogues and the unions’ strong preferences for the 
protection of public sector prevented certain issues such as wages to be part of the tri-partite 
discussions. As a result the social dialogue processes were discredited as a process and created 
                                                 
109 The party would even intervene to the selection of the union leaders who did not follow party 
lines. 
110 Adverse international political economy conditions such as capital mobility, monetary 
instability, stagflation were also influential on this process.  
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further mistrust among the actors (Featherstone 2008). It was only able to produce ad hoc and 
partial bargaining such as the already mentioned two-year agreements or sectoral deals. Thus, 
there has been a series of failed attempts to form social pacts in 1997 and 2000 by the PASOK 
government. Similarly, the ND government between 2004 and 2008 intensified social dialogue 
initiatives, which proved to be unsuccessful due to lack of trust (Zambarloukou 2006, Ioannou 
2010). These government initiatives also caused intense debates both within the GSEE and the 
parties among the different relevant factions. Similarly, it intensified the intra-party conflicts 
among the trade unionists affiliated with PASOK and ND.  
The strong trade union effect was still visible before the crisis especially on the issues 
regarding public sector employees such as privatization and pension. Through their ties and 
effect on ministers of social affairs and labor, the unions were able to stop several attempts at 
neoliberal restructuring and had also gained/sustained benefits for their members such as higher 
wages and pensions (Zambarloukou 2006, Ioannou 2010).111 They have traditionally pushed for 
regressive social and taxation policies such as profession-linked benefits, generous contributory 
pensions, employment protection and low income tax. Even in the case of two (limited) labor 
market reforms in 2005, the Karamanlis government succeeded convincing the social partners 
only through side payments112 (Ioannou 2010).  
Despite the plethora of the SMEs, a few large corporations dominated the SEV. During 
these attempts for social pacts, the SEV was committed to consensus-driven reforms with 
negotiations mainly with the GSEE. Despite its rhetoric of market liberalization, the SEV failed 
to push strongly for necessary reforms that would tackle the structural market problems and 
having a leading role in shaping the reform agendas and outcomes due to lack of willingness or 
capacity. The intra-business interest divisions prevented the SEV for having a considerable 
influence on the privatization policies (Pagoulatos 2003: 248).  
                                                 
111 In spring 2001, the General Confederation of Greek Labor (GSEE) successfully rallied public 
opinion against the PASOK government’s initial proposals on pension reform. This forced the 
government to a humiliating retreat, and the subsequent signing, a year later, of a social pact 
containing significant concessions to the unions. The GSEE emerged as labor’s encompassing, 
independent representative, and the politically dominant interlocutor in the social dialogue over 
pension reform. The reform attempts also caused a major crisis even within PASOK that 
eventually led to a reshuffle of the government in the late October 2001. 
112 DEKO reform: government defeated the unions, even though that risked alienating some of 
the party’s own trade unionists.   
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All of these structural characteristics create one of the most adversarial political systems 
in Europe and a socio-political environment that was inimical to reform and that lacked 
significant implementation strength (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2013). This is quite 
contrary to Ireland, which relied on coordination and consensus within the recent decades to 
govern both industrial relations and economic policy-making. 
6.4 NEGOTIATIONS AND IMF PROGRAM DESIGN 
6.4.1 Negotiations and the design of the SBA program  
Within this economic and policy environment, similar to Ireland, the decision to enter the 
TROIKA program was made by the PASOK government without any consultation to the 
domestic stakeholders and social partners. PASOK came to power in 2009 with a promise to 
increase social protections, wages and support for the poor.113 Given the extent of the problems 
and severe pressure, the party had to sign a program requiring a full-scale retreat from their 
promises. 
PASOK was actually in a quite strong position when the crisis hit the country. With 
nearly 44% of the votes, the party was able to secure the majority in the parliament with 160 
seats in 2009 elections. The main opposition party, the ND did not pose an immediate challenge 
since it was dealing with a leadership crisis. Even during the initial period of the crisis and 
signing of the agreement, there was a certain acceptance of the necessity of the reforms 
(McGrew, Athens 2014). Similar to the Irish government’s initial attempts to respond to the 
crisis, the PASOK government initiated an ambitious fiscal consolidation plan on January 2010 
and even successfully introduced two rounds of austerity measures in the following two months 
in consultation with the Eurozone finance ministers. These were critical in showing the 
willingness of the government towards signing of the SBA program and initial financial support 
package. However, unlike Ireland, the design stage was mainly a top-down process, the terms 
                                                 
113 The government even initiated a transparency of the legislative action program, setting up an 
online system for the citizens to submit their opinions regarding public matters and enable a 
social dialogue. 
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and the size/pace of the structural conditionality being dictated by the TROIKA.114 Without prior 
consultation to the domestic stakeholders, the main focus of the design stage was to achieve 
significant fiscal consolidation. It was an exercise to form a shared understanding of what needed 
to be done rather than a negotiation (Mitsos115, Athens 2014).  
Although certain structural reforms were implemented in Ireland, the Irish program did 
not have a strong reliance to structural conditionality116. The Irish government in consultation 
with the TROIKA partners initiated the Irish reform and decided on the size and pace of the cuts. 
On contrary, the Greek authorities did not have a significant room for maneuver especially in the 
initial period of the program, being forced to implement the designed program goals in return for 
the disbursements of the funds.  
The Fund generally starts with a maximalist position during negotiations to impose a 
maximum set of structural reforms given its set of preferences and guidelines (McGrew117, 
Athens 2014). The borrowing country governments attempt to moderate this agenda using its 
bargaining power.118 In Ireland, the government had both strong ability and capacity to moderate 
the Fund’s agenda and agree on a program closer to its preferences. However, the Greek program 
had been closer to the preferences of the Fund and the maximum set (McGrew, Athens 2014). 
The Fund was especially stricter on certain reforms pertaining the labor market (flexibility and 
liberalization of closed professions) and competitiveness. Most of the reforms agreed under the 
SBA program had actually been discussed in Greece prior to the crisis (Pagoulatos119 and 
                                                 
114 Given its expertise and experience, the Fund was the leading partner within the TROIKA in 
the design stage and initial phase of implementation.  
115 Personal Interview with Achilleas Mitsos. Former Director-General for Research in the 
European and former Secretary General for Research and Technology in the Greek Education 
Ministry 2009-2011. Athens, September 2014 
116 Following the examples of the other Eurozone countries, the conditionality requirements was 
much more extensive in Greece than a traditional IMF Programme. The main reason for more 
extensive conditionality requirements in the Eurozone countries was the lack of external 
adjustment mechanisms. Thus, the Fund enforced more severe structural conditionality to replace 
the traditionally available external adjustment mechanisms. 
117 Personal Interview with Wes Mcgrew. The IMF Resident Representative in Greece. Athens, 
September 2014. 
118 The government’s bargaining power is affected by a combination of several factors: 
underlying economic conditions and the need for financial support, donor interests, the domestic 
political conditions, the capacity to negotiate and implement reforms.  
119 Personal Interview with George Pagoulatos. Former Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister 
Lucas Papademos and Director of Strategy at the Prime Minister’s Office (11/2011-6/2012); 
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Tsakloglou120, Athens 2014). Especially during 2000’s, many studies were funded to identify and 
address the structural problems of the Greek economy. However, despite a general understanding 
for the need for reforms, they were mostly put into shelves without being legislated (Mitsos, 
Geroulanos121, Folias122, Athens 2014). 
Given the extent and the severity of the economic problems in Greece, its program was 
far more extensive than the Irish one, including structural reforms in various policy issues and 
requiring a significant fiscal adjustment of 14.5% of GDP within a period of five years. While 
the focus of the Irish program was a fiscal consolidation accompanied by reforms specifically 
targeting the financial sector, the recipe for Greece was more severe with quick fiscal 
consolidation and strong emphasis on the structural reforms to tackle Greece’s underlying 
economic problems. Given the strength and militancy of the unions, labor market has been one 
of the main targets of the IMF reforms. Thus, the structural conditionality required several 
rounds of austerity measures, affecting many policy domains and having crucial distributional 
consequences. The extent of the conditionality and adjustment cost for the society exacerbated 
the political and social problems in Greece, creating significant problems of implementation. 
6.4.2 Implementation of Labor Market Conditionality in Greece (SBA Program) 
The SBA program in Greece relied on wage/pension cuts, public sector layoffs, privatization of 
state institutions to achieve fiscal consolidation and reforms in the labor market to increase 
competitiveness. The newly elected coalition government in Greece, under the leadership of 
PASOK, made a strong start to the IMF program implementation. On top of the reforms prior to 
the program on January and March 2010, the government announced a third round of austerity 
measures with a mix of spending cuts and tax increases on May 2010. One significant 
                                                                                                                                                             
Professor of European Politics and Economy at the Athens University of Economics & Business; 
and Athens, September 2014. 
120 Personal Interview with Panos Tsakloglou. Chief Negotiator and Professor of International 
and European Economic Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business. Athens, 
September 2014. 
121 Personal Interview with Pavlos Geroulanos. Former Minister of Culture and Tourism from 
PASOK (2009-2012). Athens, September 2012. 
122 Personal Interview with Christos Folias. Former Minister of Development (2007-2009) and 
Deputy Minister of Economy and Finance (2004-2007) from the ND. Athens, September 2014.  
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achievement through these measures was the introduction radical reform of the pension that was 
passed in the parliament on July 2010 (IMF 2010).123 Moreover, other structural measures were 
also introduced such as legislation for the liberalization of the closed professions, the 
consolidation of various public bodies and companies, changes in labor market regulation such 
as reduction in notice periods, raise in the lawful redundancy rate, change in dismissal rules and 
cuts in severance pay entitlements.124  
As a result of these efforts, workers have lost on average at least 1,500 Euros in their 
annual earnings compared to 2010. Total wages and salaries have declined by 30 percent since 
2009 (Lanara 2012). The national minimum wage was cut by 22 percent and by 32 percent for 
young workers, bringing the level of pay to a gross monthly sum of 585 Euros and 490 Euros 
respectively (Lanara 2012). Pensions had to be reduced around 10-12% for both public and 
private employees. With the addition of substantial tax increases on top of these cuts, Greek 
citizens, especially workers had to pay a significant adjustment cost. 
In the second review and third reviews of the program on December 2010 and February 
2011, despite the progress in current account deficit, tackling inflation and achieving wage 
moderation, the Fund warned that the GDP contraction had been higher than initially expected 
and the country would need additional financing to avoid default on its debt. The IMF openly 
recognized that the country was unlikely to return to market financing in early 2012 as it was 
envisaged under the program (IMF 2011). The Fund also estimated a need for additional 
financing between €70 to €104 billion if the market access was to be delayed further highlighting 
                                                 
123 This reform raised the retirement age from 60 to 65 (also equalized it for both men and 
women); introduced penalties for early retirement; suspended pensions payments to people who 
were still employed and who were below the age of 55; decreased the number of insurance and 
pension funds which led to sizeable reduction of pension entitlements for a number of 
professional occupations (lawyers, journalists, doctors, etc..); and introduced limits to pension 
transferability to offspring and widowed spouses 
 124 Other measures included: An 8% cut on public sector allowances (in addition to the two 
previous austerity packages) and a 3% pay cut for DEKO (public sector utilities) employees; 
Public sector limit of €1,000 introduced to bi-annual bonus, abolished entirely for those earning 
over €3,000 a month; Limit of €500 per month to 13th and 14th month salaries of public 
employees; abolished for employees receiving over €3,000 a month; Limit of €800 per month to 
13th and 14th month pension installments; abolished for pensioners receiving over €2,500 a 
month; Increasing taxes for those with a yearly income of over €8,000; An extra tax for those 
with a yearly income of over €12,000; Increasing VAT in the housing industry; An extra tax of 
2% for combating unemployment. 
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the problems in fiscal consolidation in the local level, the lack of inter-institutional cooperation 
and limited administrative capacity. The bond spreads continued to remain high due to another 
round of Greek fiscal data revisions and financial turmoil in the Eurozone. The strong start to 
implementation had also started losing momentum due to strong opposition within the 
government, parliament as well as from vested interests across the country. 
The market sentiment took a sharp turn for the worse in the spring of 2012, fueled by the 
expectations that the Greek debt would be restructured. Although the ECB continued to provide 
liquidity support to preserve the stability, the lack of market confidence and rising deposit 
outflows had put additional stress on the financial system. Despite also the emergency liquidity 
assistance by the Bank of Greece to address the significant deposit outflows, the Greek banks, 
which were already highly exposed to sovereign bonds, were hit hard.125 Despite the substantial 
fiscal consolidation achieved by the Greek authorities, the confidence of European authorities to 
the ability/capacity of Greek government to implement the program started to decline. The 
TROIKA warned Greece regarding the lack of implementation and the need to speed up the 
process to get its finances back on track. These negative assessments regarding the pace of and 
commitment to implementation added to these developments, creating a prolonged period of 
uncertainty about a possible “Grexit” and debt re-structuring. Thus, all of these created 
additional fears within the markets that the Eurozone fiscal problem would not be sustainable 
and put pressure on Greece. 
As a response, the Greek government announced its medium-term fiscal plan (MTFP) for 
2012-15, which constituted a key conditionality under the program in April 2011. The program 
mainly aimed to introduce fiscal consolidation measures of spending cuts and revenue measures 
worth €28 billion to bring down the government deficit to 0.9% by 2015. The newly proposed 
measures included layoffs in public sector, improving the financial performance of state-owned 
enterprises and streamlining social transfers. Moreover, the new fiscal strategy included an 
ambitious privatization and public real estate development program designed to raise €50 billion 
by 2015, including €15 billion by 2013. Given the Greek government’s administrative 
vulnerabilities, the program initiated the establishment of an independent privatization authority 
that also included officials from the IMF and EU to oversee the process. Although the country 
                                                 
125 Greek economy had also been affected by the deepening crisis within the Eurozone with 
several countries such as Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Italy having their own problems. 
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already passed legislations for 80% of the reforms for the period of 2011, the Greek authorities 
had struggled to implement the reforms approved under the MTFP due to strong domestic 
opposition. 
By June 2011, the fiscal policy measures, that helped the country in the initial period of 
the program, had started failing to keep up with the recessionary pressures. Due to the lack of 
structural reform, which would lead to productivity increases, the economy was adjusting only 
through recession and related wage-price channels. The European authorities, gave ultimatum to 
Greek authorities to initiate implementation of structural reforms to continue receiving financial 
support. Thus, on June 8, 2011, the Papandreou government agreed to additional austerity 
measures. This was not enough to calm the markets since the major credit rating agencies had 
downgraded Greece to near-default status on June 13 when Greece actually got the lowest credit 
rating in the world by S&P. This was followed by a major re-shuffle in the Papandreou 
government on June 17, through which a party heavyweight and a rival of Papandreou, 
Venizelos was appointed as the finance minister. This new government was able to secure a 
parliamentary majority in favor of the five-year austerity plan. Thus the Greek government 
introduced an additional round of austerity measures on June 2011 in order to secure the 
disbursement of the funds approved under the first bail-out program.126 As a result, the Fund 
enabled the disbursement of the long waited €3.2 billion on July 8.  
 Following the speculative attack on Italy on July 2011 and given the implementation of 
the necessary reforms as prior actions before the 5th review of the program, the European leaders 
eventually agreed to an enhanced official support package for Greece under the European 
Financial Stability Facility totaling €109 billion. This second package had been made available 
under more favorable terms in terms of interest rates and longer maturities for both the new and 
the existing Eurozone loans to Greece. The new program also identified parameters for 
significant private sector involvement, estimated to total as much as €50 billion by mid-2014.127  
                                                 
126 This included a higher income tax for upper income scale, a sizeable levy on own account 
owners, a new property tax, the lowering of tax-free income allowance and unveiled series of 
privatizations. 
127 The inclusion of bondholders was a significant shift in the approach to responding to Greek 
crisis. The first bail-out program was mainly designed to achieve recovery through provision of 
financial assistance to and economic reforms in Greece. 
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6.4.3 Intra-Party Politics 
Throughout this process, Prime Minister Papandreou failed to secure internal consensus within 
its party. The severe austerity measures and structural reforms not only created huge public 
discontent but also targeted the main voter base and clientele of PASOK: the public sector 
employees and the labor who were appointed or were given privileges through their links to the 
party in return for their support. Along with the dissatisfaction in the party base, the deepening 
crisis, the extent of the austerity measures and the gradual escalation of the domestic political 
opposition intensified the internal dissent within PASOK. When the government used emergency 
legislative procedures to push for further austerity measures and reforms, this created significant 
reaction from the party backbenchers. For instance, when the parliament passed a controversial 
bill reforming collective bargaining and public-sector pay, the backbenchers in the parliament 
strongly criticized the government. Following the intense debates, Papandreou expelled one of 
his MPs and former advisors, Evangelos Papachristou, from the party. The internal divisions 
further deteriorated during the discussions of 2011 budget during which most of the MPs even 
publicly indicated that they did not agree with the measures. The government even had to delay 
passing a legislation to open closed professions. As a result of these problems, within the first 
year of the program, Papandreou had to reshuffle his cabinet three times and finally appointing 
his rival and strong party backbencher Evangelos Venizelos as the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Finance on 15 June, 2011.128 By going against its backbenchers, expelling dissident 
members and reshuffling its cabinet, Papandreou was able to pass many legislations regarding 
the labor market.  
6.4.4 Inter-party Politics and opposition to PASOK government   
PASOK also faced also strong opposition from actors both inside and outside the parliament. 
The main opposition party, the ND, had publicly declared several times that they would not 
support the program. The leader of the party, Antonis Samaras told that “I am not going to 
consent to this recipe that has been proven wrong” and called for snap elections that would 
                                                 
128 Venizelos was later elected unopposed to replace Papandreou as the PASOK president on 18 
March 2012.  
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produce a new credible government with the mandate to oversee the country’s economic 
recovery (Phillips 2011). However, New Democracy, although formally against austerity, was 
not a pro-labor party and was not against the labor market conditions. Even some members of the 
party supported the reforms. The implementation of the program also led to the rise of the anti-
memorandum parties such as SYRIZA and Golden Dawn, who had capitalized on the discourse 
that the memorandum should be renegotiated. Their effect in the parliament was limited during  
The opposition from the political parties had also been accompanied by significant 
dissatisfaction and social unrest within the general public. There was a widespread perception 
that the burden of the adjustment was not equally shared. While different rounds of cuts and tax 
increases eroded the welfare of many people, the government failed to challenge vested interests 
and tackle tax evasions. The relatively long period of recession and adjustment period that did 
not produce any positive outcomes and hope contributed to negative perception as well. By the 
end of 2011, nearly 70% of the population was against the memorandum (Teperoglou, Freire et 
al. 2013). The anti-memorandum rhetoric found sympathizers from nearly everyone in the 
political spectrum, both the radical left (82.8 %) and the radical right (64.9 %) opposing it 
(Teperoglou, Freire et al. 2013). Tens of thousands of people had taken to the streets to protest 
the reforms in various occasions both in the form of collective demonstrations orchestrated by 
different political/social organizations or initiated by individuals. 129 For instance, according to 
the official accounts, a total of 7,123 demonstrations took place in Greece in 2010.130 
Moreover, there was a broader rejection of the austerity measures and structural reforms 
on an ideational basis.131 The program in Ireland and necessary measures had a broader support 
and also suited the pre-dominant neo-liberal economic policies. Despite the fact that the reforms 
were discussed in various policy circles prior to crisis, the majority of the reforms was opposed 
                                                 
129 Several popular protest movements became popular in Greece. For instance, the “Den plirono 
(I don’t pay)’ movement lifted the bars of toll stations in national highways to let drivers pass for 
free. The “Aganaktismeni (the Outraged)” movement was able to politicize many youth who had 
no prior political experience or affiliation.  
130 Given the annual number of 200 over the 1990’s, most of these protests can be associated 
with the anti-austerity movements.  
131 From the early stages, both the opposition parties and the media engaged in blame-shifting 
(blaming the Germans, the Fund, the banks, the markets) and the political elite (uniformly across 
the political spectrum) played a key role in legitimizing and even mobilizing public discontent. 
Opposition, in various occasions, denounced all fiscal consolidations efforts, suggesting that 
reforms and fiscal consolidation were not necessary.  
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and rejected by various political and social groups and majority of the Greek society.132 Unlike 
Portugal and Ireland, the media also did not support the program, undermining its legitimacy. 
Main political parties refused to take ownership due to deep-rooted connections to various 
clientelist networks, leading to higher levels of political polarization in Greece. The pro-
TROIKA bloc had been more divided, the major political parties PASOK and ND having their 
own party factions opposing the reforms (Pagoulatos 2012). The 2012 elections gave only a slim 
majority to the parties that seemed to be behind the program against the anti-MoU parties. On 
contrary, the Irish elections did never produce strong anti-MoU parties; even the minor partner of 
the coalition, the Labor Party partially opposed certain measures in the program rather than 
willing to initiate a full re-negotiation. As a result, appealing to their own constituencies and 
public perception, the political parties did create a public narrative that also contributed to the 
mass protests. Nobody took the blame, created a discourse to support the program and demanded 
the public to stick with the authorities, be patient and wait to develop for positive outcomes to 
come (McGrew, Athens 2014). 
6.4.5 The Interaction between PASOK and the Unions 
Although the Fine Gael-Labor government was in a stronger position in Ireland, the efforts by 
the Labor Party and its ministers were critical in maintaining the social dialogue and broadening 
the ownership. However, the PASOK government failed to gain the support of the unions that 
mainly represent the public sector due to its internal weaknesses. More importantly, the severity 
of the crisis would result in less room for negotiation, making the possibility of a negotiated 
adjustment through social pacts impossible. However, the literature on the emergence of social 
pacts would suggest otherwise. The social pacts in 1990’s was born as a response to the severe 
pressures of meeting the original EMU criteria and stabilizing public finances while introducing 
disinflation (Culpepper and Regan 2014). The weak governments in various European countries 
were able to negotiate social pacts to push for hard reforms and credibly commit to the trade 
unions. This could have happened in Greece as well since creation of social dialogue/pacts 
would have helped the government to stabilize the domestic political economic environment. 
Moreover, the social pacts would send a positive signal to international markets, decreasing the 
                                                 
132 For instance, the reforms in the public sector were not wanted.  
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uncertainty. Thus, in the context of a weak government facing severe crisis, the incentive to 
adopt a negotiated process of adjustment should be higher (Culpepper and Regan 2014). 
The inability of the Greek politicians to form social dialogue could be placed in the 
interactions between the government and the trade unions, especially the weakening of PASOK 
and lack of credible coordination and social dialogue attempts. The Greek trade union 
representation was heavily dominated by the public sector. The most productive sectors of the 
economy such as the export-oriented firms/private sector were not represented by the unions. 
The union board members were mostly center-left and had been affiliated with PASOK prior to 
the crisis (Folias, Athens 2014). Through this privileged partnership, PASOK was able to contain 
the militant parts of the trade unions, preventing severe industrial action especially in the 1980’s. 
Given their strong ties, PASOK would be the only party to initiate public sector re-structuring 
with a broader coalition with the unions when the crisis hit. However, PASOK failed to provide a 
legitimate discourse for the reforms to form a coalition with the unions. Their strong ties to the 
public sector had left the PASOK ministers in a vulnerable position against the austerity 
measures that targeted severely their constituencies. In response, the ministers mainly attempted 
to protect their turfs and constituencies, shifting the blame to other actors. This prevented an 
effective communication that would provide the basis for a shared understanding or a broad 
coalition behind the reforms. More importantly, even when the reforms were negotiated and 
enforced, there was a lack of proper dialogue and consultation. The officials from both the 
ADEDY and GSEE emphasized the lack of efforts by PASOK. They also indicated that the 
possibility of having a dialogue and re-negotiation of certain parts even in the later stages of the 
agreement would be of crucial importance in maintaining social peace (Lanara 2012).   
Unable to have an effect on the process, strong implementation record of PASOK in the 
first year created further mistrust between the actors. More importantly, austerity measures 
resulted in a break between the union members and their PASOK-affiliated leaders as well as 
between some trade union leaders and PASOK. The unions had become influential in 
orchestrating general strikes, maintaining a high degree of organizational cohesion and activism. 
Their reaction to the austerity measures was as severe, using every available measure to block 
the reforms and initiating 23 general strikes across the country133. For instance, while Portugal 
                                                 
133 Apart from the general strikes, there were constant protests by the workers who were laid off 
from their jobs at the public facilities.  
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had only three days of general strikes, Ireland had none. As a result, the Greek politicians faced 
more frequent, more violent and widespread mass protests. This created an environment in which 
it was no longer possible to initiate a social dialogue between the government and the unions as 
well as a broaden coalition behind the reforms. Thus, unlike the relationship between the Labor 
Party and public sector unions in Ireland that resulted in two successful agreements, similar deals 
could not be reached in Greece. Only the SEV was behind the broader set of structural reforms 
among the social partners. However, their communication with PASOK had already been limited 
in many respects. Over time, they were able to establish a direct access to the Fund, contributing 
to the discussions and influencing the content of the reforms134. 
Greece was able to achieve a remarkable degree of fiscal consolidation within the first 
year of the program. It was able to bring down the government deficit from 15.8% in 2009 to 
10.7% in 2010. The first review on August 2010 welcomed the efforts by the Greek authorities 
(IMF 2010). A joint statement by the TROIKA partners indicated that major reforms in public 
administration and pension system were ahead of the schedule.135 Despite the lack of broader 
political support from some political parties and even within his own party, severe political 
upheaval outside the parliament and several strikes by the unions, the Greek Prime Minister 
Papandreou was successful in initiating the first round of reforms. Even the Fund praised the 
government’s willingness and effort to undertake difficult reforms defined this as an impressive 
effort and achievement by even international standards (IMF 2010, Wyplosz and Sgherri 
2016).136 
This episode in Greece provides support to the findings in the empirical section. Even if 
the left still wants to appeal to workers and labor unions, it must implement the IMF’s conditions 
                                                 
134 Anecdotal evidence show that they even actually affected the wording of the proposed 
measures.  
135 This strong start to implementation and fiscal consolidation was also accompanied by the 
policies of the ECB that aimed to relieve some of the pressure on the Eurozone and Greek 
economy. For the first time, ECB announced that it would start buying European government 
bonds in secondary markets to increase confidence and lower bond spreads for Eurozone bonds. 
This led to a total of purchase of €78 billion government bonds between May 2010 and June 
2011. The estimates showed that nearly €45 to €65 billion of the ECB’s purchase were regarding 
Greek bonds. The ECB also started providing liquidity support to private banks in the Eurozone 
and in Greece intensively, increasing its support from €47 billion in January 2010 to €98 billion 
in May 2011.  
136 On 20 August 2011, the government's economic measures were still out of track; the 
government revenue went down by €1.9 billion while spending went up by €2.7 billion. 
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since it needs the Fund’s loans for economic recovery or to address short term balance of 
payment problems. The party elite take the long run view of establishing a healthy labor market 
and are less averse to the short term costs of reforms. Given pressures from the IMF and long-
term benefits, party elite forms an elite pro-reform coalition, going against opposition by the 
rank-and-file and party base. When faced with strong organized and militant labor, the left-wing 
governments implement labor market reforms because they are better able to isolate the unions. 
Even going against its backbenchers and isolating the unions, the Papandreou government 
unilaterally introduced the reforms directly affecting the unions such as more flexibility in 
employment laws, reduction in public wages/pensions, lay-offs and new collective agreement 
mechanisms. Greek unions had traditionally strong ties with left-wing PASOK and had been 
receiving favors from party officials. When the crisis started and PASOK attempted to 
implement reforms, the unions resisted and had been militant. Despite their strong historical ties, 
PASOK could not create consensus with the unions, but managed to pass many structural 
reforms. This was because the main opposition party, right-wing New Democracy, although 
formally against austerity, was not a pro-labor party and was not against the labor market 
conditions. PASOK government was much more effective in isolating the unions and 
implementing labor market conditionality.  
6.4.6 The Stall of Implementation (2011-2012) 
The initial success under the Papandreou government and optimism regarding the 
implementation had quickly eroded in the following period. A sequence of events led to the stall 
of the implementation process, the resignation of Prime Minister Papandreou, formation of an 
interim government with a technocrat prime minister, the signing of a new EFF program that 
replaced the initial SBA program, and twin elections of 2012 that had significant electoral 
consequences. The factors that contributed to this process were: Upward revisions of fiscal 
deficit and debt, increasing negative market sentiment, fear of contagion in the Eurozone and the 
possibility of Grexit, severe social and political unrest, significant opposition from actors from 
all across the political spectrum, a deepening recession and expectations of debt restructuring. 
 145 
6.5 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EFF PROGRAMM 
6.5.1 The Interim Government and the signing of the EFF Agreement  
On September, the crediting rating agency Moody’s downgraded several Greek banks’ ratings 
due to concerns regarding Greek public debt. On October 2nd, the Greek government announced 
that it would miss its deficit target for 2011 when the 2012 budget was approved in the 
parliament. The government also introduced more austerity measures on October 21 despite a 
general strike and defying protests in Athens. Just a few days later on October 26-27, Prime 
Minister Papandreou had agreed to the largest sovereign default in history in the Eurozone 
meeting.137  
However, returning from the meeting, the Prime Minister gathered a small group of 
advisors and announced that he would call a national referendum to secure public support for the 
newly agreed package on October 31st. This was a shock for both Greek politicians and 
Europeans whom were not consulted about these decisions.138 The Eurozone bond markets sold 
off in panic. The yields on Greece’s 10-year bond were spiked by 16.2 percent in a single day. 
The European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, who was desperate to avoid the 
referendum, approached the ND leader Samaras and the PASOK heavyweight Minister of 
Finance Venizelos. As a result of the intense pressure by the European authorities and domestic 
actors, the Papandreou government agreed to drop the referendum plans and even survived a 
parliamentary vote of confidence on November 6th to avoid the snap elections. Papandreou was 
forced out of power after a deal with the opposition to form a coalition government. Following 
his resignation on November 9th, a three-party coalition was formed between PASOK, ND and 
LAOS. This coalition government, known as the government of the unity, appointed former ECB 
vice-president Lucas Papademos as the technocrat Prime Minister.  
Papademos assumed power with a mandate to conclude negotiations on the new program 
and the PSI before the new elections that was planned to take place in spring of 2012. The ND 
                                                 
137 The Eurozone leaders reached a deal with the private banks and insurers to accept a 50% loss 
on their Greek government bonds to lower Greece’s debt burden. 
138 German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy declared their 
dissatisfaction and even warned Papandreou that Athens would not receive any more financial 
aid until the government kept its commitments. 
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leader Samaras also gave a written pledge to the Fund indicating his party’s support for the plan. 
Given this new government’s commitment to the program targets, a final disbursement under the 
original program was made in December 2011.139 The public quickly responded to the new 
government by unions calling a 24-hour general strike and violent protests taking over the streets 
of Athens. The government, showed its willingness by passing the 2012 budget that involved 
significant austerity measures to cut the deficit by 5.4% of GDP and generate a surplus. 
However, the implementation of the reforms once again stalled. The European and IMF officials 
constantly warned to the Papademos government to speed up process to receive new 
disbursements. Following intense debates within the coalition140 as well as with the TROIKA 
partners, the unity government was able to introduce new reforms on February 13, 2012.141 
Unemployment in Greece was already around 21% percent before the measures took effect. 
These measures created huge public discontent and resulted in a 48-hour strike by the two major 
unions, ADEDY and GSEE.  
The negotiations regarding the new financial aid plan and to complete a PSI plan with the 
private creditors took place until March 2012.142 The Greek authorities requested a 4-year 
extended arrangement in the amount of €28 billion (2,158.8 percent of its quota) and cancelled 
the existing Stand-By Arrangement on March 2012. The Eurozone members also agreed to 
contribute a further €144.7 billion for the period of 2012-2014. The new program aimed to tackle 
the same problems that was outlined in the cancelled SBA program: improving competitiveness 
through internal devaluation (making collective bargaining more effective, reducing the 
minimum wage, lowering nonwage labor costs, liberalizing services); gradual fiscal adjustment 
built on structural expenditure reforms and improvement in tax collection; restoring financial 
                                                 
139 This brought the total disbursement to €73 billion out of the agreed €110 billion, €53 billion 
by the Europeans partners and €20 billion by the Fund. 
140 In fact, the severe discussions within the government became quite evident when the Minister 
of Transportation, Makis Voridis as well as five deputy ministers from various ministries 
resigned before the new austerity measures. 
141 These included a reduction in the minimum wage by 22% (32% for the new entrants), 
decentralization of the wage bargaining system, abolishment of life long tenure in the public 
sector, reduction of the public sector employment by 150,000 by 2015, a controversial property 
tax, cuts in social benefits, health spending and pensions, liberalization of certain closed 
professions. 
142 The Eurozone Finance Ministers demanded written assurances from the Greek politicians that 
they would implement the austerity measures to complete the negotiations and agree on the new 
financial aid package.  
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sector stability through recapitalization and oversight measures; and a combination of private and 
public sector involvement to deliver the debt relief.  
 
6.5.2 The Twin Elections of 2012 
Following the agreement, the government called off the elections. The first election, that took 
place on May 6, 2012, had a devastating effect on the Greek electoral landscape. Dominated by 
the anger born out of three years of austerity policies, this election brought the stable two party 
system down. While PASOK’s vote fell to 13.2 % from 43.9 that it got in 2009, the ND got 
18.9%. The anti-memorandum party SYRIZA came as the second strongest party with 16.8 %. 
The Independent Greeks got 10.6%, the Democratic Left got 6% and Golden Dawn got 7%. 
However, these elections did not give a majority to any party, a second election was called in 
June. While PASOK’s vote went even further down in the June 2012 elections to 12.3 %, the ND 
was able to get 29.7% of the votes. SYRIZA was also able to increase its votes to 26.9%. 
DIMAR and the Independent Greek’s vote did not change significantly. Under the intense 
pressures from the TROIKA partners, the June 2012 elections produced an unusual coalition 
government between the ND, PASOK and DIMAR (as the junior third partner). The new Prime 
Minister of this coalition was the ND leader Antonios Samaras, who had constantly rejected the 
memorandum during the first two years of the program.  
SYRIZA has emerged as the main opposition party within the parliament attracting votes 
from youth, both public and private sector employees and unemployed people through its anti-
memorandum rhetoric. Moreover, capitalizing on this discontent and mistrust, SYRIZA was able 
to strengthen its ties with the unions and became influential especially among the public sector 
employees by providing a legitimate anti-austerity discourse and successfully encouraging 
collective action (Pagoulatos, Athens 2014). This was especially critical since neither the media 
nor the trade unions in Ireland was able to provide this kind of legitimate discourse, mobilizing 
public against the reforms.  
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6.5.3 The ND-PASOK-Dimar Coalition 
The new government came into power following a period of severe political crisis and the 
extended election period. However, the expectation regarding the formation of a greater 
consensus behind the program policies with the grand coalition government had not materialized. 
Rather than providing the legitimacy for the reforms and support to pro-MoU parties, the 
elections led to a significant political shake-up with extremist parties such as SYRIZA gaining 
popularity. Thus, sharp loss of political support and reconstitution of a determined opposition 
weakened the ability of Greece to undertake the ambitious reforms built into the EFF. The 
reforms were still facing strong resistance not only by the opposition parties but also from the 
bureaucracy and vested interests.143 The violent protests and social unrest were still visible in 
Athens.144  
Thus, the stalemate during the election period and continuing social and political tensions 
made it difficult for the government to speed up the process. The review process that was on hold 
during the elections period, re-started following the formation of the new government. The first 
and second reviews of the program took place between June and October 2012 with four 
different visits of the Fund mission teams to Greece. Although most of the quantitative fiscal 
targets were met, reforms on reducing tax wedge and administration, privatization initiatives and 
meeting the performance criteria for revenue administration and public financial management 
either were missing or delayed considerably. As expected, the government was able to re-start 
reform attempts in product and service market liberalization, the business environment and the 
private sector reforms. These were the areas in which the government does not face significant 
opposition. The implementation problems led to even further weakening of the fundamentals 
such as weaker confidence and tight liquidity conditions (IMF 2013).145  
Given the intense pressures from its donors and the need for the disbursement of the next 
financing to prevent running out of money, the parliament was able to pass €1.35 billion worth 
                                                 
143 There was a significant leadership vacuum. For instance, there had been no Secretary General 
to oversee the tax administration reform for nearly ten months. 
144 For instance, in September, the trade unions organized another 24-hour strike against the 
austerity measures.  
145 The Fund warned about the signs of deepening recession that created further problems for 
fiscal adjustment, increased the debt burden and raised the probability of getting stuck in a weak-
confidence, high-debt and low-growth trap. 
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austerity measures on October 2012146. Amongst the passed legislation were further reduction in 
social benefits, further increases in fuel taxes, complete abolition of the 13th and 14th salaries, 
some further cuts in pensions, further reduction in dismissal notice periods in the private sector 
and the introduction of new taxation legislation. This was actually the fourth round of austerity 
measures in three years. Conditional on the implementation of these reforms, the government 
was able to secure the release of the next installment of the program plan on November 2012 
under favorable repayment terms and including a partial buy-back of the Greek debt. This deal 
was perceived also as mitigating the risk of the Grexit, which had created uncertainty in the 
markets.147 These measures did not have immediate positive effects in the following months. 
Some limited progress was observed in the macroeconomic fundamentals and decline in the 
current account deficit. However, the adjustment was still based on recessionary channels. The 
economy kept contracting during the last quarter of 2012 and unemployment reached nearly 27% 
percent on January 2013, the highest in the Euro. The youth unemployment rose near to 60%.  
During the first half of the 2013, the political situation had remained fragile. The 
governing coalition was able to maintain the support for the program without further party 
defections. However, the continuing long and deep recession as well as very high levels of 
unemployment especially among the youth had prevented political and social tensions from 
cooling down. Implementation problems persisted especially in key fiscal institutional and fiscal 
structural reforms. Reforms in tax and public administration as well as privatization either were 
unsatisfactory or were behind the schedule. The reform attempts in liberalization of closed 
professions and in judiciary were strongly resisted by vested interests.148 One important step was 
                                                 
146 These measures were mainly the austerity package that was agreed on March 2012 but were 
not implemented due to continuing political crisis.  
147 Moreover, given the difficulties in implementation, the TROIKA partners agreed to extend 
the timeline for fiscal adjustment and allowed a recalibration of fiscal measures. The focus of the 
adjustment strategy also shifted from taxes increases (as it was between 2000 and 2012) to 
decreasing expenditures/spending. However, this meant that the cuts would fall mostly again on 
cuts in pensions, wages and social benefits since these constituted nearly three quarters of the 
Greece’s spending. To make this more acceptable to public and reassure that adjustment burden 
to be fairly distributed, the Fund also prioritized the protection of the most vulnerable and aimed 
to match the cuts with immediate efforts to reduce waste in government operations and improve 
tax compliance. 
148 There was progress especially in the liberalization of services and product. However, the 
goals seemed to be short-term oriented rather than creating medium and long term sustainability. 
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taken in privatization with the sale of state’s stake in the betting company OPAP for 712 million 
Euros, which was later not implemented. Secondly, the parliament passed an additional round of 
austerity measures on April 2013 with a bill sanctioning a total 15000 civil service cuts by the 
end of 2014 (5,000 by the end of 2013) and the law that was designed to overturn what had been 
a constitutional guarantee of a job for life law. Lastly, a new minimum wage setting mechanism 
was adopted through which the power to set the statutory minimum wage was shifted from 
employer and union organizations to the government. These secured the installment of €2.8 
billion that was pending since March 2012. 
Following these reforms, another political crisis hit the Greek government. Following the 
closure of the national broadcasting station ERT as a part of fiscal consolidation attempts in June 
2013, the junior coalition partner, the DIMAR withdrew from the government. This left the 
coalition with only a margin of three seats above the 151 minimum seat majority in the 
parliament. This had a dampening impact on the implementation process and led to another 
cabinet reshuffle.149 The problems persisted regarding the reforms in opening up regulated 
professions, liberalizing further trade and transportation sectors, judicial system and anti-
corruption mechanisms. Given the pressures from the creditors and the pressing need for the 
additional financial aid, the Greek parliament narrowly approved the new measures in July 13th, 
including a contentious plan for thousands of layoffs and wage cuts for civil service workers. 
This move secured the release of the first installment of almost €9 billion from the Eurozone 
countries. However, it also led to questions about the stability of the fragile coalition to enforce 
the cuts. Following severe discussions, the bill was passed only after amendments to overcome 
objections by wavering coalition of the lawmakers and by the city mayors over cutbacks to local 
authority.150 
Under intense negotiations within the parliament as well as with the TROIKA regarding 
the size of the budget gap and the target of the budget cuts, the parliament was able to pass the 
2014 budget on December 2013. The new bill introduced a new property tax and auction of 
state-owned houses. However, the implementation of these reforms stalled for nearly seven 
                                                                                                                                                             
Before the conclusion of third review, the government was able to conclude some critical 
reforms. 
149 For details see, http://www.dw.de/greek-cabinet-reshuffle-bolsters-pasoks-role/a-16903375.  
150 One amendment was to exemption provided to workers with more than three children from 
the mobility plan 
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months until the government reached deal with its creditors on economic reforms necessary to 
unlock billions of Euros in crucial rescue funding finally on March 19, 2014151. As a result, the 
parliament narrowly approved a big reform package that would open more retail sectors to 
competition, which secured the release of €8.3 billion on April 2nd, 2014152.  
Starting in early 2014, the Greek economy started showing some positive signs. The 
Fund praised the progress within Greece; going from having the weakest to the strongest 
cyclically adjusted fiscal position within the Eurozone in just 4 years. This was seen as an 
extraordinary achievement by even international standards. The country was also able to produce 
a surplus of about €1 billion on February 2014. It was also poised to grow for the first time after 
six years of recession. There were also signs of recovery with the establishment of more than 
41,000 businesses in 2013. The international credit agencies upgraded Greece’s credit rating153. 
More importantly, the Greek government also was able to return to capital markets through the 
introduction of a new medium-term bond on April 2014. This bond received enthusiastic reaction 
by investors and raised nearly €4 billion from the financial markets. Given this success, the 
government also announced a second bond-selling initiative on July 2014. The fifth review of the 
EFF program was concluded on May 2014.154  
This was the last successful review under the EFF. The political system has still been 
fragile, creating further bottlenecks for the implementation process. The coalition government 
had only two seats to secure majority in the parliament. Both intra-party and inter-party 
opposition to reforms make it difficult to move forward boldly and swiftly, creating significant 
delays. As a result, the Prime Minister Samaras announced another cabinet reshuffle on June 9 
(2014), naming professor Gikas Hardouvelis as the Minister of Finance155. The main anti-
                                                 
151 Pledges to distribute 500 million Euros to Greeks hit hardest by the crisis 
152 Deputy of government's majority was expelled by Samaras, because he didn't support an 
article of the bill.  
153 Fitch rating agency upgrades Greece's credit rating to B from B-.  
154 The Fund highlighted the progress in primary fiscal and external current account balances, 
increasing investor confidence, return to growth and notable acceleration of product and service 
market liberalization as well as reforms in tax administration. However, the Fund also warned 
about the continuing problems in economic fundamentals and political process. The real 
exchange rate remains overvalued and exports outside of the tourism sector are relatively weak. 
Despite the recent developments, many SMEs are still struggling to get loans for their recovery. 
More reforms are needed to address financial sector and public debt, which still remains high. 
155 Despite the strong opposition, the Greeks courts continue to content range of cuts to salaries 
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austerity party, SYRIZA continued to build on the discontent created by the implemented 
measures.156 Continuing domestic political problems and implementation problems have once 
again led to delay of the review of the program. The Fund mission team postponed their visit to 
Athens for the sixth review of the EFF program. After the parliament failed to elect a new 
President by the end of December 2014, the parliament was dissolved. The elections in January 
2015 introduced SYRIZA as the largest party with 36.3% of the vote and 149 out of 300 seats. 
The party Leader Tsipras agreed to form a coalition government with the Independent Greeks.  
The coalition government inherited political problems from the Papandreou government. 
However, this unusual coalition between the ND, PASOK and DIMAR had its own problems 
and weaknesses. Similar to Ireland, this coalition government represented a broad segment of the 
ideological spectrum, from center-right to center and moderate left. However, the legitimacy of 
this government and the broader public support was much more limited. The parties continued to 
respond to their particular constituencies during the implementation process. In particular, during 
the negotiations and implementation, while ND attempted to protect the farmers, DIMAR 
pursued more pro-worker measures and PASOK attempted to block the reforms in the public 
sectors such as collective dismissals (McGrew, Tsokloglou, Peglis157, Athens 2014). The 
DIMAR leader did not meet the IMF officials during their time in the government (McGrew, 
Athens 2014). Especially after the withdrawal of the DIMAR from the government, the coalition 
was left in a much more vulnerable position with only 2 seats to secure majority in the 
parliament.  
Despite these fragile conditions, the ND and PASOK failed to have a constructive 
dialogue and homogeneity within the government. The traditional rivals, forced to work together, 
failed to overcome the historical hostilities as well as the memory of the recent experiences 
(Peglis, Tsakloglou and Pagoulatos, Athens 2014). PASOK was trying to punish the ND for their 
                                                                                                                                                             
and pension and jobs for public employees made by the government over the last four years, 
ostensibly satisfying the demands of creditor.  
156 Not only the polls started showing SYRIZA having a slight edge over New Democracy, the 
party was also able to come first in the European Parliament elections on Many 2014 with 
26.6%. SYRIZA was also able to win the new prefect for Athens whose election represented the 
biggest victory for the party. 
157 Personal Interview with Michael Peglis. Political advisor to the Prime Minister Samaras on 
the TROIKA issues and Deputy Secretary of EU and International Relations with the Greek New 
Democracy party. Athens, September 2014. 
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severe opposition during their term in the government and would not behave cooperatively 
(Peglis, Athens 2014). They created opportunities to differentiate themselves from the ND to 
gain the support of the public with the hope that they would re-gain their position in Greek 
politics (Peglis, Athens 2014). PASOK especially tried to prevent reforms concerning the public 
sector, resulting in delays and problems in the implementation process. At the same time, the ND 
tried to reach a balance between huge public reaction and being a responsible/credible partner to 
the TROIKA. They intentionally did not want to show ownership of the program since 
significant portion of the society did not believe in the program (Peglis, Athens 2014). Thus, 
unlike the Irish coalition that solved their differences in private meetings and stood firm as a 
unified voice against the TROIKA, the Greek government suffered additional weakening of the 
bargaining power due to their divisions.  
These problems within the government also prevented the coalition partners to establish 
effective communication with the domestic stakeholders. SYRIZA continued to capitalize on the 
anti-austerity discontent and provided a legitimate discourse for some of the unions. This 
challenged the government to broaden the ownership of the program and maintain a stable socio-
political environment for implementation. Although the public’s reaction and the activism by the 
trade unions cooled down, the ND/PASOK coalition failed to establish a social dialogue with the 
domestic stakeholders.  
Despite intense pressure from the Eurozone institutions and the IMF and his willingness, 
Greek Prime Minister Samaras had been unsuccessful in his attempts to initiate privatization and 
labor market reforms during his term between 2012-2014. Samaras not only failed to gain 
support from his coalition partners, but he also faced strong resistance from the rising opposition 
party, SYRIZA, within the parliament and from professional organizations and unions outside 
the parliament. Accordingly, Samaras failed to initiate major reforms in the labor market. This 
episode in Greece highlights the right wing government’s difficulties in forming pro-reform 
coalitions. Although a social democratic party, PASOK, was part of the coalition, Samaras still 
faced significant challenges since PASOK and its ministers still tried to appeal to their interests 
of the unions. However, given its record in the first two years of the program, PASOK failed to 
align with the unions. The rise of SYRIZA was critical in appealing to and gaining the support of 
the unions. This is especially critical in in adversarial party systems such as Greece. That is why, 
even single party majority governments led by the right wing parties have failed in many 
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instances to reform the labor market (Alexiadou 2013). As in the case of SYRIZA, the left 
parties would use this opportunity to gain politically, appeal to public and distance themselves 
from the government, even though their vote does not have a significant effect on the passing of 
the bill in the parliament (Alexiadou 2013).    
In summary, unlike PASOK government, which was much more effective in isolating the 
unions and implementing labor market conditionality, right-wing ND faced severe opposition 
both from PASOK and more importantly from SYRIZA. Aligning with the unions, SYRIZA was 
able to limit ND’s ability to pass very ambitious reforms in the labor market.  
6.5.4 The Bureaucratic Process and Public Administration 
The roots of the implementation problems also lie within the unique policy-making structure of 
Greece and relative autonomy of individual ministers in their respective domains (Featherstone 
and Papadimitriou 2013) (McGrew, Athens 2014). Many ministers in the cabinet strongly 
resisted and prevented the implementation of the measures agreed in the parliament. They were 
not seen as fully aware of the severity of the economic reforms, the seriousness of the issues and 
the necessity for the rapid adjustment (Pagoulatos; Folias; Tsakloglou; Geroulanos; Mitsos, 
Athens 2014).158 Even if they saw the necessity of the reforms, they were reluctant to implement 
given the advantage of their operational independence. The Prime Minister or the Minister of 
Finance could not maintain control over individual ministers who continued to respond to their 
own constituencies and their interests (McGrew; Pagoulatos, Athens 2014). In some ministries, 
the attempt was either to pretend implementing the measures or trying to do as little as possible 
given their own domains (Mitsos, Athens 2014).159 Especially in certain areas such as cutting 
down the salaries that were clearly visible/easily observable, the ministers had to implement the 
proposed measures. 160 However, in less visible areas, they used their ministerial autonomy or 
                                                 
158 Many even thought that the crisis would be over in two years. 
159 There are several anecdotal notes regarding the minister’s attempts to stall the implementation 
process. For instance, a minister was noted to attending to meetings with the Fund and promising 
to deliver the reforms but telling the other ministers that they should actually do just the opposite 
as soon as they leave the room.  
160 For instance, one of ministers cited that it was easier to start dismissing the temporary 
workers rather than permanent ones in first wave of budget cuts.  
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administrative process as an excuse or cover to stall the implementation.161 As a result, even 
there was a willingness in the leadership level, the government faced additional challenges due to 
lack of oversight and control mechanisms over individual ministers. This was also critical 
especially when PASOK was part of the coalition and had certain portfolios. PASOK ministers 
used this autonomy to appeal to their constituencies and stall the implementation of reforms. For 
instance, most of the reforms that had significant political costs required signatures by different 
ministers. Thus it could take up to three months to have the approval of different ministers with 
different constituencies and priorities (McGrew, Athens 2014). The process became even more 
complicated with constant reshuffles in the cabinet, leading to a start over. Similarly, even the 
government tried to bypass this process through presidential degrees, the constitution also 
required the legal cases to be heard and approved by the council of state. Thus, these problems 
led to strong implementation problems and delays. This was quite contrary to the political 
circumstances in Ireland in which actually the strong cooperation/coordination between Fine 
Gael and the Labor party led to cohesion in the governmental level. Moreover, individual 
ministers such as Joan Burton even became critical in extending the ownership to a societal level 
by providing a credible point of access for the public sector unions.  
The Greek bureaucracy had also presented two crucial constraints to the implementation 
capacity, namely the inability and unwillingness to reform. Greece had significant administrative 
capacity constraint, especially lack of management oversight mechanisms and monitoring 
systems to track the implementation record and a form of legal formalism that created 
bottlenecks. The Fund was quite surprised when it arrived to Greece to find out that the Greek 
bureaucratic capacity was nothing like an advanced industrialized country but more like a 
developing country (McGrew, Athens 2014). The public sector was quite big, inefficient and full 
of people without necessary capabilities and willingness to do their jobs (McGrew; Geroulanos; 
Folias; Tsakloglou; Athens 2014). Public sector employees did not only have no motivation to 
work and but even resisted. They were unionized and sought protection from their organizations 
(McGrew; Geroulanos; Folias; Tsakloglou; Athens 2014).162 The Greece’s vulnerability to 
                                                 
161 Huge public reaction was important as well since they could not even go to movies due to 
reactions.  
162 In an interview published in Kathimerini, the minister of administrative reform Kyriakos 
Mitsotakis: recognizes the problems in public administration, from previous governments 
appointing staff from their own clienteles with little regard to merit. Both major parties are guilty 
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undertake a number of administratively complex reforms became evident along the process 
especially in relation to reforms in revenue and health/pension administration.  
The Fund and European partners tried to substitute for the inefficiencies and inability of 
the Greek bureaucracy through intensive technical assistance. The Fund’s technical assistance 
covered areas such as revenue administration, public financial management, banking issues, and 
execution of policy and structural reform initiatives (anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, 
judicial reform). The focus was also on the establishment of committees to oversee the structural 
reform work, identify the capacity and willingness constraints and propose the adjustments to the 
program. One example of this was the creation of a body of experts to oversee the privatization 
projects, independent from the political apparatus. The EU also stepped up its efforts to provide 
technical assistance to Greece through its task forces and various EU agencies. Greece has 
become a significant receiver of funds through Partnership Agreements and EU Structural and 
Cohesion Funds.  
On top of these administrative constraints, significant resistance by the bureaucracy had 
made it quite difficult. Even though, the parliament was successful was passing certain 
legislations, there was a significant disconnect between legislation and implementation.163 There 
were various reasons for this. The bureaucracy was called to implement reforms that had been 
undercutting their own wages/pensions and introducing new systems of entry, evaluation and 
promotion (Pagoulatos, Athens 2014). In other words, they were both subject and implementer of 
reforms. Thus, there were not enthusiastic to implement the new legislations and had a strong 
tendency to sabotage the process (McGrew, Athens 2014). Their ties to the vested interests such 
as certain professional groups provided also a point of resistance. 
6.5.5 The interactions between the Fund and the domestic stakeholders 
The Greek program was marked by extreme negative reaction to the structural conditionality and 
                                                                                                                                                             
of this and indulged in pre-election sprees to by votes with public sector jobs. As the former 
Deputy Prime Minister, Theodoros Pangalos put it: ‘everyone ate together’.  
163 For instance, although the Fund praised the efforts in reforming public administration, it also 
indicated its worries of not ensuring exit of redundant or unqualified staff but re-allocation of 
such staff within the public sector. Similarly, some legislations were passed regarding the tax 
administration, significant implementation problems persisted especially in the local levels.  
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lack of domestic ownership.164 Greece was a unique setting for the Fund, with a strong left and 
interest group opposition (Pagoulatos, Athens 2014). Thus, it provided challenges for the 
program design and implementation. Failures of communication and establishing a dialogue as 
well crucial mistakes on both sides intensified these challenges, leading to mutual mistrust 
between the Fund and the Greek officials and domestic stakeholders.165   
The program was written with a top-down approach without initiating any kind of social 
dialogue between the Fund and the government, and between the government and the domestic 
stakeholders. The Fund, without giving any room for negotiation, designed an ambitious 
program that relied on a speedy fiscal adjustment and structural reforms (McGrew, Athens 
2014). However, there was a widespread negative perception of the program goals and proposed 
measures. Many believed that the program was built on wrong foundations, setting 
unrealistically optimistic targets and often imposing unfeasible objectives in the specified 
timeframe (Folias; Geroulanos; Mitropoulos166, Athens 2014). For instance, the chief negotiator 
on behalf of the Greek government, Panos Tsakloglou, criticized the TROIKA approach of 
treating the crisis as a solvency problem but not liquidity one which led to the specific fiscal and 
structural policy measures (Tsakloglou, Athens 2014). He argued that this was a bad recipe and 
the Greek problems required a long-term payment plan with low interest rate loans rather than 
short-term goals and loans (Tsakloglou, Athens 2014).   
The program had not been tailored to the specific Greek economic, political and social 
circumstances (Folias, Pagoulatos, Tsakloglou, Mitsopoulos, Athens 2014). It also did not take 
into account certain necessary measures to ease the extremely negative public reaction. There 
was no prioritization of the objectives and the proposed measures affected every part of the 
society in severe ways.167 The Fund started pushing for costly structural reforms early on even 
                                                 
164 Except the Indonesia program in 2002, the IMF Country Representative McGrew defined 
Greek programme as one of the most extreme negative reaction to the conditionality.  
165 One problem in Greece has already been the problems of interest representation which has 
been dominated by certain groups both within the trade unions and employer organizations. For 
instance, due to lack of access, the most productive parts of the economy such as the tourism 
sector did not have a say on the process and formulation of the policy (Mitsopoulos, Athens 
2014).  
166 Personal Interview with Michael Mistopoulos. Senior Advisor at the SEV. Athens, September 
2014. 
167 For instance, some of the proposed measures set very high standards, even beyond the 
standards that the OECD countries were required to follow. The Fund also started the 
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for the ones that would not materialize in the short term.168 Many believed that the austerity 
measures would not create the positive impacts for the recovery of the Greek economy such as 
initiating growth and attracting capital. Since the initial years of the program did not bring 
positive outcomes, this resulted in further deterioration of the belief in the program objectives 
and policy measures.  
Even the Fund officials admitted their mistakes in the early stages of the programs such 
as pushing for certain structural reforms, overestimating the Greek capacity to implement and 
underestimating the burden of the adjustment on the Greek public (McGrew, Athens 2014).169 
The Fund believed that they could have explored some of issues better, understood the 
constraints, could be more understanding and changed their position (McGrew, Athens 2014). 
Similar discussions were evident regarding the reform in tax amnesties, without a solid 
understanding of the Greek local conditions. Moreover, even for the necessary reforms, the Fund 
was not willing to enforce the implementation or tackle the real sources of structural problems 
(Mitsopoulos; Drakopoulos, Athens 2014). For instance, the need for reforming the public 
administration was evident. However, the Fund’s approach has been to do it through labor 
market reforms and public sector re-structuring and lay-offs. However, these measures were 
inadequate to address the underlying sources of problems such as clientelism and high level of 
corruption.  
                                                                                                                                                             
negotiations and policy implementation with an extreme position such as requiring immediate 
and severe reduction in the minimum wage and cuts of 13th and 14th salaries (Pagoulatos, Athens 
2014). Moreover, the timing of some of the reforms were problematic. The labor market reforms 
such as re-structuring/flexibility/lay-offs were enforced while also decreasing the wages would 
not work. Moreover, still attempting the lay-off public employees with unemployment around 
28% was very challenging (Tsakloglou, Athens 2014). Bimpas also argued that the reforms in 
tax administration created additional burdens to the SMEs. They were copied from the European 
legislations and did not take into account the local (Bimpas, Athens 2014).  
168 The reforms could have been explained better. For instance, some reforms such as on the 
pensions were long term oriented and the benefits would not materialize in the short term. For 
some others, the benefits would appear when the economy recovers such as labor market 
reforms. This should have explained better (Tsakloglou, Athens 2014).  
169 For instance, the Fund officials admitted their lack of understanding the societal impact of the 
introduction of property tax. The Fund introduced the property tax given the belief that it is 
shown to be necessary and beneficial in the advanced economies. However, Greece has a strong 
tradition of investing in properties, especially families providing housing for their children. 
When the property tax was introduced along with cuts in wages/pensions and other tax increases, 
there was a huge public reaction. Neither paying the taxes nor selling the houses were possible 
given the severe loss of household incomes and the collapse of the property markets. 
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One contributing factor to these problems has been the Fund’s failure to communicate its 
program objectives effectively to the broader public, the Greek politicians and relevant 
stakeholders. This could have been achieved through effective communication through the media 
or the meetings with the relevant actors. However, the Fund failed on both fronts. When the 
Fund tried to communicate through the media, their messages either failed to reach to the broader 
public or were distorted (McGrew, Athens 2014). The media even portrayed that it was the MoU 
that brought the crisis rather than the already existing Greek structural problems, contributing to 
the negative public perception and creating difficulties for reform (Tsakloglou, Athens 2014).170 
The trade unions had been alienated from the negotiations and implementation process early on. 
The officials of the major unions, the GSEE and the ADEDY, met only once with the Fund 
officials throughout the program. The unions mainly believed that the Fund came in with an 
agenda, aiming to impose a strong neo-liberal agenda. They did not believe that the Fund had an 
aim of initiating a social dialogue with them. They believed that the Fund’s only aim was to 
secure that their loans would be paid back and did not care about the Greeks or the effect of 
reforms. Only the SEV was able to maintain a fruitful relationship with the Fund. They had 
regular meetings with the Fund on different levels. However, even the SEV officials criticized 
the Fund being very inflexible and unable to target the sources of the problems in the Greek 
economy (Mitsopoulos, Athens 2014). For instance, the SEV officials especially criticized the 
Fund’s approach to public administration and labor market reforms and inability to tackle 
corruption and tax evasion. The SEV eventually contributed to the memorandum since their 
proposals were acknowledged by the Fund and incorporated into the memorandum after the first 
two years of failed IMF reforms.171 The Fund believed that the SEV spoke their language, 
provided valuable source of information, perspective and interesting/informative analysis 
(McGrew, Athens 2014). Thus, there was a huge reaction to the program, its goals and especially 
                                                 
170 The media also served to the interests of various groups. For instance, when the legislation 
regarding the liberalization of milk industry was introduced, although it was beneficial for the 
public through lowering the prices, the industrialists created an important campaign against this 
reform. This also led to a huge public reaction, adding pressure on the Minister of Agriculture 
whom eventually withdrew the legislation.  
171 Tsakloglou argues that the terminology of some of the proposed reforms were too detailed 
and seemed to be written by the SEV. He also argued the SEV had regular meetings with the 
Fund through which they were able to influence the reform agenda (Tsakloglou, Athens 2014). 
The SEV officials also accepted this and argued that they were able to provide effective policy 
solutions and secure access to the Fund. 
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to the Fund from the general public. 
6.5.6 The interaction between the government and the Fund 
The relationship between the Greek government and the TROIKA partners had been 
complicated, involving a huge mistrust as well as various critical mistakes on both sides. The 
European reaction to the global financial crisis and the following Eurozone crisis had been 
characterized by the inability to provide a decisive, coherent and immediate respond.172 When 
the crisis hit Greece, this uncertainty had also been reflected on the European response to the 
Greek crisis. The initial attempt by the Commission and the Ecofin was to ask Greece to design 
its own policy measures to cut its budget to the required 3% level. When the crisis deepened and 
Greece lost its access to the markets, the Europeans agreed to a financial package to support 
Greece. However, several issues remained unresolved creating a never-ending policy shock and 
uncertainty. For instance, in the initial periods, the problems of the Greek debt resurfaced every 
month given the lack of clear support and contradictory statements at the European level.173 The 
ECB refused to accept Greek sovereign bonds as collateral for liquidity provision to commercial 
banks in Greece. This led to further destabilization of the Greek markets. Moreover, the 
European officials consistently failed to address two major issues of debt re-restructuring and the 
                                                 
172 The EU had mixed policy reactions following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008. 
Rather than formulating a policy recipe in the EU level, the European governments initiated 
unilateral policy responses to their own problems. The Irish government acted unilaterally to 
guarantee its banks’ debts, deposits and bonds. Similar actions had been taken by Netherlands 
and Belgium, both governments nationalizing the Fortis Bank. As the crisis deepened further, 
meetings at the European Commission and the EcoFin had intensified as well. Following the 
inter-governmental meetings at the Paris Summit in 2009 and the G20 meetings in London and 
Washington D.C., the US and the EU agreed on a more coordinated response to the crisis. 
However, the specific means of the policies remained unsolved while the EU continued to have 
problems of homogeneity. Lacking the institutional structures to deal with the deepening crisis, 
the EU eventually established the European Financial Stability Mechanism (60 billion, May 
2010) and European Stability Mechanism (500 billion, Oct 2012) to help countries in need. 
These were in addition to the IMF’s European Financial Stability Facility (600 billion Euros). 
173 The European response to the crisis was also highly affected by the negative public opinion 
within the core countries such as Germany and France. The media launched a broad campaign 
against Greeks, who were portrayed as lazy people with high pensions and abundant holiday. 
They were contrasted with hard-working Germans who had to pay with their tax money for their 
failures to make sound fiscal policy.  
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possibility of Grexit.174 The ECB was the most vocal opponent of the debt restructuring arguing 
that a forced PSI would create further problems for banks, growth and contagion across the 
Europe. These were critical in prolonging the crisis. 175 This uncertainty and lack of clear support 
had devastating effects on the Greek implementation willingness/capacity, deepening the 
recession and making the adjustment harder (Tsakloglou, Athens 2014).   
The Fund had critical mistakes in predicting the effect of fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms as well (Wyplosz and Sgherri 2016).176 The Fund constantly revised its growth 
projections downwards. For instance, the Fund’s predictions of primary surplus for 2012 and 
2013 did not materialize. While it predicted a negative inflation rate for 2011, it actually turned 
out to be 3.3%. The Fund also had problems in estimating the effect of internal devaluation on 
exports and more importantly, estimating the effect of the austerity measures on incomes and 
domestic consumption. The Fund later admitted that the calibration of the multiplier effects was 
misconceived which actually increased the adjustment burden on the public (Wyplosz and 
Sgherri 2016).177  
Due to lack of willingness in the government, strong domestic opposition both within and 
                                                 
174 The ECB’s strong position to debt restructuring is evident from a letter that the ECB President 
Trichet addressed to the Greek PM Papandreou on April 7, 2011.  
175 The process was also mired by significant differences of opinion among the TROIKA 
partners. These were reflected on three main issues. The first one was on the size of the fiscal 
gap and the measures to address it. While the Fund believed that the government had optimistic 
projections on the fiscal gap, the EC/ECB supported Greeks and took a more flexible position in 
relation to strictness of the lending rules. It was the Fund pushing for longer-term adjustment and 
fiscal consolidation programme. Secondly, despite the Fund’s warnings given their experience in 
privatization reforms (which generally take long time technically, and financially to materialize), 
the EC was willing to be more flexible due to their optimism. Lastly, the Fund and the European 
officials had differences regarding the pace and content of the structural reforms. The Fund was 
more persistent on issues regarding the labor market and administrative reforms. These 
differences were also evident in the Irish program. However, the Greek officials cited that there 
were intense arguments within the TROIKA in some of the meetings and even they were present 
(Tsakloglou, Athens 2014).  
176 These mistakes had actually been common in the previous Fund arrangements as well. A 
report by the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office in 2003, in its analysis of 133 IMF austerity 
programmes, found that policy makers consistently underestimated the disastrous effects of rigid 
spending cuts on economic growth.  
177 The Fund’s and European authorities’ mistakes were also criticized by famous economists 
such as Stiglitz who argued that the EU was too slow to help Greece and was insufficiently 
supportive of the new government, lacking the willingness to maintain solidarity and establish 
stabilization framework to support countries experiencing economic difficulty.  
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outside the parliament and lack of bureaucratic capacity, Greece had problems in implementing 
structural reforms. This added further pressure on the already problematic relationship between 
the Greek officials and the Fund. The revelations regarding the misreport of the Greek financial 
data put the Greek authorities into a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the Fund. The Fund constantly 
warned the Greek authorities regarding implementation problems and especially the significant 
disconnect between legislation and implementation (McGrew, Athens 2014). Although the 
parliament was able to pass the necessary legislations, strong vested interest and bureaucracy 
resistance either delayed the implementation or was able to reverse the legislation (McGrew, 
Athens 2014).178 These further intensified the mistrust between the Fund and the Greek officials 
that the measures agreed would not be followed (McGrew; Tsakloglou, Athens 2014).  
The government’s interactions with the domestic stakeholders were already broken. The 
deteriorating mistrust and implementation problems had also broken the dialogue between the 
Fund and the government. As it was seen in the Irish chapter, the mutual trust between the Fund 
and the Irish government enabled a relatively smooth implementation process. Although the 
Fund’s interaction with the domestic stakeholders such as the trade unions were not productive, 
the Irish government and especially the Labor party and its ministers were critical in bringing 
them on board. However, lacking this kind of relationship and credibility, the Fund started even 
more intensely enforcing the terms of the deal and placing extra pressure on the implementation. 
The negotiations along the process were always initiated by the Fund, pushing for the maximal 
set of reforms along their own preferences. Lacking the benefit of the doubt or any credibility, 
the Greece government further got away from the minimal set of reforms. The structural 
conditionality became harsher and more detailed to make sure that the Greek officials had no 
escape roots (McGrew, Athens 2014). Despite the lack of popular backing, the Fund continued to 
push for ‘the necessary evils’ even they were not pleasant (McGrew, Athens 2014). They 
developed measures to control the implementation process and did not enable further 
disbursement of loans without making sure that they have the record for implementation.179  
                                                 
178 Especially the reforms in the liberalization of the labor market and professions were 
characterized by stop and go. Examples include the changing the baby formula and liberalization 
of milks both of which were reversed.  
179 Current program interest rate for Greece is 1.82%.  
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6.5.7 The SYRIZA Period 
The SYRIZA-led Greek government came to power with a mandate to end austerity, increase 
minimum wage, reinstate the laid-off public sector employees and re-negotiate the terms of the 
deal. In first couple of months in the office, Prime Minister Tsipras, along with his finance 
minister Varoufakis, stalled implementation of the EFF program. They were especially critical of 
the IMF and blamed the IMF for its mistaken policies (Ekathimerini 2016). Through various 
meetings with the Eurozone finance ministers and institutions, the government tried to negotiate 
a new deal (Guardian 2015). However, unable to service its debt and expiring agreement on 
February 28, the new government signed a four-month extension under severe pressures from the 
TROIKA partners and the threat of Grexit.  
Between March and July 2015, the new government was not able to make any significant 
progress. The SYRIZA government even reversed some of the public sector reforms. For 
instance, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras reinstated the cleaning ladies to their jobs, who were 
protesting outside the finance ministry for 20 months (Reuters 2015). The economic conditions 
continue to deteriorate due to lack of a new agreement. The ECB stopped emergency funding to 
Greece, which had to close banks and impose capital controls to prevent capital flights on June 
2015. In the Eurozone meeting late June, the European partners offered a new plan to Greece. 
However, Tsipras unilaterally broke off negotiations the next day and announced a bailout 
referendum. These led to further deterioration in the Greek as well as global markets, increasing 
the fears that Greece would be forced to leave the Eurozone. Greece also missed two debt 
repayments to the IMF for 1.6 billion euros and 457 million euros late June and mid-July. Over 
61% of the Greek citizens voted against the proposed measures by the Eurozone on July 5th.180  
Following the referendum vote and on the brink of bankruptcy, Tsipras replaced his 
radical finance minister Varoufakis with more moderate left-wing economist, Euclid Tsakalatos. 
The Greek government then made a formal request of a new loan from the ESM on 8 July 2015. 
The Parliament approved the new plan and Greece and Eurozone creditors signed a new program 
of up to €86 billion with the Eurozone creditors on 19 August 2015. However, the IMF has 
refrained from participating in the latest Eurozone bailout. The IMF argues that another financial 
                                                 
180 For details regarding the referendum results: https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-
interactive/2015/jul/05/live-results-greek-referendum 
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package for Greece without further debt relief as unsound and recommends a strategy based on 
combination of structural measures, debt restructuring and financing. IMF’s analysis of debt 
sustainability highlights several conditions for Greece: in order for Greek debt to be sustainable, 
Greece has to maintain a targeted primary surplus of 3.5 for decades.181 However, this would 
only be possible without domestic ownership of program, which Greece lacks.  Thus debt re-
profiling is necessary. Eurozone countries, led by Germany, argue that with proper economic 
reforms, Greece can maintain this growth rate. IMF believes a realistic target is 1.5 percent of 
GDP surplus, along with debt relief and necessary financing. IMF also recommends that Greece 
debt payments should be spread out between 2040-2080 with a fixed interest rate of 1.5, without 
any debt repayments before 2040 (IMF 2016). 
Despite the initial period of stalled implementation and critiques against the austerity 
measures, SYRIZA initiated several rounds of measures on July and August 2015, introducing 
changes to pensions and taxes. During this process, Tsipras reshuffled his cabinet and sacked the 
left wing deputies who voted against the new bailout agreement from the government. Following 
the new agreement, Tsipras resigned and called for new elections on August 2015. SYRIZA 
came first in the elections of September 2015 and formed a new government along with the 
Independent Greeks. The government passed another austerity package on November 2015. Two 
deputies of the government's coalition vote against the measures and they were expelled. 
However, the implementation problems have persisted since the government has a small 
parliamentary majority, which makes it more difficult to deliver the reforms required by 
creditors. Despite the opposition, the SYRIZA government delivered on many requirements 
(Welle 2016). The Eurozone ministers just completed the second review of the program and 
decided to release another €2.8 billion to Greece (Reuters 2016). Especially, significant steps 
have been taken in two controversial reforms: pension and privatization plans that enables a new 
independent authority to manage the funds and tax reforms. 
                                                 
181 The IMF argues that this requires increasing already high taxes, which are levied on a narrow 
base, cutting excessively discretionary spending and public sector reforms, which Greek 
government does not accept. 
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6.5.8 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the politics of program design and implementation in 
Greece. Greece had difficulties in implementing labor market reforms due to strong opposition 
by the strong and militant trade unions. However, analysis of the different governments in 
Greece and their implementation records provide interesting insights about the politics of labor 
market reform. While the left-wing PASOK government was the most successful in 
implementing the reforms and achieving significant fiscal consolidation, the coalition 
government led by the right wing New Democracy had problems in forming a pro-reform 
coalition despite severe pressures by the IMF. Papandreou, who led the PASOK government, 
faced opposition from his party backbenchers who had ties to the trade unions and even from the 
members of his government. However, due to the inability to secure union support and 
backbenchers, Papandreou isolated them from the political process. By using executive orders 
bypassing the parliament, reshuffling his government and even firing some of the party 
backbenchers, Papandreou successfully passed several legislations. On the other hand, coalition 
government led by right wing PM Samaras, failed to form a pro-elite coalition due strong 
resistance from the rising opposition party, SYRIZA, within the parliament and from 
professional organizations and unions outside the parliament. SYRIZA capitalized on this 
opportunity to gain politically, appeal to public and distance themselves from the government, 
even though their vote was not significant on the passing of the bill in the parliament (Alexiadou 
2013). Similarly, its coalition partner, the left-wing PASOK, stalled implementation in various 
areas that affected their core constituency, the public sector workers. These provide additional 
support to the findings in the empirical chapter.  
Despite the problems in the labor market, the Greek governments were able to implement 
the financial sector conditionality more efficiently due to lack of strong financial interests. Prior 
to crisis, the strong government control over the economy was also visible in the financial sector, 
especially in the state-owned financial institutions. However, domestic financial interests were 
not collectively organized and did not have a significant interest group effect. Despite the 
negative socio-political environment, the financial sector conditionality was largely met without 
major setbacks. Several rounds of stress tests and frequent reviews ensured that the banks are 
adequately capitalized. These tests also enabled timely interventions by imposing precautionary 
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capital buffers to respond to declining deposits and regularly mounting non-performing loans 
(Veron 2016). However, the implementation of financial sector conditionality was affected by 
other developments. The reluctance of the European governments and the ECB to provide a clear 
support to Greece, the overall structural failures in the Greek economy and mounting questions 
about the Greek debt restructuring and private-sector involvement put additional pressures on the 
stability of the financial system (Veron 2016). One of the major challenges was the government 
control and interference on the banks prior to the crisis. Accordingly, the IMF has pushed for 
early on for privatization and restructuring of the Greek banks due to government’s poor track 
record of properly managing state-owned banks and managing its own finances (IMF 2011). In 
summary, the implementation of the financial sector aspects of the program was comparatively 
uneventful.  
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
The implementation of structural reforms has been critical for economic recovery and long-term 
sustainable growth for countries under crisis. As one of the main international financial 
institutions responsible for global financial stability, the IMF’s structural conditionality has 
become critical for economic reforms around the globe. However, we still know very little about 
which policies are eventually adopted and how the IMF interacts with struggling countries in 
specific policy areas. This is critical since there is significant variation in the implementation of 
different policies. What accounts for the differences in implementation across countries and 
across policy areas? Why do some countries are more effective in implementing the IMF reforms 
than others, and in some policy areas than others? In this dissertation project, I argue that one of 
the most important sources of this heterogeneity in implementation lies in the strength of 
organized interests who are adversely affected by specific policies and their interaction with their 
respective governments. Due to its distributional consequences, the IMF reforms have resulted in 
strong opposition by organized domestic interests who are adversely affected by these reforms. 
Despite this common occurrence, we still do not have a systematic understanding of the effect of 
strong organized interests on the implementation of IMF structural conditionality.  
 This study provides one of the initial efforts to analyze the disaggregated rates of 
implementation in the IMF Conditionality. By focusing on the implementation of labor market 
and financial sector reforms, the results confirm that a disaggregated approach is fruitful for 
studying the IMF structural conditionality. We can only predict the successful implementation of 
specific policy-related conditions when we know and account for the role of strong organized 
interest groups and stakeholders and their relationship to governments. Accordingly, the 
implementation should be analyzed at a disaggregated level by analyzing specific policy areas in 
which different organized interests have distinct effects.  
 The empirical analysis on the implementation of the IMF labor market reforms provide 
evidence that strong and militant labor has a conditional effect on the implementation through 
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their partisan linkages in democratic borrowers. When faced with increasing number of strikes, 
left governments are more likely to implement labor market reforms than right/center 
governments in non-election years. However, during election years, they respond to strong labor 
and are less likely to implement labor market reforms. These findings provide support to the idea 
that left governments are more capable of building the pro-reform coalitions regarding labor 
market reforms than center/right governments. In fact, left governments not only are able to form 
pro-reform coalitions better than center/right governments but they can do so even when 
organized labor is strong and militant.  
IMF borrowers with stronger financial sectors are more likely to receive financial sector 
conditionality. IMF maximizes conditionality to ensure the stability and transparency of the 
sector, enable access for the foreign institutions, especially the ones from the major stakeholders. 
Moreover, left wing governments on average more likely than the right wing governments to 
receive the financial sector reforms, especially when financial sector is stronger. Left wing 
governments use the IMF conditionality to weaken financial sector interests in the design stage. 
When the financial sector is important for the borrowing country economy, the implementation 
of the financial sector conditionality significantly decreases. Although partisan politics matter 
during the design of financial sector conditionality, unlike the trade unions, the effect of the 
financial interests is not mediated by the partisan politics and democratic institutions due to lack 
of broader electoral appeal and mobilization capacity in the implementation stage. Their effect 
operates through their importance and control over the economy irrespective of regime type and 
government ideology. These findings build on the previous literature that identifies the effect of 
organized interests on the design of conditionality (Caraway, Rickard et al. 2012).  
Case studies on the implementation of the IMF programs in Ireland and Greece further 
highlight the importance of domestic interest groups. These detailed cases provide nuanced 
insights related to determinants and consequences of IMF programs in democratic regimes and 
politics of economic reform in Europe. While Ireland has successfully concluded its program, 
successive Greek governments faced a difficult political environment and strong opposition. This 
is explained by the strength of the organized interests in Ireland and Greece.  
The Irish experience provides several interesting insights regarding the implementation of 
financial sector and labor market reforms. First, the Irish financial sector has been relatively 
weak and did not have significant influence over the government. Thus, the implementation of 
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the financial sector reforms was not significantly opposed. However, the analysis of the 
interaction between the financial sector, debtors such as the mortgage borrowers in the country 
and the government provides insights regarding particular contentions with respect to the 
financial sector reforms. The analysis also highlights the role of the bureaucracy and the intricate 
legislative processes that might lengthen the implementation of the reforms. Secondly, the unions 
in Ireland have not been strong and militant. Despite their weaknesses, the unions were able to 
gain concessions through their links to the minority party in the government, the Labor Party. 
The empirical analysis on the labor market suggests that the right wing governments would find 
it easier to implement labor market reforms when they do not face significant opposition, 
especially in non-election years. The analysis of the Irish program supports this expectation. 
However, it also highlights the unique role of the Labor Party and social partnership process in 
Ireland that enabled the unions to have access to policy-makers. Accordingly, it highlights the 
structure of the labor market coordination and its mediating effect on the organized interests, 
which is not common in typical IMF borrowers.  
Moreover, the focus on the implementation records of different governments in Greece 
provides interesting insights about the politics of labor market reform. While the left-wing 
PASOK government was the most successful in implementing the reforms and achieving 
significant fiscal consolidation, the coalition government led by the right wing New Democracy 
had problems in forming a pro-reform coalition despite severe pressures by the IMF. 
Papandreou, who led the PASOK government, faced opposition from his party backbenchers 
who had ties to the trade unions and even from the members of his government. However, due to 
the inability to secure union support and backbenchers, Papandreou isolated them from the 
political process. By using executive orders bypassing the parliament, reshuffling his 
government and even firing some of the party backbenchers, Papandreou successfully passed 
several legislations. On the other hand, coalition government led by right wing PM Samaras, 
failed to form a pro-elite coalition due strong resistance from the rising opposition party, 
SYRIZA, within the parliament and from professional organizations and unions outside the 
parliament. SYRIZA capitalized on this opportunity to gain politically, appeal to public and 
distance themselves from the government, even though their vote was not significant on the 
passing of the bill in the parliament (Alexiadou 2013). Similarly, its coalition partner, the left-
wing PASOK, stalled implementation in various areas that affected their core constituency, the 
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public sector workers. Despite the problems in the labor market, Greece governments were able 
to implement the financial sector conditionality more efficiently due to lack of strong financial 
interests.  
The SYRIZA government under the leadership of Tsipras provided the most significant 
challenge to implementation given its constituency. By reversing some of the lay-offs from the 
public sector such as reinstating the cleaning ladies and reopening of the ERT, Tsipras 
government attempted to renegotiate the conditions of the bailout, especially the ones on the 
labor market, spending cuts and privatization. However, as a result of the intense pressure at the 
European level, the threat of Grexit and severe economic conditions, Tsipras had to sign a third-
bailout program, which included passing of many legislations requiring public sector, social 
security system and privatization reforms. Tsipras even reshuffled his ministers, fired some of 
the dissidents within his own party and successfully negotiated additional rounds of austerity 
with the Eurozone partners despite continuing strikes and protests.  
 This study also raises several important questions regarding the effect of IMF programs. 
Highlighting the differences in implementation of specific policies under the conditionality 
requirements, the effect of implementation or therefore lack of it on certain economic outcomes 
still remains to be investigated. We need to have a systematic understanding of the IMF’s effect 
on domestic economy by integrating the implementation records in specific policies. Do the 
governments that implement the IMF structural conditionality perform better than the ones that 
do not? Does implementation in certain areas contribute to economic growth more than others? 
How should governments prioritize strategies during economic crisis? These questions are 
relevant in understanding the politics of reform during economic crisis and the IMF’s 
effectiveness in introducing change in the borrowing countries.  
 The case studies raise an important question regarding compatibility of the IMF programs 
with democratic institutions. Most importantly, to the extent that the IMF conditions go against 
citizens' and organized interests’ policy preferences, the success of implementing IMF conditions 
might be a proxy of the loss of sovereignty in a globalized and inter-connected economy. The 
Irish government had strong support of the public and maintained social cohesion. However, the 
Greek governments, under severe pressures from the international actors, acted against the public 
will, demonstrated by their strong reactions. More importantly, the consequences of the austerity 
measures are severe in Greece. Some scholars even compare the Greek program to the Treaty of 
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Versaille. For instance, Galbraith writes that “Germany lost its merchant marine, its rolling 
stock, its colonies, and its coal; Greece has lost its seaports, its airports — the profitable ones — 
and is set to sell off its beaches, the public asset that is a uniquely Greek glory. Private 
businesses are being forced into bankruptcy to make way for European chains; private citizens 
are being forced into foreclosure on their homes. It’s a land grab” (Galbraith 2016) The mistakes 
by the IMF and the Eurozone institutions in dealing with the Greek Crisis are severely criticized. 
This in turn calls for a debate regarding the compatibility between democracy and IMF 
conditionality on the one hand and accountability/transparency of the international institutions on 
the other.  
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
A.1 LIST OF INTERVIEWS IN IRELAND 
1) Jack O’Connor, General President, Services, Industrial Professional & Technical Union 
(SIPTU). 110 minutes interview in Dublin on April 2, 2014. 
2) Shay Cody, General President, IMPACT. 45 minutes interview in Dublin on April 3, 2014. 
3) David Begg, General President, Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU). 30 minutes interview in 
Dublin on April 3, 2014. 
4) Peter Breuer, Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund, the IMF Country 
Representative to Ireland. 60 minutes interview in Dublin on April 7, 2014. 
5) Niahm Hardiman, Associate Professor, University College Dublin. 120 minutes interview in 
Dublin on April 4, 2014. 
6) Michael Breen, Lecturer, Dublin City University. 60 minutes interview in Dublin on April 9, 
2014. 
7) Kevin Foley, Chief Conciliator of Labour Relations Commission. 45 minutes interview in Dublin 
on April 9, 2014. 
8) Colm O'Reardon, Economic Advisor at Office of the Tanaiste; Advisor and Director of Policy at 
Office of the Leader of the Labour Party. 60 minutes interview in Dublin on April 8, 2014. 
9) Feargal Ó’ Brolcháin, Principal Officer, External Programme Compliance Unit, Department of 
Finance. 60 minutes interview in Dublin on April 10, 2014. 
10) Michelle Murphy, Social Justice Ireland. 65 minutes interview in Dublin on April 4, 2014. 
11) Ashok Vir Bhatia, Senior Economist at the International Monetary Fund (Chair of Irish Mission 
Team). 60 minutes interview in Dublin on May 18, 2014. 
12) Jochen Andritzky, Economist at the International Monetary Fund (Member of the Mission Team 
to Ireland). 60 minutes interview in Dublin on May 18, 2014. 
13) Podrig Yeates, Independent Writing and Editing Professional (was consultant to SIPTU and used 
to work for Irish Times). 80 minutes interview in Dublin on April 1&2, 2014. 
14) Rory O’Donnell, Director, National Economic and Social Council of Ireland (NESC). 60 
minutes interview in Dublin on April 1, 2014. 
15) Danny McCoy, CEO, IBEC. 35 minutes interview in Dublin on April 7, 2014. 
16) Craig Beaumont, Assistant Director of the European Department at the IMF and the Mission 
Chief to Ireland. 60 minutes interview in Washington D.C., August 2016. 
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17) Patrick Honohan, Former Governor of Irish Central Bank (2009-2015). 60 Minutes in interview 
in Washington D.C., September 2016.  
 
 
A.2 LIST OF INTERVIEWS IN GREECE 
1) Michael Peglis. Political advisor to the Prime Minister Samaras on the TROIKA issues and 
Deputy Secretary of EU and International Relations with the Greek New Democracy party. 30 
minutes personal interview in Athens on September 19, 2014. 
2) Michael Mitsopoulos. Senior Advisor at the SEV. 60 minutes personal interview in Athens on 
September 19, 2014. 
3) George Pagoulatos. Former Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Lucas Papademos and Director 
of Strategy at the Prime Minister’s Office (11/2011-6/2012); Professor of European Politics and 
Economy at the Athens University of Economics & Business. 30 minutes Skype interview on 
November 2, 2014. 
4) Panos Tsakloglou. Chief Negotiator and Professor of International and European Economic 
Studies, Athens University of Economics and Business. 60 minutes personal interview in Athens 
on September 19, 2014. 
5) Pavlos Geroulanos. Former Minister of Culture and Tourism from PASOK (2009-2012). 45 
minutes personal interview in Athens on September 18, 2014. 
6) Christos Folias. Former Minister of Development (2007-2009) and Deputy Minister of Economy 
and Finance (2004-2007) from the ND. 90 minutes personal interview in Athens on September 
16, 2014. 
7) Achilleas Mitsos. Former Director-General for Research in the European and former Secretary 
General for Research and Technology in the Greek Education Ministry 2009-2011. minutes 
personal interview in Athens on September 17, 2014. 
8) Wes McGrew. The IMF Resident Representative in Greece. 60 minutes personal interview in 
Athens on September 17, 2014. 
9) Dimitris Bimpas. Economist at IME (Foundation of the Hellenic World). 45 minutes personal 
interview in Athens on September 19, 2014. 
10) Georgios Drakopoulos. Director General for the Assoication of Greek Tourist Enterprises and 
Member at the European Economic and Social Committee. 45 minutes personal interview in 
Athens on September 16, 2014. 
11) Spyros Blavoukas. Assistant Professor at the Department of International and European 
Economic Studies, at the Athens University of Economics and Business. 60 minutes personal 
interview in Athens on September 18, 2014. 
12) Dimitrios Katsoudas. Chief speech-writer of former PM  K. Mitsotakis and Dora Bakoyiannis 
(former ND MP and Leader of the Democratic Alliance party). 40 minutes personal interview in 
Athens on September 18, 2014. 
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APPENDIX B 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS  
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Labor Market Analysis 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor Market 
Implementation 292 0.338 0.341 0 1 
# of Labor Market 
Conditions 389 3.355 4.038 0 28 
Strikes  346 0.26 0.825 0 8 
Left 362 0.213 0.41 0 1 
Strikes*Left 341 0.094 0.611 0 8 
GDP Growth 384 2.85 4.844 -30.9 16.729 
Inflation 361 19.578 82.255 -1.146 1058.374 
Unemployment 384 12.092 7.332 0.9 39.3 
UNSC Member 389 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Political Constraints 360 0.388 0.157 0 0.684 
Total Debt to GDP Ratio 280 7.498 8.604 0.084 135.376 
Trade of GDP 388 80.572 38.139 14.731 321.632 
Bureaucracy 314 2.03 0.756 0 4 
Programs with Labor Market 
Conditionality-Percent 387 0.721 0.105 0.511 0.914 
Programs with Labor Market 
Conditionality-Total 387 39.463 14.11 7 60 
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Table 7. Number of Missing Observations in the Labor Market Analysis 
 
 
Missing Total 
Strikes 51 369 
Political 
Constraints 33 387 
Bureaucracy 96 324 
Total Debt to 
GDP Ratio 134 286 
Inflation 29 391 
Trade of GDP 2 418 
GDP Growth 6 414 
Unemployment 23 397 
Strikes*Left 68 352 
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Table 8. Labor Market Implementation-Heckman Models   
 
 Second stage 
(Outcome 
Equation): 
Full 
Sample 
Non-
Election  Election 
Strikes -0.053 -0.106** 0.052 
 
-0.034 -0.044 -0.057 
Left -0.124** -0.117 -0.051 
 
-0.057 -0.073 -0.087 
Strikes*Left 0.079* 0.130** -0.190* 
 
-0.046 -0.054 -0.106 
GDP Growth  -0.007 0.012* 
0.002 
 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Unemployment 0.002 0.000 0.012** 
 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.006 
UNSC Member 0.069 0.125** 0.064 
 
-0.076 -0.1 -0.109 
Political 
Constraints -0.078 -0.112** -0.22 
 
-0.125 -0.155 -0.206 
Debt 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
Trade % of GDP 0.000 0.000 0.002 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Bureaucracy -0.023 -0.042 -0.004 
 
-0.03 -0.037 -0.055 
period 0.249 0.164 0.607 
 
-0.335 -0.419 -0.535 
period 2 -0.136 -0.11 -0.279 
 
-0.143 -0.181 -0.216 
period 3 0.016 0.014 0.031 
 
-0.018 -0.024 -0.027 
Constant 0.38 0.546 -0.206 
 
-0.262 -0.313 -0.415 
# of Observations 265 187 78 
Mills  -0.111 0.027 0.089 
Lambda 0.17 0.195 0.205 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Labor Market Implementation- Random and Fixed Effect Models  
  1) Full Sample 
2) Non-
Election 
3) 
Election 
4) Full 
Sample 
5) Non-
Election 
6) 
Election 
   
  
   Strikes -0.036 -  0.091** 0.085* -0.045 -0.104* 0.159*** 
 
-0.03 -0.044 -0.047 -0.037 -0.058 -0.051 
Left -0.029 -0.049 0.078 -0.076 -0.079 0.143 
 
-0.077 -0.1 -0.092 -0.094 -0.131 -0.106 
Strikes*Left 0.034 0.101* -0.310*** 0.034 0.015 -0.442*** 
 
-0.059 -0.059 -0.109 -0.069 -0.141 -0.149 
GDP Growth -0.005** -0.006* -0.001 -0.005* -0.008* 0.009 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Unemployment -0.004 -0.003 0.006 -0.012 -0.013 0.017 
 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.017 -0.026 
UNSC Member 0.203** 0.189 -0.004 0.197* 0.149 -0.237 
 
-0.093 -0.135 -0.154 -0.103 -0.153 -0.151 
Trade % of GDP 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004** 0.004 0.002 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 
Debt 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.01 
Bureaucracy 0.006 -0.026 0.036 0.009 -0.025 0.071 
 
-0.038 -0.044 -0.049 -0.057 -0.072 -0.108 
Political 
Constraints -0.088 0.000 -0.28 -0.269 -0.116 -0.113 
 
-0.169 -0.16 -0.32 -0.205 -0.235 -0.399 
period 0.23 0.031 0.6 0.273 0.11 0.562 
 
-0.301 -0.392 -0.485 -0.296 -0.418 -0.502 
period 2 -0.122 -0.034 -0.311* -0.144 -0.069 -0.301 
 
-0.118 -0.158 -0.187 -0.115 -0.169 -0.191 
period 3 0.012 0.002 0.037* 0.015 0.007 0.036 
 
-0.014 -0.019 -0.022 -0.014 -0.021 -0.022 
Constant 0.303 0.533* -0.048 0.184 0.354 -0.3 
 
-0.278 -0.32 -0.425 -0.369 -0.472 -0.578 
# of Observations 265 187 78 265 187 78 
# of Countries 42 41 30 42 41 30 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 10. Summary Statistics for Financial Sector Analysis 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Financial Sector 
Implementation 1,228 0.339 0.369 0 1 
Financial Sector Conditionality 1,715 0.716 0.451 0 1 
Capital Stock 1,513 2.885 1.465 0.152 9.568 
Left Government 1,606 0.281 0.45 0 1 
Capital Stock*Left 1,479 0.896 1.657 0 9.568213 
Democracy 1,715 0.443 0.497 0 1 
Political Constraints 1,636 0.263 0.202 0 0.684 
Bureaucracy 1,269 1.524 0.841 0 4 
GDP Growth 1,693 4.295 5.545 -36.047 66.58 
GDP Per Capita 1,697 1800.037 4050.571 113.706 61097.91 
Inflation 1,514 14.823 65.162 -10.067 1877.372 
Capital Account Openness 1,149 0.034 1.456 -1.757 2.532 
Trade of GDP 1,665 73.549 39.322 14.731 504.884 
Debt 1,552 4.832 5.806 0.046 135.376 
UNSC Temporary Member 1,715 0.044 0.206 0 1 
Non-Performing Loans 464 12.498 10.838 0.8 74.1 
Bank Concentration 973 72.616 19.667 27.543 100 
% of Foreign Banks 222 52.261 31.155 0 100 
Credit to State Insti.  1,499 6.751 7.796 0.005 54.494 
Total Access 1,715 790.89 2993.598 0 27375 
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Table 11. Number of Missing Observations in the Financial Sector Analysis 
 
 
Missing Total 
Capital Stock 202 1,513 
Political Constraints 79 1,636 
Bureaucracy 446 1,269 
GDP Growth 22 1,693 
GDP Per Capita 18 1,697 
Inflation 201 1,514 
Capital Account Openness 566 1,149 
Trade of GDP 50 1,665 
Debt 163 1,552 
Non-Performing Loans 1251 464 
Bank Concentration 742 973 
% of Foreign Banks 1493 222 
Credit to State Insti.  216 1,499 
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